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Abstract
Democracy and Constitutional Recognition?
Does modern democracy require social cohesion? Is the nation-state
the answer to this need? Is the constitutional protection of republican
values enough? In Europe, the template of the national state bounded
by a liberal constitution has provided the answer to these questions.
However, authors like Habermas and Tully argue that the idea of a
substantive relation between a homogeneous national-population and
the constitutional state is stretched to its limits by pluralism and
globalisation. On the one hand, pluralism pushes the template of the
nation-state, which assumes the ethnic uniformity of the population
under the umbrella of a republican constitution, to its limits. On the
other hand, international organisations like the United Nation and the
European Union have taken the role of guarantor of republican values.
Habermas proposes a new solution to the problematic relation
between republican values and democracy. He asserts that a new
model of social cohesion is needed: a democratic society should be
founded exclusively on the acceptance of a system of constitutionally
established rules which are the logical result of the historical evolution
of constitution making. In contrast with Habermas, Tully argues that a
democratic process based on the acceptance of liberal values will
provide the template for a modern multinational society. In this thesis,
2
I will point out the democratic incoherence and the internal
shortcomings of these alternatives to the nation-state, and I shall argue
that a theoretical substitute of the national state should radically re¬
consider the role of national identities in a modern pluralistic society.
Constitutional law can be more than formally legal only if two
normative conditions are satisfied: public discourse exists in the
public sphere and the legal system includes the recognition of
multinationalism. Thus, certain demands originating from national
identities will not pass the rationality test of a democratic debate. The
point is, however, that this can be considered as a normative
presupposition in the public sphere only after discussion and it would
not exclude the possibility of a constitutional system which promotes
and defends national identity/ies.
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What is nationalism? What is its relation with constitutional
democracy? These questions will accompany us in this thesis.
However, the role of the two queries will be different. In what
follows, the first query will be suspended. It will keep coming back,
but the reader will not find in the text a substantive answer. This will
frustrate cosmopolitans and some nationalists. How can we
understand the role of nationalism in modern democracy without first
knowing what nationalism is? Should we consider only Civic
nationalism? Like the one Tony Blair seems to endorse here:
"There are issues ofdemocratic accountability in
Europe - the so called democratic deficit. But we
can spend hours on end, trying to devise aperfect
form of European Democracy and get nowhere.
The truth is, the primary sources of democratic
accountability in Europe are the directly elected
and representative institutions of the nations of
Europe - national parliaments and governments.
That is not to say Europe will not in future
generations develop its own strong demos or
polity, but it hasn't yet. And let no-one be in any
doubt: nations like Poland, who struggled so
10
hard to achieve statehood, whose citizens shed
their blood in that cause, are not going to give it
up lightly.
Or, should our analyses include the ideological interpretation of
nationalism like the one suggested by Savigny and Herder?
There are two reasons for not engaging in this issue. First, modern
constitutional democracy does not need to know which are the
substantive motivations that support a political claim. The debate over
the meaning of nationalism and the reason for supporting the
protection of its role in modern democracy is a dynamic political issue
that cannot be solved by a single constitutional norm or by a
constitutional theory such as federalism. In what follows, I will
explain that the theory of constitutional democracy should set the
procedural limits within which a political solution, such as defining
the role of nationalism in modern democracy, can be retrieved. In
other words, I argue that the tension between nationalism and
constitutional democracy cannot be dissipated in a definitive
constitutional solution such as federalism and 'subsidiarity'. It is a
common mistake to use constitutional norms as reference for forcing
political solutions unsupported by a democratic debate. I will argue
that this is the error shared by liberals such as Laden2 and republicans
T. Blair, Check against Delivery (Warsaw: 2000).
2
A. S. Laden, Reasonably Radical : Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2001).
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such as Habermas3 on their analysis of the relationship between
nationalism and constitutional democracy. By rejecting these
interpretations of the role of nationalism in modern democracy, we
have to seek an alternative theory which allows the constitutional
recognition of national identities and protects democracy.
Second, there are various interpretations of nationalism. By taking one
as a normative criterion for developing a constitutional theory (which
allows its democratic inclusion or exclusion), we promote social and
political homogenisation. In the last decade, nationalism has spread
throughout Europe. In the former communist countries, nationalism
has revived ethnic divisions which we thought were confined to
history books, and on the rest of the continent the new-left has
endorsed ethnicity as a functional linkage between population and
democracy. This nationalist revival has prompted a multitude of
studies on the role of nationalism in modern society. The aim of these
studies is to find out the relation between nationalistic claims and the
future of European integration. Authors such as Keating,4
MacCormick,5 and Miller4' to name just a few, and institutions such the
3
J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 -27.
4
M. Keating, "So Many Nations, So Few States: Territory and Nationalism in the Global Era", in ed/s J.
Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39-
65.
5
N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Law. State and Nation in the European Commonwealth.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
D. Miller, On Nationality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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European Commission7 have produced various proposals that try to
accommodate a legal protection of national identity with European
integration. Nevertheless nationalism, both at national and regional
level, is either interpreted as an irrational social phenomenon which
supports antidemocratic political claims (e.g. Habermas) or it is
considered a substantive aspect of modern politics which guarantees
the political stability of the polity (e.g. Canovan8 and Weiler9). These
studies, which greatly diverge in their conclusions, adopt the same
methodological structure. First, they adopt a definition of nationalism
which they consider truthful (e.g. nationalism is a set of irrational
mental images) and link it to some political issues (e.g. protection of
minorities or the right of self-determination). Next, they elaborate a
theory grounded on this definition. Finally, they test the theory on the
solution of the political issues considered associated with their chosen
definition of nationalism.
In contrast with the methodology of these studies, I argue that there is
relatively little research on the role of national identities in modern
constitutional democracy. If we accept that nationalism is part of
modern democracy, should we accept that all its claims are discussed
in the political arena? It is important to answer these questions.
Discussion over political issues produce effects on a polity
7
European Commission, European Governance Debate. 2002. Ht lm. Available:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/contributions/index_en.htm.
8
M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).,
9
J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe : "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other
Essays on European Integration. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), J. H. H. Weiler, "The
Promised Constitutional Land." Kings College Law Journal 12/1 (2001), 5-16
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independently from the outcomes of the debate. The democratic arena
has the function of making people aware of any political issue raised
by the members of the polity, but this amplification is strategically
used by political entities for gathering support for antidemocratic
demands.
Nationalists argue that there are no alternatives to the sense of sharing
a common identity, which ties democratic political decisions to single
members of the national community. This idea supports the political
model of the present day nation-state and its right of international self-
determination. The fact that we all reside in this political form of
association is often taken for granted, but Habermas explains how in
the eighteenth century the nation-state superseded the Empire which
was the most common political form of political association and
helped the formation of the modern constitutional democracy. The
template of the nation-state, which we have inherited from the
development of the nation state, is grounded on the idea of ethnic
uniformity of a population under the umbrella of a republican
constitution. This allows the separation between members and aliens;
between 'us' and 'them'.
This supposition is blatantly counterfactual. There is not such a thing
as a uniform ethnic community within a modern state. Even the
27,000 residents of the republic of San Marino cannot claim ethnic
14
homogeneity; but this is a trivial point. The issue here is that the
concept of one single nation-state cannot develop the basic function of
constitutional democracy: the creation of social integration. In this
aspect, modern democracy is different from ancient democracy where
decisions were taken with the participation of all free members of an
ethnically homogeneous community. Modern constitutional
democracy is based on the assumption that indirect democracy
practically guarantees the linkage between different national groups
and their representatives. However, nationalists argue that democratic
participation by itself cannot make people obey the decisions taken in
the political arena. To guarantee the individual's commitment to
decision arising from a majority, we need to share a sense of
belonging which normatively precede the legitimacy of the democratic
process; this is provided by nationalism.
However, the logic of linking the shared social sense of belonging to
the national community, and then to the individual's loyalty to the law
is problematic. By assuming that nationalism is the link between
legality and state stability, the nation-state aprioristically excludes
those who refuse to conform to the given model of political
association. This, I agree with Habermas, drives the template of the
nation-state into an irresolvable legitimation crisis. To solve this
problem, he argues that the sense of "community" in a democratic
society should be founded exclusively on the acceptance and support
10
NationMaster.com, Encyclopaedia: Demographics of San Marino, 2004,
Available: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Demographics-of-San-Marino
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of a system of constitutionally established rules, which are the logical
result of the historical evolution of republicanism. An account of the
constitutional process which was the catalyst the formation of the
modern state should provide the criteria for a rational set of norms
which will exclude nationalism from the political arena. Even if I
agree with Habermas, when he points out the normative problems of
linking the state apparatus to a national identity, I do not share his
conclusions."
In contrast with Habermas I argue that ah modern states are
multinational, and nationalist claims cannot only be considered as
elements of the democratic process. I suggest that the state should
acknowledge national identities and provide a procedure for allowing
their claims into the debate. This hypothesis is unpersuasive in one
crucial matter. Which are the political limits of nationalism in modern
democracy? The answer to this question has pragmatic implications:
Should we accept that a white national minority can exclude black
people from democracy? Should we accept that female members of a
nation have no political rights since this conforms to the tradition of
that national identity? Should we reject democracy and adopt a
I lis idea of constitutional patriotism is theoretically precarious and democratically inconsistent. His
hypothesis stimulated an array of critiques focused on the weakness of a community restricted by a
constitutional agreement. In contrast with these critiques, I will argue that Habermas' proposal
aprioristically excludes political entities from the political arena. By a priori ruling out these entities, he
reduces the democratic coherence of the political decision making process.
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military regime on the grounds that this better represents our national
aspiration?12
The dilemma here is that, on the one hand, we want to protect our
democracies from the abuse of extremist groups, yet on the other
hand, if the process of recognition of national identity is limited by
some narrow minded procedural limitations, national identities will
feel unrepresented by the decisions taken in the political arena.
Obviously, this paradox cannot be theoretically solved but I will
suggest pragmatic responses to it.
This thesis divided into 6 chapters. In the first chapter, I will
introduce the terminology, which I will use throughout the thesis. I
explain, with the help of Habermas, why we need an alternative model
to the nation-state. The template of the modern nation combines
liberalism with the assumption that we live in an ethnically uniform
community. The sense of belonging to the national community
supports the system of basic rights and freedoms of modern liberal
societies. Habermas makes clear that linking democracy to a system of
substantive values is irrational." He argues that the substantive
relationship between the state and nationalism is a precarious
historical fabrication which cannot solve the tension within a socially
The referendum which annexed Austria to Hitler's Germany is an historical example of how a
democratic community can democratically decide to degenerate into a dictatorship.
13
This claim was firstly elaborated by Habermas in his Legitimation Crisis. He argues that in society
based on the protection of private interests will be unavoidably divided between those 'who have' and
those 'who have not'. This tension between people and a legal system which protects private interest
cannot be solved by the sense of belonging to the national community. J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,
(London: Heinemann, 1976), J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), 4), J. Habermas, Toward a
Rational Society : Student Protest. Science and Politics. (London: Heinemann Educational, 1971).
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divided capitalistic society. In chapter 2, I will continue on the same
methodological path as followed by Habermas. I will explain that,
even if I agree with his analysis of the lack of a substantive
relationship between the state and nation, he cannot use an historical
analysis for labelling nationalism as an irrational political
phenomenon. This has to do with the relativism of his historical and
sociological account. Taking from the examples provided by modern
political theorists, such as MacCormick14 and Miller,15 I will explain
how these authors starting from the same sociological analyses arrive
at an opposite solution. The problem here is that little is known about
the relationship between socio-political movements and rationality
and what we known suggest that one cannot label nationalism as an
irrational political movement.
In the third chapter, I will analyse Habermas' template for a
constitutionally patriotic state. I argue that Habermas cannot exclude a
political stance without endangering the republican values he intends
to defend. I will test against the liberal template of the nation-state and
we will analyse the theoretical and pragmatic effects of aprioristically'"
excluding nationalism from the political arena. For instance, I will
discuss how constitutional patriotism would settle the hypothetical
case of a land dispute between a Palestinian and a Jewish settler, the
14
N. MacCormick, Can Nationalism Be Intellectually Respectable?. 1991), N. MacCormick, The English
Constitution, the British State and the Scottish Anomaly. 2000).
15
D. Miller, "Bounded Citizenship", in ed/s R. Dannreuther, Cosmopolitan Citizenship. (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999),
16
In what follow, 1 will use the term apriori with the meaning: Derived by or designating the process of
reasoning without reference toparticularfacts or experience.
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protection of minorities and the democratic deficit of the European
Union.
In the fourth chapter, I argue that nationalism is an axiological
element of modern society which can demand the constitutional
recognition of its role in modern society. I will draw this idea from
Tully's theory of constitutional multinationalism, which explains that
a process of recognition is a multiphase dialogue between members of
the national group and its 'aliens'. The typical phases of this process
include an internal debate within the community which might lead to a
referendum. In the fifth chapter, I will explain the limits of Tully's
theory of multinationalism. I argue that his idea of adopting Laden's
political liberalism as a template for accommodating nationalistic
demands is incoherent. I will use again the same examples I proposed
in the third chapter to clarify the effects of political liberalism in the
process of recognising a national identity.
In the sixth chapter, I will explain that constitutional
multinationalism cannot normatively solve some of the dilemmas
related to the recognition of a national identity, such as: can we limit
the process of constitutional recognition of national identity? Are all
national groups entitled to national self-determination? However, it
suggests some procedures for allowing a democratic debate over these
issues. This solution seems a combination of Habermas'
communicative democracy and Tully's constitutional
multinationalism. On the one hand, I accept that open deliberative
19
democracy is the only procedure which can link democratic decisions
to the individual subjected to these decisions. Any derogation to this
procedure is at the expense of democratic coherence and legitimacy.
On the other hand, national groups are political entities which have to
be constitutionally recognised. This is the result of the democratic
process. I conclude by arguing that a democratic society should be
founded exclusively on the acceptance of a system of constitutionally





CLARIFYING THE MEANING OF TERMS AND
SETTING THE FRAME OF THE DEBATE
As I mentioned in the introduction the final aim of this thesis is to
propose an analysis of the relationship between nationalism and
constitutional democracy. Before starting the elaboration of this, we
have to do two methodological tasks. Firstly, I have to clarify the
terms which I will use throughout the thesis by providing some basic
'working definitions'. These definitions should not be considered
normative presuppositions, but only theoretical devices for opening
the discussion over the role of nationalism in modern democracy. I
will go back to this point on chapter five when we will discuss the use
of words in a political theory - at least Wittgenstein's interpretation of
it 17 -, for now it is important to provide the reader with some basic
definitions to explain my interpretation of the role of nationalism in
modern democracy. Secondly, if a study seeks to analyse the role of
nationalism in modern constitutional states, it must explain which
17
L. Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). See
in particular: J. Tully, "Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity." Political Theory 30/4 (2002), 533-55
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elements of the relationship between the two are relevant. This critical
activity explains the importance of analysis of the role of nationalism
in modern democracy and it will set the limits of our analysis.
There are a plethora of studies on both nationalism and democratic
theories, which might overwhelm a theoretical analysis of the
relationship between the two. It is important to decide what is relevant
and what is not. In this task, I will follow the methodological steps of
Habermas' account of the role of nationalism in modern society.18 I
will start by pointing out the irrelevance of some of debates over the
historical connection between state and nationalism. Then, I will
discuss the relationship between the rational basis of nationalism and
modern constitutional democracy. This should provide the spring
board for the next methodological phase, where I will propose my
personal interpretation of the relationship between democracy and
nationalism. Bearing in mind this sort of 'road map' we can start our
journey by explaining some basic definitions and the use of the terms.
These definitions are the basic equipment of the traveller, her boots
and the backpack without which she can go nowhere.
18
His works - such as The Postnational Constellation or The inclusion of the other - are taken as reference
for both cosmopolitans and nationalist supporters. J. Habermas, "Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe."
Journal of Democracy 14/4 (2003), 86-100, J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation : Political
Essays. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001). J. Habermas, et al., The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in
Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation : Political
Essays. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001).
22
1. Themeaning of terms
a) a constitutional or a theoretical proposal?
In this thesis, the term constitutional will be used in a broad sense.
Such an analysis - like the one suggested here- is not a constitutional
proposal but a theoretical account of the role of nationalism in a
modern constitutional democracy. It is important to clarify this point
since many constitutional theories (such as the ones that support
constitutional federalism) are confused with theoretical proposals
(such as the ones proposed by Tully and Habermas). Let us make this
point clearer. In spite of the fact that authors such as Habermas make
direct reference to a missing European constitution," his hypothesis
should be considered a theoretical analysis of the evolution of
European constitution making. The constitutional difficulties of
implementing his conclusions are contingently - not theoretically -
relevant to the European constitutional project. Like Habermas'
constitutional patriotism, this thesis should be read as a theoretical
proposal which supports the idea of a new relation between the state
and its population.
19
J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 - 27, J. Habermas, "The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization." New Left
Review (1999), 46-59, J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future
ofEurope." Praxis international 12/1 (1992), 1-19
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"Today, as the nation-state finds itself
challenged from within by the explosive
potential of multiculturalism and from without
by the pressure of globalisation, the question
which arises is whether there is a functional
equivalentfor the fusion of the nation ofcitizens
with the ethnic nation. "~°
Habermas' own answer to this question is the endorsement of
communicative democracy and the exclusion of the ambiguous
relation between nationalism and state. This point cannot be rebutted
by a pragmatic evaluation such as the one proposed by Weiler2', which
argues that the lack of these common cultural aspects will make the
project of a European Constitution politically unstable. "/ would argue
that in the modern notion of the European organisational national —
state, the state is to be seen principally as an instrument, the
organisational framework within which the nation is to realise its
potentialities."22 Habermas does not deny a factual connection between
the sense of belonging to a particular ethnic community and the
political commitment to its legal system,2 but the problem of how the
J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 - 27.p. 117
21
J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe : "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other
Essays on European Integration. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), J. H. H. Weiler, "The
Promised Constitutional Land." Kings College Law Journal 12/1 (2001), 5-16
22
J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe : "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other
Essays on European Integration. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).p.339
23
J. Habermas, "Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe." Journal of Democracy 14/4 (2003), 86-100, J.
Habermas, The Postnational Constellation : Political Essays. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), J.
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relationship between demos and legal system is sustained is a
theoretical problem not a pragmatic one. Thus, Weiler might argue
that pragmatically the political stability of modern states is
underpinned by the shared sense of belonging to the national
community, but this does not solve the problematic relationships
between state, national identity, and democracy. Instead, Habermas'
proposal argues that the idea of sharing a common identity as a
political justification of the state is based on an irrational
psychological belief- he refers to Anderson's mental images24 -.
I will explain later (chapter 3) that his exclusion of nationalism from
modern democracy is unsupported, but for now it is important to make
clear that his proposal cannot be criticized for being constitutionally
unworkable - such as Weiler does - . Political theorists who want to
propose an analysis of the role of nationalism in modern democracy -
such as Habermas, Tully25, Laden2", and MacCormick27, - have to be
defiant of pragmatic difficulties and in their works they have to avoid
making facts fit hypotheses. Habermas' constitutional patriotism is not
an exception to the rule. The reasoning proposed with constitutional
patriotism stands upon a normative presupposition which considers
Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in ed/s
P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), : 105 -
27, J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe." Praxis
international 12/1 (1992), 1-19
24
15. Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism. (London:
Verso, 1983).
25
J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Aee of Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
26 A. S. Laden, "Outline of a Theory of Reasonable Deliberation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30/4
(2000), 551-80, A. S. Laden, Reasonably Radical : Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
27
N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Law. State and Nation in the European Commonwealth.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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democracy the only source of legitimacy and then it suggests an
exclusion of nationalism from democracy. Thus, these proposals
cannot be criticized by pointing out that the stability of modern
constitutions is pragmatically related to the protection of national
interests.
These critiques confuse the examples used for supporting a particular
point, such as the relationship between Swiss federal constitutions and
Swiss national identities, with the theory which suggests them.
Obviously, it is the reader's prerogative to challenge the veracity of the
examples proposed in a theory, or indeed the correctness of the
reasoning deduced from them. However, examples in political theory
are there to support a point not to be used as templates for a normative
proposal. For instance, Habermas points out that multiethnic societies
- such as the United States of America and Switzerland - do not
attach the protection of republicanism or their political stability to the
sense of belonging to an ethnic community. These two instances
support the possibility of having a state unbounded from the idea of
nation - not to suggest Switzerland or America are templates for his
patriotic state -. The American constitution certainly represents the
first historical example of a liberal constitution, whereas Habermas
has spent most of his career explaining the incongruence and the
shortcomings of liberalism.2* These examples are put forward to
See for instance: J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society : Student Protest. Science and Politics.
(London: Heinemann Educational, 1971), J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976),
J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of
26
support the uncertainty of the belief which presumes the impossibility
of having a state without a national population. Only a superficial
reading of Habermas' proposal would consider them as templates for
a European federal constitution.
b) Ethnic community, nation, national identity and
nationalism: which word should we use?
As I made clear on the previous part of this thesis, our main aim is to
study the role of nationalism in modern democracy. However before
starting the analysis of the connection between the two, we have to
explain my use of terms such as nation, national identity, patriotism,
and nationalism. These words represent - and mean - something
different depending on the context in which they are used. For
instance, there is a negative connotation attached to nationalism,
whereas patriotism seems more appealing to the great majority of the
public. This occurs, if the terms are often used to reinforce each other.
The meaning of the word patriotism echoes in sentences such as 'it is
a patriotic duty of all citizens to protect their national interests'. Ideas
such as these ones are easier to accept by a democratic community,
than 'a nation should have the possibility to expand and flourish'. The
first affirmation refers to the protection of republican values and the
second to imperialistic policies. However, the common usage of the
two words is not clearly distinguishable and both assertions might
Bourgeois Society. (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to
a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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support a policy of antidemocratic exploitation of other people and
their resources, infringement of human rights, and war. This
uncertainty on the use of words is a general problem of any political
theory. As I mentioned earlier, we will discuss more about this point
in chapter 5 ( where we will analyse the relationship between the
usage of language and political theories) for now it is important to
point out the meaning we will associate to key words such as nation."
I will use the term 'nation' to indicate a community in which
members share a particular set of beliefs. These beliefs refer to a
mythological past - which is considered as ideological - or to common
ethnic features - which are objectively measured.
However, it is normatively impossible to distinguish between the two.
Sharing some cultural elements helps members of the national
community - and the others - to distinguish between themselves and
aliens. These distinctive cultural elements have the same function as
the t-shirt of football fans since they allow the creation of a distinction
between 'them' and us'. The most obvious of these cultural features is
the idiom spoken by the community and the geographical space in
which the community resides, but neither of these elements is
essential for creating a national identity. We have both cases of a
nation which speaks different languages - such as India - and cases in
which the national community does not have a geographical area of
I have to stress again that these definitions will be our 'basic equipment' for our journey of exploration
on the analysis of the relationship between national identity and constitutional democracy.
28
residence - such as the Gypsies The whirlpool of studies on
ethnicity has increased - instead of diminishing the uncertainty on the
normative boundaries of the ethnic community. Given there is not a
clear distinction between ethnic nationalism and ideological
nationalism, in what follows the meaning of the term nation is
inclusive ofboth anthropological and ideological interpretations.
With the term 'cultural diversity', I will describe all the elements that
join and diversify civil society. We will see that the protection of
cultural diversity and democracy are closely related. I will use the
term 'nationalism' as the ensemble of political claims which want to
support and protect the national identity. This includes the activity of
nationalist political parties, which are often labelled as undemocratic,
and all those demands which simply want to protect an aspect of the
national heritage - such as language, sacred sites, tradition etc.-.
Given that it is impossible to clearly define when a political claim is
discriminatory and when it is not - at least in a communicative
democracy -, I will adopt a neutral interpretation of the word
nationalism which will include all political demands which support
the concept of national identity. Finally, I will use the term
'exclusion' and 'unilateral secession' as political claims unrelated to
sociological analyses of the efficiency of the relationship between
individuals and state apparatus."
30
A. O. Hirschman, Exit Voice, and Loyalty : Responses to Decline in Firms. Organizations, and States.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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c) The protection of republican values and civic nationalism
Cosmopolitans - such as Habermas - argue that nationalism is a
dangerous political element of modern society which might endanger
'republican values'. The coherence of this claim will be discussed in
the third chapter but before we examine the details of this point, we
should clarify my use of the term republican values. As
Christodoulidis" argues, the term republicanism covers certain
political theories that assert a connection between law and a system of
procedural values. "Republicanism is a theory about how political
sovereignty finds expression in law. Law, claim the republicans,
substantiates popular sovereignty by lending it constitutional
provisions as vehicle or 'home' ofpolitical deliberation. "" Liberals
and supporters of republicanism argue that a democratic community
should have some basic rights which are constitutionally protected.
However, republicans assert that there is something more to the
relationship between democracy and law. They argue that the
deliberative process allows a democratic society to express its political
power.
31
E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).Ch. 2
Ibid.p.10
30
"Both [republicanism and liberalism] seek a
home for political deliberation in the
Constitution. It is in the freedom of speech,
broadly understood, that both see political
sovereignty substantiated in law. The citizen is
free and sovereign in that his/her speech is
uncompromised. Both liberal and republican
constitutionalism begin from this premise. While
both locate the site ofpolitical deliberation in
the Constitution, the republicans attribute far
more decisive functions to constitutional
political deliberation. For them, the political is
rooted in law, and it is from the constitution that
it draws for backing and aspiration. ""
The complex interrelationship between law, citizenship and
democracy is established by the political debate. They contest an
understanding of constitutional norms which place restrictions on
political and economic bargaining. Republicans - such as Habermas34,
Arendt35 etc. - argue that the procedures which form modern
constitutional norms provide the linkage between demos, politics, and
citizenship.
33
My emphasis. Ibid.p. 10
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J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. (London: Heinemann, 1984).
35
See for instance: H. Arendt, Between Past and Future : Eight Exercises in Political Thought.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
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From this hypothesis, Habermas states that citizenship is a
cosmopolitan category.'" This interpretation - Christodoulidis argues -
of the relationship between democracy and constitution goes back to
ancient Greek political theory.
"There are strong resonances here of the
'Aristotelian' politics of the polis [Italic on the
original text], a tradition that envisages man as
a 'political being' who could only realise his
'telos' [Italic on the original text] in a 'vivere
civile', [Italic on the original text] a republic, as
there are of Rousseau's concept ofpolitics as
the expression ofthe civic will of the people, and
the republicanism ofHannah Arendt. 17
The point that republicans make - Christodoulidis argues - is that
membership in the political community is the practice of partaking
perspectives and discussing with one another - not the protection of
goods or values- . These values and goods are only procedural
elements which maintain the political coherency of the community.
30
J. Habermas, "Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe." Journal of Democracy 14/4 (2003), 86-100, J.
Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). Similar
point are made by: F. I. Michelman, "Terry Firma: Background Democracy and Constitutional
Foundations." Michigan Law Review 99/8 (2001), 1827-52
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E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).p. 17 See also: H. Arendt,
The Origins of Totalitarianism. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1958), H. Arendt and Charles R. Walgreen
Foundation for the Study of American Institutions., The Human Condition. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958).
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"Whereas in the liberal/pluralist world-view,
politics is about promoting diverse goods and
thus relies on bargaining within a framework of
rules neutral to the bargaining parties, the
republican picture of politics is one of the
pursuits of the "common good"[Bold in the
original text].
In their account, the heterogeneity of interest
(of the Hobbesian rent-seekers), associated with
liberalism, gives way to the heterogeneity of
perspective. Bargaining gives way to arguing,
and this shift allows republicans to claim "civic
virtue"[Bold in the original text] for their
politics
While all the republicans share the basic idea of the interrelationship
between community, politics and law, they differ in their analyses of
how this connection is constructed. Some authors - such as
Habermas™ - consider public debate the proper forum for deliberative
practice; others rely on institutional activities of the constitutional
38
My Emphasis: E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).p. 17
Christodoulidis refer to Michelman.
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See for instance: J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976), J. Habermas, The
Theory of Communicative Action. (London: Heinemann, 1984), J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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court - such as Michelman -4" or the parliament - such as Sunstein 41-.
We will see in the last chapter how this distinction plays a role on the
evaluation of a demand of unilateral secession, but for now let us
continue on our brief analysis of republicanism.
The republican account of the relation between democracy and
nationalism should be also distinguished from the analysis of the so-
called 'civic nationalism'. Supporters of a civic nationalism - such as
Smith-42 argue that we should conceptually distinguish between ethnic
and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism supports an idea of sharing
an ideological belief - and might degenerate into racism -, civic
nationalism accepts and gives backing to democratic values.4' Civic
nationalists - or supporters of a hybrid idea between the two such as
MacCormick -44 directly support the system of substantial liberal rights
and goods which are heavily criticized by republicans such as
Habermas for being democratically incoherent. Republicans propose a
procedural template of democracy which provides the deliberative
space for debating political questions and reaching a consensus on the
40
F. I. Michelman, "Law's Republic." Yale Journal of International Law 97/ (1988), 1493 See also the
more recent: F. I. Michelman, "The Problem of Constitutional Interpretative Disagreement", in ed/s M.
Aboulafia, et al., Flabermas & Pragmatism. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002),
41
C. R. Sunstein, "Political Conflict and Legal Agreement." Tanner Lectures on Fluman Values 17/
(1996), 137-250, C. R. Sunstein, "Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State."
Stanford Law Review 48/2 (1996), 247-310
42
See for instance: A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971), A. D. Smith,
Ethnicity and Nationalism. (Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1992), A. D. Smith, Nationalism : Theory,
Ideology, History. (Cambridge: Polity Press ; Blackwell, 2001).
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As I mentioned earlier there is the theoretical problems of distinguishing an ethnic group which support
antidemocratic claims from the national community which supports civic values. We will discuss this
point extensively in chapter 3.
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N. MacCormick, The Scottish Debate : Essays on Scottish Nationalism. (London ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970), N. MacCormick, Can Nationalism Be Intellectually Respectable?. 1991), N.
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), N. MacCormick, The English Constitution, the British State and the
Scottish Anomaly. 2000).
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problem of the common good. Again, this is in contrast with civic
nationalism. No one is coerced into adopting a pre-determinate
political perspective which endorses the existence of a national
community or liberal values such as civic nationalists argue. In the
republican model of democracy, the dialogue tends to enhance rather
than to diminish cultural and political diversity. In contrast with civic
nationalism, the republicans invite all perspectives into the political
arena without considering the idea of nation as a support of moral and
political claims.45
d) The use of the terms democracy and radicalism
Let us continue the clarification of the use of terms by explaining the
meaning of words such as democracy and radicalism. I will refer to
the term democracy as the praxis which links political choices to
those who are subjected to these decisions. At first sight this definition
depicts democracy as a procedure without any linkage to substantive
values, but I will make clear that the protection of the practice which
connects the political recognition of cultural diversity, which might
include national identities and constitutional norms, is a substantive
element in any free society. Thus, I will not endorse a relativistic
prospective - in which all political models of societies are normatively
equal, instead I will argue that we should adopt a procedurally open
model of 'communicative democracy' similar to the one suggested
45
E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).p.41
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by Habermas in his theory of communicative action. This is the only
possible template of political association which can link national
identities to constitutional norms.
This radicalized interpretation of democracy should be distinguished
from the one proposed by authors such as Mouffe4'' and Tully.471 will
argue that his idea of radicalism is compromised by his endorsement
of liberal values. The authors propose a philosophical reinterpretation
of the principles of equality and individualism which wants to
preserve the legal framework within which liberal values are
protected. This point is clarified by Mouffe when she argues that the
liberal values which underpin modern constitutional society are
axiological elements ofmodern democracy.
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C. Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" Social Research 66/3 (1999), 745-58
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J. Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy."
Modern Law Review 65/2 (2002), 204-28, J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Age of
Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), J. Tully, "The Agonic Freedom of Citizens."
Economy and Society 28/2 (1999). 161-82
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"In 'Hegemony and Socialist Strategy',
Ernesto Laclau and I attempt a reformulation of
the socialist project in terms of "radical and
plural democracy", by arguing that it should be
conceived as the radicalisation and deepening
of democratic revolution - as the extension of
the democratic ideals of liberty - and equality to
more and more areas of social life. The aim is
not to create a completely different kind of
society, but to use the symbolic resources of the
liberal democratic tradition to struggle against
relations ofsubordination. ""
These 'radical democrats' argue that endorsing the liberal right of
having a self-organised life within a certain regime does not mean we
have to support individualism or economic liberalism. Instead, they
argue that at the moment in which we relinquish the idea of a
homogeneous society and we accept the fact that modern society is
pluralistic, liberal institutions become the greatest contribution to
modernity. "Pluralism, understood as the principle that individuals
should have the possibility to organise their lives as they wish, to
choose their own ends, and to realise their lives as they wish, to
choose their own ends and to realise them as they think best is the
48
C. Mouffe, "Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy?" in ed/s D. Trend, Radical Democracy:
Identity, Citizenship, and the State. (London: Routledge, 1996), 19-26.
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greatest contribution of liberalism to modern society,"4J This
interpretation of the relation between cultural diversity and democratic
institutions relies on the assumption that democracy cannot stand on
its own feet and it needs a system of limitations, which avoids
degenerating into dictatorship. These controls are only functional to
the protection of democracy and they do not promote the values of
individualism and capitalism. In other words, individual freedom is an
apriori value of democracy.
By supporting this thesis, radical democrats seem to propose a theory
which situates itself in the middle ground between the acceptance of
the liberal regime, and the Marxist critique of capitalism'". On one
hand, they reject the socialist analysis of the state's institutions as an
instrument of power that enforces a system of values which oppresses
the poor and protects the wealthier. The system of legal rights and the
institutions which enforce these rights are necessary elements if a
society wants the guaranteed stability and democracy. On the other
hand, radical democracy is critical of the ideological support which




See for instance: C. Mouffe and E. Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy : Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. (London: Verso, 1985).
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"To promote a project of radical andplural
democracy we need to create a strong alliance
over the ethical-political principles of modern
democracy. Only on that condition will the
extension of the ideals of liberty and equality
become the driving force of a democratic
politics. The current dominance of an
instrumentalist model ofpolitics is an obstacle
to a real understanding of the radical potential
ofthe liberal democratic regime. ""
Radical democrats argue that the function of liberal institutions is not
to protect liberal values but to protect democracy from degenerating
into populism, cultural homogenisation, and dictatorship. They
suggest that the function of liberal legal institutions is separable from
the ideological element which supported their making.
C. Mouffe, " Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy?" in ed/s D. Trend, Radical Democracy:
Identity. Citizenship, and the State. (London: Routledge, 1996), 19-26.p,23
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"Liberal individualism is unable to
understand the formation of a collective
identities and it cannot grasp that the collective
aspect of social life is constitutive. [...] The
liberal idea that general interest results from the
free play ofprivate interests and that a universal
rational consensus can result from free
discussion prevents liberalism from
comprehending the nature ofthe political. ""
The discussion of political issues is a critical activity which maintains
the connection between people's aspirations and constitutional norms.
The tension, which continually emerges between these last two




"Democratic advances have usually been the
result of the process of displacement of rights
along a double axis: either new groups have
claimed the access to rights already declared, or
new rights have been demanded in social
relations hitherto considered 'naturally'
hierarchical, such those concerned with race,
gender, etc. Radical democracy must
acknowledge that the articulation of the ideas of
popular sovereignty and civic equality with the
liberal themes ofnatural rights [...] has made it
possible for new rights to be claimed and new
meanings, new uses and new fields of
application to be createdfor the ideas of liberty
and equality. It is within such a framework that
the struggle for a free and equal society has to
be waged. It is high time to adhere to Norberto
Bobbio's long-held conviction that liberal
democratic institutions should be an essential
part of any democratisation process, and that
socialist goals can only be achieved in any
acceptable way within a liberal democratic
regime. One objection to a strategy of
democratisation as the fulfilment of the
41
principles of liberal democracy is that
capitalistic relations constitute an insuperable
obstacle to the realisation of democracy.\...]
However this identification is not a necessary
one, as some liberals argue. Rather, it is the
result ofan articulatory practice, and as such it
can therefore be broken. Political liberalism and
economic liberalism need to be distinguished
and then separatedfrom each other. ""
In this - rather lengthy - quotation we find the basic assumptions of
radical democracy which Tully endorses in his analysis of the relation
between democracy and national identity.54 I will go back to this point
on chapter 5 for now let us simply say that radical democrats such as
Tully cannot endorse the protection of liberalism - as Bobbio does -
since liberal values falsified the process of recognition of national
identity.
In liberal states, the theoretical procedure which guides the ruling out
of irrational claims such as the one proposed by nationalist groups is
relatively straightforward. Firstly, there is a substantive evaluation of
the compatibility of these political entities with a hypothetical set of
democratic values, which are embedded in liberal societies. Secondly,
C. Mouffe, Dimensions of Radical Democracy : Pluralism. Citizenship. Community. (London: Verso,
1992). p.2
54
J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational
Democracies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-35.
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if political claims supported by these movements are considered
"democratically intolerable" the exclusion might be inserted into the
legal system by a decision adopted either by a legislative body or by a
jurisdictional account of the incompatibility of the political claims by
a jurisdictional institution - such as a constitutional court However,
linking democracy with a substantive set of values - such as the ones
supported by liberals and 'radical' (sic) democrats - cannot be but
democratically unsupported.
2. The importance of the relationship between nation and
state
Once the use of terms such as national identity and democracy is
clearly set, we have to continue in our task of making clear the
normative limits of our discussion over the relationship between
national identity and constitutional democracy. The issue here is how
to exclude debates which are correlated to both nationalism and
political theories but are not relevant to the relationship between the
two. This process of reducing our debate to a workable size is
methodologically crucial in an analysis of the role of nationalism in
modern democracy since both fields of research provide an
uninterrupted flow of high level theoretical material. Therefore,
deciding which hypothesis is relevant and which is not is a delicate
task which will affect the normative solidity of my successive claims.
The obvious risk is to overlook pertinent studies and transform the
whole thesis into a tautological exercise, which confirms its
43
presuppositions. It is for this reason that I adopted the same
methodological approach proposed by an experienced political
theorist such as Habermas.' Ultimately, he argues that the role of
nationalism in modern democracy should be theoretically reduced to
three discussions:
• the analysis of the historical relation between state and nation,
• the dialogue over the rational admissibility of nationalistic
claims in the modern state,
• the connection between national identity and democracy.''
The understanding of these threes debate is important.
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ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 - 27, J. Habermas, "The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization." New Left
Review (1999), 46-59, J. Habermas, "On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of Law and
Democracy", in ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge:
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This analysis was prompted by a partial rebuttal to his critique of capitalistic society. In his
Legitimation Crisis (J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976).) Habermas argues
that the state's protection of liberal values with democracy is irrational. He explains that liberal societies
rely on the logic of the market and on the protection of private interests to support their legal system but a
substantive linkage between law and liberalism aprioristically excludes political claims which are
intolerable with the theoretical basis of liberalism. This exclusion has a detrimental effect on the
rationality of the liberal state which finds itself unsupported by those who are not sharing its idea of
justice and fairness. This critique which Habermas sees its logic conclusion in Habermas' Theory of
Communicative Action (J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. (London: Heinemann,
1984).) where he proposes a procedural alternative to the liberal state. In that work he argues that a
modern nation-state's legal system should be based on the communicative participation of all citizens.
This conclusion was rebutted by communitarians. Apart from the critiques of contra-factuality which
focused on practical difficulties of transforming parliamentary democracy into an ideal democracy for all,
communitarians (M. Walzer, The Politics of Ethnicity. (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1982).) - who concur with Habermas' critique of liberalism - point out that social cohesion within
liberal democracies is granted by a pre-political sharing of a common identity. In a nut shell, they argue
that liberalism protects republican values, and a shared sense of belonging to the national community
ensures social cohesion. These two aspects of modernity - they argue - are linked by a symbiotic
relationship within the modern state but they are theoretically separable. They conclude their critique
saying that Habermas mistakenly criticized liberalism for not providing something which is given by
being members of the national community. This critique casts doubts over Habermas' account of the
liberal state and over his hypothesis of deliberative democracy. This criticism and the revival of
nationalism which followed the unification of the two Germanys motivated Habermas to write about
nationalism and its relation with modern state. In this thesis the whirlpool ofGerman politics will be kept
at the side, instead we will focus on how Habermas attempts to clarify the relationship between
constitutional democracy and national identity.
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"For the democratic constitutional state
guarantees equality before the law, in the sense
that all citizens are to have an equal opportunity
to exercise their rights. John Rawls, the most
influential theoretical politician of political
liberalism writing today, speaks in this
connection of the fair value' of equitably
distributed rights. [...] In constructing the post¬
war Europe, politicians of all stripes were
guided by this dynamic conception of the
democratic progress. Today, we are coming to
an awareness that this idea has so far been
57
realized in the framework of the nation-state. "
I agree with Habermas when he argues that the historical linkage
between nationalism and the protection of republican values is pushed
to its limits by globalisation. "The nation-state at one time guarded its
territorial and social boundaries with a zeal bordering on the
neurotic. Today these defences have long since been penetrated by
inexorable transactional developments,"58 He explains that
globalization affects all areas of modern living, but it is in the field of
economics that the scale of this social phenomenon is most evident.
J. Habermas, "The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization." New Left Review
(1999), 46-59 p.47
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J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 -27.p.120.
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"The welfare-state mass democracies on the
Western model now face the end of a 200 year
developmental process that began with the
revolutionary birth of the modern nation-states.
[...]The phenomena of the territorial state, the
nation, and a popular economy constituted
within national borders form a historical
constellation in which the democratic process
assumed a more or less convincing institutional
form [...] Today, developments summarized
under the term 'globalisation' have put this
entire constellation into question.
States' borders cannot separate national economies from international
trading. They cannot control internal markets and support a welfare
system which implements national social policies. After the world
economic crisis of the twenties, the necessity of limited control over
national economies - in Keynesian terms - was favoured even by
liberals who saw the devastating effects of a completely unrestrained
economy. This consensus around the beneficial effects of limited state
intervention gave the reason for the implementation of redistributive
policies which guaranteed an effective social justice/'" This had -
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Habermas argues - a paradoxical effect on the relation between the
universal values of the liberal state and its population. These policies
which directly satisfy universal individual aspirations - such as the
shortening of the working day, the advantage of free education etc. -
reinforced the linkage between the liberal state and the national
population. "Although capitalism from its inception was a global
development, the economic dynamic was fostered by the modern state
system and in turn had the effect ofreinforcing the nation state.""
However, Habermas suggests that this connection between state and
nation has been eroded by the development of a global economy
which is gradually taking over the state's control of its internal
market.
r>i
Ibid.in ed/s p. 121 The same point is repeated in : J. Habermas, "Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe."
Journal of Democracy 14/4 (2003), 86-100
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"But with the recent trend towards the
denationalization of the economy, national
politics is gradually losing its influence over
enterprises that orient their investments decision
with a global horizon. They are caught in the
dilemma of having to avoid two equally
unreasonable reactions. A policy ofprotectionist
isolationism and the formation of defensive
cartels are hopeless, but balancing the budget
through cut backs in the domain ofsocial policy
is no less dangerous in view of its likely social
„ 62
consequences.
This trend, which is often associated with the term globalisation
makes the state relinquish the management of its economy. This has
pragmatic and theoretical effects. Firstly, it cannot guarantee the
efficiency of its welfare system - and this includes free access to
education, health care etc. - which was originally inserted for
implementing the principles of equality. Secondly, the hijacking of the
national economy by non-democratic entities - such as international
organizations and multinational corporations - constantly increases
the economic areas which are out of the state's control." Obvious
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examples of the state losing control of its economy can be found in
Central American states in which internal economies rely on the
export of a single product - such as bananas - which is bought by
multinational cartels at a fixed price".
"[A] state that it is increasingly 'entangled'
[Italic in the original text] in the
interdependencies between the global economy
and global society is seeing its autonomy,
capacity for action, and democratic substance
diminish.
Habermas argues that there are three responses to the globalization
trend. The first theoretical answer to globalization suggests that we
should adopt cosmopolitanism and the universal values of liberalism
as an alternative template to the ethnic based nation-state. Supporters
of this proposal - such as Rawls - assert that a combination of
constitutional protection of republican values with a liberalised
economy is the solution to the democratic decline of the nation-state.
Habermas agrees on the fact that once approved constitutional norms
are theoretically binding, however in his previous works - such as
Legitimation Crisis - he made clear that the protection of private
interests cannot support a model of social inclusion. The second and
the third reactions to the erosion of the democratic prerogatives of the
64
A similar effect is produced by the activity of International organizations - such as the Word Trade
Organization, the European Union etc-.
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nation state are endorsing nationalism. One supports the idea that all
nations should be free and independent within their territory.
This hypothesis - Habermas argues - has paved the path for
xenophobia and ethnic cleansing. The break-up of the former
Yugoslavia is the latest European example in which ethnicity led to a
full scale ethnic war. The theoretical incongruence of this idea of a
modern state is the aprioristic exclusion of the process of self-
identification of the demos in the legal system which is a democratic
requirement of modern society. The other reaction to globalization
proposes a 'third way' between universal liberal values and
reactionary nationalism. This form of nationalism - which sometime
takes the name of civic nationalism"'' - is more complex. Firstly, it
emerges from the acceptance of globalization. Secondly, it is
supported by leftwing theorists who used to deny the rational basis of
nationalism. Supporters of this 'third way' - such as Giddens"7 - who
interpret social solidarity as the liberal principle of equal opportunities
assimilate the protection of democratic values to the protection of
national identity. This theoretical proposal finds its way into European
politics as the new-left - such as the New-Labour party in the United
Kingdom or the Democratic Left Party in Italy - which exchanged its
leftist ideals with the support of a free economy. However, this "run
for the centre" is not limited to an adoption of different universal
J. Hearn, Big Citv : Civic Symbolism and Scottish Nationalism. 2003), D. Brown, Contemporary
Nationalism : Civic. Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics. (London: Routledge, 2000).
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claims; it also includes a support for a revisited form of nationalism
which is associated with the protection of democratic values."8
Obviously, caution in sending the United Kingdom on the track of
more collaboration with the European Union strategically helps to win
the vote of British Euro-sceptics, but there is more than "spinning" on
the position adopted by Europe's new left. The new element on the
political manifesto of the European left is the acknowledgment that
ethnicity is part of the process which guarantees a linkage between
democratic institutions and their population.
Even if I disagree with some of Habermas' conclusions, I concur with
him when he rejects both interpretations - the one that revisited the
concept of the ethnic state and the so called third way The idea
which associate nation with state are obsolete and modern
constitutional democracy needs to reinterpret the role of nationalism
in a modern democracy. Then the question is how could we propose
an alternative to the present day relationship between nation and state?
Moreover and even more compelling, - what is the modern role of
nationalism in modern constitutional democracy?
See for example this passage of Tony Blair's Speech. Also quoted in introduction "The truth is, the
primary sources of democratic accountability in Europe are the directly elected and representative
institutions of the nations of Europe - national parliaments and governments - . That is not to say Europe
will not in future generations develop its own strong demos or polity, but it hasn't yet. And let no-one be
in any doubt: nations such as Poland, who struggled so hard to achieve statehood, whose citizens shed
their blood in that cause, are not going to give it up lightly." T. Blair, Check against Delivery (Warsaw:
2000).
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However, I disagree with him when he argues that nationalism is based on a set of irrational beliefs
(such as the myth of an original ethnic population) which support a set of incoherent political claims
(such as the right of self-determination of the nation and unilateral secession) which should be excluded
from the political arena. We will discuss this point in chapter 3.
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a) Our relevant areas of study: The historical connection
between nation and state
Habermas argues that the discussions over the historical relation
between state and nationalism, the irrationality of nationalism, and the
effect of this irrationality on the protection of republican values
support a reinterpretation of the role of nationalism in modern
democracy which he named constitutional patriotism. The key stone
of this model is the aprioristic exclusion of nationalistic claims from
the political arena. I will explain later - in chapter 3 - that I disagree
with his ruling out of nationalism from modern democracy, but for
now we will follow Habermas systematic analysis of these three
debates. This will provide the methodological path for reducing our
debate on the role of nationalism in modern constitutional democracy.
Let us start with the first of these discussions which focused on the
historical assumption that nationalism creates social cohesion,
political stability and protects republican values. The formation of the
modern nation state and the spread of democracy as a model of
governance - Habermas argues - result in the unfounded belief that
nationalism and the state protection of republican values are
historically connected. "The nation state and democracy are twins
born out ofthe French Revolution. From a culturalpoint ofview, both
have been growing in the shadow of nationalism' [Italic on the
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original text]."7" Historically the formation of the national-state has
followed three different paths. It might have started from an already
established kingdom which transformed its subjects into a quasi
uniform national population — such as France or it could be the
result of intellectual campaigns conducted by romantic writers and
poets - such as Italy and Germany or it could be the result of the
process of decolonisation. These three processes have confused the
arbitrariness of state's borders with the moral claim of national self-
determination and superseded the political model based on divine
right of the royal family. He explains that state and nation are
normatively different. The state is the apparatus in charge of
collecting taxes and protecting the peace with its borders, whereas the
concept of nation refers to a community which shares - or is believed
to share -11 some cultural characteristics. Habermas asserts that the
term nation, which is now used as synonymous to state, was used for
distinguishing communities which were speaking different languages.
This transformation of meaning is connected to the new function
attributed to the idea of nation.
Habermas argues that the invention of the nation-state has added an
element of social integration to the egalitarian value of republicanism,
which in the eighteenth century replaced tribal and local connections. '
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As I mentioned earlier, in this thesis the distinction between these two definitions of nation is
irrelevant.
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"Popular national self-consciousness provided the cultural background against which "subjects" could
becomepolitically active "citizens. " Belonging to the "nation " made possible for the first time a relation
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Habermas makes the point that on one hand this concept solves the
problem of the legitimisation of the state, which was previously based
on the theological predestination of the royal family. On the other
hand, it gives a response to the sense of confusion in individuals who
had nothing in common. The idea of the nation - Habermas points out
- is the element of union between people and state, and it gives to the
state the possibility of considering itself an autonomous entity, which
is conceptually detached from its constitutive elements and free to
consider itself as an equal subject in the international political arena.
Habermas argues that moving the legitimisation of the state from the
divine right of the royal family to the right of self-determination of the
nation creates a new form of freedom which competes with the two
individualistic concepts of freedom "[T]hat of the members of a civil
society and that of the political autonomy ofcitizens ' This new form
of autonomy has two pragmatic effects on the political arena. Firstly,
it equips national-states with a moral reason to act as individuals who
struggle to protect their own private interest in a free market.
Secondly, it allows democratic states to behave in the international
political arena similarly to the political template supported by the
royal family they have just superseded. This includes the idea of a
ofsolidarity between persons who hadpreviously been strangers to one another. Thus the achievement of
the nation-state consisted in solving two problems at once: it made possible a new mode of legitimation
based on a new more abstractform ofsocial integration. " J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other :
Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), pp: 105 - 27.p.111
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right of protecting national interests, with violence if necessary, which
before was associated with the defence of the crown.
However, these ideas of defending the national community and
protecting republican values - Habermas explains - are conceptually
separate. "The nationalism which was inspired by the works of
historians and romantic writers founded a collective identity that
played a functional' [Italic on the text] role for the implementation of
the citizenship that arose in the French Revolution."74 In modern
times, multiculturalism and globalisation have made the chimera of a
homogeneous national population more visible, but he explains that
theoretically the incoherency of the binomial relationship between
state and nation was clear since it appeared. Habermas gives the
example of the 'Germanists'' meeting in 1848, - which can be
compared to today's European Convention - where intellectuals from
all over Germany met to suggest an intellectual base for a newly
formed German state detached from the imperial values of the
Austrian royal family. The project - Habermas points out - of making
the political basis for a state ruled by Germans was faced with
theoretical difficulties. "In this respect things were even more difficult
for the German jurists than the philologist. While foreign languages
formed nothing more than the back-ground for philologists, Roman
J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe." Praxis
international 12/1 (1992), l-19p.4
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law still ruled in the jurists own countryThe German legal system,
like all the European legal institutions, relied on Roman codifications,
such as the Corpus Juris Civilis and Corpus Juris Canonici, and on
their mediaeval interpretations by Italian scholars, such as Pillio and
Accursio . The universal value of this foreign theoretical material was
supported by a long interpretative tradition of ancient texts which was
alien to the Germans, and by the linkage between these texts and the
religious beliefs. The substitution of these universal values which
support the Roman legal doctrine with national laws was difficult for
constitutional law. On writing about a proposal for a new constitution
for Germany theorists had to substitute theological values with the
right of self-determination of the nation, and at the same time they had
to make a constitutional text without referring to Roman law. "The
juristic version of the doctrine of the people runs into three major
difficulties: [...] Above all, they were unable to provide the bases of
legitimation for a democratic constitutional state from their own
legal-historical resources.
The problem was that secular democratic values (which were
established during the French Enlightenment) can not substitute the
process of social cohesion of a religious society. They believed that
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"But such legal-political transformation would have lacked driving force, and formally established
republics would have lacked staying power, if a nation of more or less self-conscious citizens had not
emerged from a people defined by its subjection to power. This political mobilization called for an idea
that was vivid and powerful enough to shape people's convictions and appealed more strongly to their
hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights. This gap was filled by the
modem idea of nation, which first inspirited in the inhabitants of state territories an awareness of the new,
legally and politically mediated form of community." J. Habermas and M. Pensky, The Postnational
Constellation : Political Essays. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001).p.l2
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this space, which was left empty after the relinquishment of the ancien
regime, should be filled by the sense of belonging to the national
community. The idealised national community substituted the model
of social cohesion around the royal family and stood side by side with
the new constitutionally protected republican values.77
Habermas argues that pluralism and cosmopolitanism have simply
magnified the historical shortcomings of nationalism and national
state. Multiculturalism constantly increases the gap between the myth
of the uniformity of national population and the factuality of cultural
pluralism. "The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from
some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the
praxis [Italic on the original text] of citizens who actively exercise
their civil rights."" He concludes asserting - and I agree with him -
that the modern state is normatively unrelated to the evolution of
nationalism. This historical analysis -which is the strongest point of
Habermas' critical account of the role of nationalism, is rebutted by
political theorists such as Weiler7' and Canovan"" who believe in a
substantive relationship between political stability and nationalism.
As I mentioned earlier, I do not support all the conclusions which
Habermas suggests in his theory of constitutional patriotism - such as
J. Habermas, "The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship." Ratio Juris 9/2 (1996), 125-37p.l 12.
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the aprioristic exclusion of nationalism as a political movement within
political arena but I accept that his historical account of the
relationship between state, republican values and political stability
cannot be criticized with the argumentations which Canovan and
Weiler propose. These two authors argue that a state legally bounded
only by a constitutional agreement is politically unstable. In particular,
Canovan argues that constitutional patriotism relies on Habermas'
personal understanding of the relation between nationalism and
republicanism, which associates nationalism with racism.8'
Communitarians - such as Taylor - make a similar analysis but derive different conclusions. See for
example : C. Taylor, "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate", in ed/s N. L. Rosenblum, Liberalism and the
Moral Life. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989),, C. Taylor and A. Gutmann,
Multicultural ism and "the Politics of Recognition" : An Essay. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992).)
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"What is it, then that is supposed to
differentiate 'patriotism' (which is desirable)
from ' nationalism' (which is not)? The central
claim is that patriotism means the political
loyalty of citizens to the free polity they share,
whereas nationalism is a matter ofethnicity and
culture. While nationhood is taken to be a
'prepolitical' matter depending on ties of birth
and blood, the bond that unites citizens in a
patriotic polity is a matter of will, the free
consent ofcitizens united by their commitment to
liberal democratic principles.
She argues that supporters of patriotism in order to distinguish
nationalism from patriotism - claim that the former does not suppose
or require ethnic and cultural homogeneity and is tolerant of diversity.
However, she claims that the project of avoiding the illiberal effect of
nationalism by basing the state upon a procedural system is self-
defeating. To support her critique she focuses on the examples which
Habermas uses to underpin his thesis and she argues that the cases
cited to show the plausibility of this kind of patriotism do not in fact
do so.1"




Canovan suggests that there are two theoretical templates of
patriotism. One is supporting an idea of a patriotic state underpinned
by universal values - she includes Habermas' proposal in this group -
. The second, which she names the "republican rooted version of
patriotism" reads patriotism as the protection of "the political culture
of liberty"f She does not advocate either. Canovan argues that
patriots - of both kinds - misconstrue the political effect of
nationalism in modern states and she supports her criticism of
Habermas with an analysis of the examples given by the German
author. Firstly, she suggests that the Swiss confederation and the
United States of America are considered by Habermas the models of
his constitutional patriotism, but they cannot support his proposal. She
points out that Switzerland adopts a non-inclusive system which
highly protects Swiss identity via a strict control over immigration.
This is in direct contrast with Habermas' inclusive patriotism.
"Switzerland is indeed less welcoming to immigrants than many more
conventional nation-states, and less tolerant of non-Swiss cultural
differences. It is a unique polity, in many ways enviable, but it gives
little support to the project of cosmopolitan constitutional
patriotism,"85
Secondly, the American loyalty to the constitution is understood by






"The point is that the principles of the constitution are not just liberal
principles but (for Americans) 'our' [Bold in the original text]
principles, handed down to us by our forefathers, [...To think of the
USA as a society bound together by constitutional patriotism rather'
[Bold on the original text] than by nationhood is to overlook
inheritance - inheritance not only of citizenship, but of the
constitution, the principles, and the national mission." 86 Similar
points are made by authors such as Kymlicka in his analysis of the
American promotion of the English language.87 Canovan concludes her
analysis asserting that there are no alternatives to the relationship
between nationhood and liberal democracy. The process of
distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism depends on an
oversimplification which cannot transform the loyalty to a national
group into the loyalty to universal principles. "This kind ofpolity to
which thinkers ofboth sides find themselves drawn is actually neither
pure state nor simple ethnic community: it is a polity that is 'ours' [
Italic on the original text]. Structured by all the subtle mediations that
give nationhood its content and its power. "88
However, I argue that this debate over the historical connection
between the senses of loyalty generated by being a member of the
national community and the state is unrelated to the discussion over
Ibid.p. 13 [My emphasis]
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the role of nationalism in constitutional democracy. The dialogue over
the historical process, which has created a linkage between members
of a national constituency and the protection of republican values, is
part of the never-ending historical diatribe. A debate that started with
Herder8' and Savigny and which is over the historical role of
nationalism and has nothing to do with a debate over the normative
connection between national identity and democracy.Obviously, a
democratic community has to be open to political claims based on
historical analyses, but the relativistic nature of these analyses simply
makes more evident the gulf between the normative requirements of a
democratic theory and history.
b) The relation between rationality and nationalism
Once the lack of connection between the historical evolution of the
modern state and the concept of national identity is clearly set, we can
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J. G. v. Herder and B. Suphan, Herders Sammtliche Werke. Weidmann, 1877). see also: E. Kedourie,
Nationalism. (Oxford: Hutchinson, 1960).
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Even the part of Canovan's critique in which she argues that Habermas supports an 'empty'
universalistic conception of the state is theoretically precarious. In her analysis Canovan does not say that
patriotic constitutional law making is a social practice which creates social cohesion and at the same time
induces certain forms of protection of republican values which are locally and nationally interpreted. "The
political culture of a country crystallizes around its constitution. Each national culture develops a
distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles that are equally embodied in other republican
constitutions -such as popular sovereignty and human rights- in light of its own national history. A
'constitutional patriotism' based on this interpretation can take the place originally occupied by
nationalism." J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship", in ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, (Cambridge:
Polity, 1999), : 105 - 27.p.118 At first sight, the idea of interpreting the constitution in relation to a
specific culture should have included Habermas' patriotism in the group of proposals which Canovan
called "republican rooted version of patriotism". "This sort of patriotism has two particularly salient
characteristics [...] although it may arise out of'ethnocultural unity', a 'political culture of liberty' puts
stress squarely upon the republican tradition of active citizenship and civic virtue. Secondly and in
consequence of this, it is a 'critical' [in italic on the original text] love of the country, dedicated to making
sure one's polity lives up to its highest traditions and ideals, if necessary at the cost of unity." M.
Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). p. 16. This form of
patriotism is more similar to her personal analysis of the relation between nationhood and state which ties
the sense of loyalty to the national group to the political stability of the state. If Habermas' patriotic
constitution were included in 'the republican rooted group', it would have supported Canovan's critique.
That is, the patriot state relies on nationalism. However, Habermas' patriotism cannot be categorised in
such a group since individual's loyalty to the patriotic constitution is due to his/her awareness of its
universal value.
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continue to follow Habermas' account on the second debate over
rational basis of nationalism. He argues, like many cosmopolitans-
such as Anderson," Ignatieff2 etc. - that nationalism is based upon a
set of mental images" which are embedded in the national community.
This concept of mental images is used as an explicatory model by
different authors such as Deutsch who points out that the support of
national differences is based on "masses ofmental images "Deutsch
explained how these non-rational ideas which set and align
"preferences which at the end guaranteed security and success in a
competitive market.'''' 95 Many have felt a need for such a group and
have answered it by putting their trust in their nation. In spite of the
fact that this metaphorical hypothesis has been proposed in order to
support different theses the main idea behind it is that nationalism has
an irrational ideological framework which can be distinguished from
other rational ideologies - such as liberalism, communism -. Clearly
referring to this idea, Habermas shows how these sets of mental
images bridge the gap that distinguishes the state from the nation state
and the population from the national population. "Popular national
conscience crystallised into the "imagined communities" (Anderson)
propagated in national histories, which became the catalysts ofa new
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form ofcollective self-identification.These sets of beliefs solved the
problem of finding a legitimated base for the state and they guided the
community through a necessary process of social integration toward a
homogenous national population.
However, Habermas endorses the cosmopolitan critique of
nationalism as political stance and asserts that nations are precarious
historical fabrications made in Europe during the nineteenth century
that then degenerated into ideological political movements. He argues
that that the principle of self-determination - as it is explained by Kant
- is related to individual self-determination, whereas nationalists
irrationally claim a national right of self-determination.
%
J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 -27.pl 10.
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"Nationalism is the term for a specifically
modern phenomenon of cultural integration.
This type ofnational consciousness is formed in
a social movement and emerges from
modernization processes at the time when
people are at once both mobilized and isolated
as individuals. Nationalism is a form of
collective consciousness which both
presupposes a reflexive appropriation of
cultural traditions that have been filtered
through historiography and which spread only
via the channels of modern mass
communication. Both elements lend to
nationalism the artificial traits ofsomething that
is to a certain extent a fabrication, thus
rendering it by definition susceptible to
manipulative misuse by political elites.
I agree with Habermas when he argues that nationalism as a political
position is interpreted by part of its supporters as a self-evident set of
beliefs. This unquestioned conception is the precarious base for the
ideological nationalism. However, the deductions which he draws
from this analysis are less convincing. Habermas argues that
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connecting the nation-state with the ethnicity not only is irrational, but
it can endanger republican values.'8 This claim passes the limits of the
debate over the rational or irrational basis of nationalism as a political
stance and draws Habermas - and us with him - into the analysis of
the relationship between nationalism and democracy. This is the last
of the areas of research which he considered relevant for
understanding the role of nationalism in modern democracy.
c) The relation between democracy and nationalism
Habermas argues that a rational reading of modern constitutionalism
provides the theoretical ground for excluding nationalism - and its
claims - from democracy. He argues that modern citizens are linked to
constitutionally protected republican values and to the national group
with which they share their communal identity. On the one hand, a
citizen is in contractual partnership with the liberal set of principles
embedded into the constitution. In this relation he or she is obliged to
renounce the use of violence to enforce his/her claims and the state is
committed to protect his/her fundamental rights. On the other hand, a
citizen is an organic member of the national community. A defence of
this linkage between cultural and national identity with a political
community was recently revived by communitarians such as
'The positive self-understanding of one's own nation now became an efficient mechanism for
repudiating everything regarded as foreign, for devaluing other nations, and for excluding national,
ethnic, and religious minorities, especially Jews' J. I Iabermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past
and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in
Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), : 105-27.p.111.
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Taylor'and Walzer.""' In contrast with the communitarians Habermas
explains that a psychological linkage between members of the national
community and state does not mean that the two elements are
conceptually related.
"Nationalism and republicanism combine the
willingness to fight and, ifnecessary, die for the
country. This explains the complementary
relation ofmutual reinforcement that originally
connect nationalism and republicanism, the one
becoming the vehicle for the emergence of the
other. However, this socio-psychological
connection does not mean that the two are
linked in conceptual terms.
Here he seems to concur with liberal nationalists such as
MacCormick1"2 on the fact that the individual is not to be considered
simply a member of the nation, but also a conveyor of a concrete
cultural heritage. These cultural elements create in the individual a set
of obligations that lead the member to respect his/her cultural
tradition. Because of this, a member of a national identity appears to
possess a unique form of commitment to the past.
C. Taylor and A. Gutmann, Multicultural ism and "the Politics of Recognition" : An Essay. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992).
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"Nationalism has found its own solution to
the problem of boundaries. While national
consciousness itself may very well be an
artefact, it projects the imaginary reality of the
nation as an organic development which, in
contrast with the artificial order of enacted law
and the construction of the constitutional state,
needs no justification beyond its sheer
,,103
existence.
However, Habermas suggests that the political success of the
traditional nation state is due to a balanced equilibrium between social
integration and the republican protection of individual freedom. "The
nation is Janus -faced. Whereas the voluntary nation of citizens is the
source of democratic legislation [Staatsbiirger], it is the inherited or
ascribed nation founded on ethnic membership that secures social
integration [Volksgenossen].""'4
Habermas argues that if the relationship between the two is not well
adjusted there are two possible consequences.'"' Firstly, the community
might return to the form of democratic associations which historically
preceded the national state - such as the mediaeval belt of Central
103
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"This ambivalence remains harmless as long as a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation ofcitizens
is accorded priority over an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation as in a permanent state of war. "
Ibid.in ed/s p.115
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European Cities""-. Every single element of these political associations
- such as a city or a region - is socially detached from the other and it
is preoccupied on its ethnocentric search for the myth of the original
national population. This incessant search for an irrational imagined
origin drives apart the members of the association with dangerous
democratic consequences. The recent separation of the former
Yugoslavia is an example of this process. Secondly, he argues that
linking the concept of nation to the political structure of the state
might endanger the republican values on which the nation-state is
based. But this republican achievement is endangered when the
integrative force of the nation of citizens is considered something
independent of the political opinion.'"
To make this point clearer, Habermas takes as example Schmitt's
analysis of the relation between majority will and national population.
"Schmitt makes a strict distinction between the "legal" and the
"political" components of the constitution and he treats the "nation"
as the hinge between the traditional principles of the bourgeois state
and the democratic principles of the self-determination of the
people Nationalists - Habermas explains - consider the political
process which leads to the will-formation as an exchange between
J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe." Praxis
international 12/1 (1992), 1-19 p.2
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individuals who already have something in common: ethnicity. This
sharing element belongs to the national community which they
consider a pre-political feature of modern society. This belief in the
external substantive relation between democracy and national identity
is detrimental to the protection of republican values since it suggests
that the only possible form of democracy is the one supported by a
common ethnic back-ground, and it transforms the democratic debate
into a search for a national will.'"' If logic cannot be the moral
motivation which binds a community to its political decisions -
Schmitt argues - then we have to assume that it is the sharing of
national cultural characteristics which links legitimacy to the
outcomes of a political debate. "What people want is good just
because the people want (it)"."" This assumption (which pre-empts
much of today's communitarianism) makes it possible to subvert the
universal system ofHuman rights.
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"This substantialist understanding of the citizenry is related to an existentialist conception of
democratic decision making process. Schmitt conceives ofpolitical will-formation as the collective self-
affirmation ofa people." Ibid, in ed/s p. 135
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"The meaning of human rights is exhausted
by the private enjoyment of equal liberties,
whereas the exercise of political freedom by
citizens is supposed to obey a completely
different logic. The meaning of democratic self-
determination based on ethnic homogeneity is
not the political autonomy of individual citizens
but rather national independence.
Here Habermas seems to agree with Schmitt when he argues that this
discrepancy between liberal theory and a world order based on nation-
states is theoretical - not factual - . Schmitt points out that a
community cannot simply rely on a system of procedural rules but it
should also create a model of social cohesion and he concludes by
saying that a homogeneous social population is the only guarantee of a
substantive relation between democratic decision making and the legal
system. Habermas accepts that citizens interact with each other, and
this process takes place within a social context which becomes an
element of the democratic procedure.""
in
Ibid.in ed/s p. 136
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"Whereas the substantive understanding of popular sovereignty assumes an essential interconnection
between "freedom" and the 'external' [Italic on the text] independence of a people, the procedural
understanding connects sovereignty with the private and public autonomy granted everybody equally
within an association of free and equal subjects. Given the challenges that confront today, 1 want to argue,
the communicative account of republicanism is more appropriate than either an ethno-national or even
communitarian conception of the nation, the rule of law, and democracy." Ibid.in ed/s p. 138
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However, he argues that states grounded on ethnic homogeneity
cannot develop peacefully."5 In his analysis of the debate over the
connection between democracy and nationalism he claims that the
only possible solution to the risks associated with the traditional form
of the nation state is to renounce this irrational ambivalence and to
change the actual structure of the state from nationalistic to patriotic."4
"Compare "freedom" in the sense of
national independence, i.e. collective self-
assertion vis-a-vis to other nations, with
"freedom" in the sense ofpolitical liberties the
individual citizen enjoys within a country; the
two notions are so different in meaning that, at a
later point, the modern understanding of
republican freedom can cut its umbilical links to
the womb of the national consciousness which
had originally given birth to it.
He argues that a possible alternative to the irrational nation state is its
transformation into a supranational or non-national state. "[W]e can
take our orientation on the precarious path toward post-national
societies from the very historical model we are on the point of
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"However, examples ofmulticultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate that
a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principle are rooted by no means has to be
based on all citizens sharing the same language and cultural origin. "Ibid. in ed/s p. 142
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superseding.""" Habermas claims that the model of national social
cohesion, which binds citizens who are strangers to one another
should not derive from the sense of belonging to the national
community, but it should rather spring from individual commitment to
the historical evolution of constitution making. In the following
chapters (chapter 1 and 2), I will discuss the details of Habermas' idea
of patriotic state, but before that we have to set the limits of our the
relationship between nationalism and democracy.
3. The limits of our analysis
In this chapter, I clarified the meaning of the terms such as nation and
democracy, then, I explained that an analysis of the role of
nationalism in modern democracy cuts across three ongoing debates.
First, over the historical connection between nation and state, second,
over the rational basis of nationalism and finally, over the linkage
between admissibility of nationalism in the political arena. In what
follows, we will analyse the details of these debates since they provide
the essential background information for understanding the role of
nationalism in modern constitutional democracy.
I will argue - like Habermas does - that we cannot prove the existence
of substantive link between the historical formation of modern
constitutional democracy state and the spreading of nationalism.
However, I do not share the conclusion he is drawing from it. I will
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explain that we should distinguish the irrational sense of belonging to
the national community"7 and the political claims proposed by its
members. These claims and the political discussions generated by
them cannot be aprioristically excluded from the political arena
without endangering democracy. This point is essential for
reinterpreting the role of nationalism in modern constitutional
democracy.
See for instance: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. (London: Verso, 1983). and M. Walzer, The Politics of Ethnicity. (Harvard: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1982).
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CHAPTER 2
IS NATIONALISM IRRATIONAL? THE
RELATIVISTIC NATURE OF HABERMAS'
ASSESSMENT
We concluded the previous chapter with two questions. Is nationalism
an irrational political movement? Is this irrationality the reason for
ruling it out from modern democracy? In this chapter, we will discuss
the first of these two issues. I will explain that an analysis of the role
of nationalism in modern constitutional democracy should provide the
procedural framework for discussing political claims and taking
political decisions independently from the entities which put them
forward. I argue that we cannot assume that there is a pre-existing
criterion of political rationality which aprioristically excludes
nationalism from the political arena.
In order to explain the details of this point I will continue to follow the
model proposed by Habermas' account of the relationship between
democracy and national identity. At first sight, Habermas'
constitutional patriotism seems to endorse the openness of the political
debate, but then it inserts itself in the middle ground between a
procedural and a substantive theory of democracy. On the one hand, it
argues that the only form of true democracy is the one that allows an
open communicative interaction of all citizens. On the other hand, it
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seems to criticise nationalism for being a dangerous political "input"
into the communicative process that should be aprioristically ruled out
from any democratic community.
However, the problem here is the unavoidable relativist nature of
rationally assessing a political stance. Habermas argues - like many
cosmopolitans - that it is a self-evident truth that nationalism is an
irrational aspect of our society, but there is little certainty among
sociologists and anthropologists on what nationalism is, or what its
functions are in a modern constitutional democracy. By analysing
Habermas' cosmopolitan critique of nationalism, I will make clear the
theoretical relativism of this approach. I will explain that sociological
and anthropological analyses cannot be considered as axiological
elements for a theoretical explanation of the role of nationalism in
modern democracy."* By arguing the exclusion of nationalism from
modern democracy, cosmopolitans such as Habermas anticipated the
conclusion of the democratic debate and they propose an unsupported
and irrational a priori dismissal of all nationalistic claims. Let us see
the details of this claim.
1. The critique of the ideological nationalism
There is a negative perception attached to nationalism and to all
ideological political movements. Habermas, and other political
In the next chapter, I will expand even further this point. I will make clear that even if we accept that
nationalism is irrational, its aprioristic exclusion from the democratic arena cannot be combine to suspend
the linkage between demos and legal system.
76
scientists such as Anderson1", Benhabib'2", Kedourie121, Ignatieff 122 to
name just a few, argue that nations are irrational historical fabrications
made in Europe during the nineteenth century and they are based upon
a set of "mental images". These "mental images" support a doctrine
which has a detrimental effect on the democratic stability of modern
society. "[T]hey were writers and historians, and scholars and
intellectuals in general, who laid the groundwork for Cavour's and
Bismarck's subsequent diplomatic and military unification ofthe state
by propagating the more or less imaginary unity of the 'cultural
. ) 99123
nation .
Habermas here refers to one of the first definitions of nationalism,
which is - uncertainly - attributed to Herder. Herder argues that any
state should have its own national population. "[A] population is a
creation of nature". His analysis, which is quoted by nationalists
provides an account of the relation between cultural differences and a
state's political stability. Cultural differences between localised
communities - and the transmission of these differences through
generations - were analysed before,124 however Herder provides an
account of the detrimental effect of detaching the state from the
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At the time of the acme of the Muslin Empire, Ibn Kaldum, the man considered the father of
anthropology, has studied the life and tradition of the Arab nations. This was before national community
were even named.
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sociological features of its population. To make his distinction clearer
he compares the differences between the idea of empire and the idea
of nation. The empire (Reichnatiori") was the geographic area
dominated by a state's administration." [T]he unnatural state
expansion is a mixture ofhuman nations under a crown".'1'' In contrast
with the empire, the nation (Kulturnation) is an extended community
of people who are sharing the same idiom. The political implications
of Herder's account are fully explained by Von Savigny. Von Savigny
points out that it is "the web of relations" between people which
underpins the political and administrative structure of the state - and
ultimately binds the nation into one community -. He argues that this
net of relations has two beneficial effects on modern politics. Firstly,
it provides the legitimate support for the state. Next, it provides a
criterion for dividing members of the national community from
"aliens".
Cosmopolitans - such as Kedourie1"- point out that Savigny's idea of
connecting national cultural heritage with the state is irrational and it
arises from a misunderstanding of the western philosophy which is
based on Kantian canons.
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"Nationalism is a doctrine invented in
Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. [...] Briefly, the doctrine holds that
humanity is naturally divided into nations, that
nations are known by certain characteristics,
which can be ascertained, and that the only
legitimate type of government is national self-
determination 128
He points out that the doctrine of nationalism is philosophically rooted
in the Kantian idea of self-determination, but the chain of arguments -
which transformed the hypotheses of the master of Konisgberg into
one of the most successful ideologies of our time - is based on
misrepresentations and incoherencies. Kedourie explains that western
philosophy is underpinned by the assumption that there is a linkage
between individual freedom and morality. In a nutshell: a man is free,
if he acts in accordance with a moral law. As a result of that assertion,
it is a duty of every man to find a moral way of living. Kedourie
argues that the search for the perfect morality became endless and,
finally it was confused with the initial dogma; the free search of what
is moral.
This confusion over the Kantian principle of self-determination gives
nationalists the basis for demanding the right of self-determination of
the nation. They argue that Kant's book "Critique of Pure Reason" is
79
affected by a serious limitation since the vision ofmorality which the
text suggests is absolute but based on a subjective perspective. On
their reading of the "Critique of Pure Reason", they interpret the
suggested continuum search for an ideal moral behaviour as an
isolated individual activity. They argue that this search is a personal
activity, which is open to personal and therefore relativistic
interpretation. As a result, the absolute moral categorisation of Kant
was paradoxically affected by absolute relativism. Kedourie shows
how nationalists like Fichte provide the theoretical material for
leaving behind the critique of KanC - and pre-empting much of
today's communitarian literature - by changing the mindless
individual into the encumbered member of the whole.1" He explains
that in Fichte, individuals cannot understand morality outside the
society to which they are bound because it is only through society that
a moral entity can pursue a moral life. It might seem logical to
conclude that such a "whole" should embrace the entire humanity, not
only national communities.
Kedourie pointed out how nationalism, in order to close the coherence
of its reasoning, assumes that cultural diversity is part of an imagined
God's plan for stimulating humanity in its search for a perfect
morality. Kedourie argues that this unfounded belief - of divine
"This is not say that Kant himself would have acquiesced to such uses to which his doctrine was put.
He himselfwrote specifically on political questions, he iras an amalgam ofaudacity and timorousness,
preaching at the same time strict obedience to the state and hinting also at view which could lead to the
subversion ofall settled authority.'" Ibid. p.18.
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division of humanity - combined with a misinterpretation of Kantian
philosophy is the ideological base of nationalism. When
cosmopolitans, such as Habermas, propose their critique of the
relation between nationhood and state, firstly they use Kedourie's
critique of the rationality of nationalism, and then they focus on the
effects which this irrationality has on the creation of a psychological
linkage between an abstract notion - such as the idea of nation - and
state. They point out that the stream of thoughts which nationalism
brought was clearly in contrast with the premise it started from - since
national movements have neither improved the moral standards, nor
brought freedom, nor peace, instead they have made human relations
bitter, democratic governments have been substituted by dictators and
countries in which different ethnic groups were living peacefully were
exploited by war.
Habermas argues that the set of mental images of nationalism can be
ideologically exploited for supporting antidemocratic claims. He
makes direct reference to the Nazi regime and to its xenophobic
politics "But this republican achievement is endangered when,
conversely, the integrative force of the nation ofcitizens is considered
something independent of - andprior to - the political. "'"Ignatieff has
recently proposed an even deeper analysis of the effect of the
relationship between mental images created by the doctrine of
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nationalism and democratic risks."2 He explains that all nationalistic
claims are the irrational product of a psychological intolerance of
minor cultural differences among similar groups.
"A nationalist, in other words, takes "minor
differences" — indifferent in themselves - and
transforms them into major differences. For this
purpose, traditions are invented; a glorious past
is gilded and refurbished for public
consumption, and people who might not have
thought of themselves as people at all suddenly
begin to dream ofthemselves as a nation.
Ignatieff argues that the motivation, which makes nationalists think
that a group might be superior to another, is based on a psychological
difficulty to accept small differences among similar individuals. He
uses the war in the Former Yugoslavia as metaphor of how this
intolerance might degenerate into ethnic war. In the former
Yugoslavia members of the same villages initially started to consider
their neighbours strangers, then they began to see them as risks for
their families, and finally friends and schoolfellows became animals
that could be slaughtered. Ignatieff argues that there are no rational
reasons that can explain this violent escalation. Genetic studies have
provided enough evidence about the impossibility of differentiating





human beings on the base of their ethnic stock.1" From the point of
view of an external observer Bosnians, Croats, Serbians were sharing
traditions, habits, and languages and in certain cases religion. Ignatieff
explains that where differences were found they were so minimal that
even anthropologists were unable to separate two different ethnic
groups. However, these populations - which are so similar - were
killing each other.
He argues that there is no real reason for this to happen apart from the
suspension of rational judgment which results from the fact of being a
member of a "national community".'" Ignatieff claims that the motive
of this massive disengagement from reality is the result of a
psychological relation between narcissism and aggression, which
Freud called "narcissism of minor differences"."6 Ignatieff concurs
with Freud on the idea that the rational perception in which men are
similar is unreasonably overshadowed by minor differences. These
dissimilarities increase the level of group anxiety which might erupt in
violence.
T. Nairn, Faces ofNationalism : Janus Revisited. (London: Verso, 1997).
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"Moreover, what looks like a minor
difference, when seen from the outside, may feel
like a major difference when seen from the
inside. Freud's distinction [..] helps us to see that
the level of hostility and intolerance between
groups bears no relation to the size of their
cultural, historical, or physical differences as
measured by a dispassionate outside
1 })137
observer.
Ignatieff asserts that nationalism and ethnic hate are growing from the
psychological displeasure of minute differences upon which the idea
of nation is built. Nationalism - Ignatieff argues - can only be
understood as an extreme form of narcissism in which the less
substantial the differences between human groups are, the more
hostile they are likely to be toward each other. He suggests that
initially these minor characteristics provide the base for fabricating
myths and traditions, then these cultural aspects are quoted in order to
create more differences and the entire process becomes self-sustained.
He concludes saying that nationalism is not a revival of old historical
rivalries but a sophisticated hoax in which details without significance
are conveyed into a chain of reasoning which should transform
irrational claims - such as the right of excluding others from the
M. Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor : Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. (London: Vintage,
1999).p.50
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political community - into legitimate demands. Like Habermas,
Ignatieff argues that the logical solution to the risks associated with
the traditional form of the nation-state is to renounce this irrational
ambivalence™ and exclude nationalism from the political arena.
Habermas asserts that a possible alternative to this reconstruction of
the irrational nation-state is its transformation into a supranational or
non-nation-state. '[W]e can take our orientation on the precarious
path towardpost-national societies from the very historical model we
are on the point ofsuperseding.' 139 Habermas claims that the model of
national social cohesion, which must bind citizens who are strangers
to one another, is not something given by the community but rather it
springs from an individual commitment to the universal values
extracted from a rational reading of democratic constitution making.'4"
2. The theoretical relativism of cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitans - such as Habermas - argue that it is irrational to
consider national identity as a pre-political element ofmodern society.
He explains that nationalism is an irrational belief, which can be
politically manipulated, and it can endanger democratic values.
Notwithstanding these critiques, nationalism has maintained its
political appeal and it has extended - at least in Europe - its political
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Critics of Ignatieff and Habermas, such as Kymlicka and Canovan, argue that they, in fact, elevate
certain state nationalisms over others. This interpretation of Habermas is based on the idea that
nationalism permeated any from of possible political association. This assumption is normatively
unfounded and historically debatable (see chapter 1).
85
claims with the creation of new national movements (e.g. Austria,
France, Italy, and UK). A reason for this European failure to convince
public opinion on the possible political danger of nationalism might be
strategic; nationalistic propaganda can easily link unrelated
sociological situations such as unemployment with the increase of
asylum seeking demands and individuals can assimilate nationalism as
a protection of their own private interests. Theoretically this is a trivial
point but if we assume that a democratic arena is the place in which
political demands are put under a rational scrutiny, and if we assume
that nationalism is an ideology based on a set of irrational beliefs, why
does nationalism increase its political weight in Europe? If we adopt
Habermas' and Ignatieff s ideas, we should accept that given the right
input, masses reject rationality and endorse imaginary beliefs. This
tendency - which seems innate in modern society - must be stopped
by the exclusion of nationalism from modern democracy. He claims
that the irrationality of nationalism has historically affected the
common perception of the relationship between individual identity
and the constitutional state.
"[T]/ze allegedly paradoxical relation
between democracy and the rules of law
resolves itself in the dimension of historical
. )y 141
time.
J. Habermas, "Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?" Political
Theory 29/6 (2001), 766-8 lp.768
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However, the history of democratic instability of the nation-state, in
comparison with the relative steadiness of multi-ethnic constitutional
democracies - such as the one of the United States of America -IJ2 is
due to the irrational basis of nationalism and this justifies its
aprioristic exclusion from a modern democratic state.
"The history of European Imperialism
between 1871 and 1914, and nationalism
\...\(not to speak of the racist policies of the
Nazis), illustrate the sad fact that an idea of
nation did not so much reinforce the loyalty of
the population to the constitutional state, but
more often served as an instrument to mobilise
masses for political goals that can scarcely be
reconciled with republican principles.
Nationalists suggest that there is a connection between individual
autonomy, democracy, and national self-determination, but a rational
reading of the evolution of the relationship between nationalism and
state reveals - Habermas argues - that the idea of national identity is
an irrational political concept which endangers the republican values
protected in modern constitutional democracy.
Habermas makes no references here to the US civil war. We will discuss the selectiveness of
Habermas in the following paragraphs.
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However, if we accept that nationalists cannot use historical
arguments to support substantive claims, neither should cosmopolitans
- such as Habermas - be in the position to argue that an historical
analysis of modern constitution making sustains a barring of
nationalism. As we explained in the previous chapter, the reason for
this impossibility has to do with the nature of the relationship between
theoretical claims and history. Given the unavoidability of the
relativism, which affects any historical analysis, it is impossible to
support procedural - or substantial - theoretical claims. The relativistic
nature of Habermas' claims is made more obvious by a plethora of
studies on the origins and sociological functions of nationalism which
link national identity to sociological features of modern society (such
as Smith).144 These accounts support a nationalistic political theory -
such as the one ofMiller or MacCormick - which wants to protect the
role of national identity in modern democracy.14"
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1 cannot stress enough that this thesis does not support either of the approaches - the one which denies
and the one which advocates a substantive relationship between nationalism and state -. These analyses
are proposed here only to make clear the relativism of Habermas' proposal. I argue that it is
democratically incoherent to adopt any of these interpretations as factual elements for supporting an
alternative model of constitutional democracy. I will make clear later in this thesis that these proposals
confuse the reasons, which support a political claim - like a demand of protecting or ignoring the national
identity - with a proposal which supports the adoption of an alternative template of constitutional
democracy. I argue that any political claim can be matter of discussion in a political debate, but a
proposal of new template of constitutional democracy cannot impose the finding of a sociological
analysis for limiting the political arena without being considered democratically incoherent. This debate
which includes the question of linking democracy to social claims will be the theme of the following
chapters.
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a) Smith's sociological analysis of the relation between
ethnicity and modernity.
Liberal nationalists and civic nationalists - such as MacCormick"' and
Smith'47 - argue that a possible constitutional protection of individual
or community rights is not based on its rational coherence but upon its
compatibility with modern pluralistic democracies. MacCormick
argues that the sociological context, which surrounds individuals in
modern society, constitutes an asset that should be protected as an
individual's right.148 This context is constituted by an ensemble of
sociological features which they consider essential aspects of a
national identity. This aspect is not challenged by cosmopolitans -
such as Habermas'4' and Ignatieff,15" - but they argue that nationalism is
a factual aspect ofmodernity which might endanger republican values.
In contrast with what Habermas suggests,'5' sociologists like Smith"7
concur with MacCormick"' on the fact that nationalism is an
axiological aspect of modern society which might be protected as any
other individual's right. Smith shows how the pure theoretical
N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Law. State and Nation in the European Commonwealth.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). pp. 176-191.
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analyses of nationalism - such as the one proposed by Kedourie and
embraced by Habermas - has brought little light to the template which
supports the idea of national identity. They try to reduce nationalism
to a narrow paradigm such as language difference (e.g. Anderson154) or
a subjective historical analysis (e.g. Kedourie'55), which is not enough
to make a working model of a social movement. Smith explains that
language theories reduce the phenomenon of nationalism to a small
number of social variables (language, modernisation, social
transformation, and "social anomie"), which permit the elaboration of
a reasonably simple paradigm. Then, they do not use the paradigm as
a test-bed for verifying the correspondence between the model and the
social phenomenon, but they confound this tenet with the social
phenomenon itself.15''
To make this point clearer, let us go back to Ignatieff s analysis of the
effect of nationalism on the ethnic war between Serbs and Croats.'57
On his reading of the chain of events which led to civil war in the
former Yugoslavia, Ignatieff starts from the presupposition that there
are not major anthropological differences between Serbs and Croats.
Next, given that the two groups are similar, he looks for a different
criterion for separating the two ethnic communities. He suggests - in
analogy with the work of Anderson on imagined communities - that
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism. (London:
Verso, 1983).
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the division between the two communities is not factual but
psychological. To support this claim Ignatieff directly refers to a
hypothesis elaborated by Freud in which the hate between individuals
is motivated by the intolerance of minute psychological discrepancies
between characters. Freud names the motivation for this hate:
"narcissisms of minor differences". Apart from the obvious critiques
that there are few tests which confirm this hypothesis and the fact that
Freud was not referring to group dissimilarities, but to individual
differences, Ignatieff seems to reproduce (tautologically) his
presuppositions on his conclusion. He asserts there are no rational
reasons for the war in the Former-Yugoslavia since there are no
differences between Serbs and Croats.
In contrast with this idea, Smith explains how these methodological
analyses of the relationship between nation and politics are based on
an unreasonable limitation of the sociological phenomenon, they
claim to study.
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"Nationalists have not spilt their hlood [...]
they have not expended their energy and lives, to
forward the cause of the language or, even the
culture [...] The ideal of nationhood, which has
stirred these men and women, is more complex,
less earthy, yet more compelling and powerful.
It is an ideal ofa different order altogether.
Smith agrees with Anderson and Kedourie that nationalism is an
ideological belief but he adds that its doctrine provides more than a
simple and straightforward link between generations. He points out a
series of systematic distinctions which are needed to distinguish
nationalistic features from other aspects of modern society. The first
of these distinctions is the separation between what the author calls
ideological ethnocentric and polycentric nationalism. "For an
'ethnocentric' nationalist both power and values inhere in his cultural
group [...] my group is the vessel of wisdom, beauty, holiness, and
culture; hence power automatically belongs to my group."'59 An
example of this form of ideological nationalism is the one that
afflicted the former Yugoslavia during the war in Bosnia."'" Smith
suggests that this form of nationalism contains the general
characteristics of the ancient and mediaeval communities, which claim
that there is a linkage between the national group and divinity.
158
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In contrast, the second variety of nationalism considers a nation as an
ensemble of different groups. This kind of "polycentric"1" nationalism
perceives the existence of other nationalities as equal, and it tries to
join different nations in a family of nations. This last form of
nationalism appeared after the French revolution and it is related to a
theoretical mutation on the sociological nature of nationalism.
Polycentric nationalism - which Smith associates with modern
democratic nationalism - has three features which differentiate this
sociological phenomenon from the old ethnocentric nationalism.
Firstly, modern nationalism is an autonomous political movement
which does not need to link itself to divinity - as ethnocentric
nationalism does - to demand the protection of its political rights.
Secondly, it claims that each nation has its own peculiar sociological
characteristics. The protection of these cultural features provides the
theoretical reason which supports its political claims. Given that these
sociological aspects are different, different nations have different
claims. Thirdly, modern nationalism recognises the existence of equal
rights among different nations. Smith explains that the
acknowledgment of the existence of other groups with their own
claims makes modern nationalism respectful of pluralism. He argues
that polycentric nationalism supports an idea of world order in which
liberty depends on the realisation of nation-states, each of which gives
161
A. D. Smith. Theories ofNationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971 ).p. 158
93
own contribution to humanity by expressing its own cultural character
in a state of its own 162.
Smith suggests that the three features of polycentric nationalism -
autonomy, individuality and pluralism - converge on a single
definition of nationalism. "Define 'nationalism' as an ideological
movement, for the attainment and maintenance ofself-government
He asserts that this definition describes two different aspects of
ideological nationalism; the first is related to those groups, which are
not yet a nation, but which are struggling to obtain their right of self-
determination and the second is tied to an image of nationhood. These
two aspects of nationalism are connected to the two different
dynamics used by national movements for developing a modern
society. Nationalism may start as a claim of independence, and then it
might develop the other elements of polycentric nationalism (e.g. the
regional movements in Britain, Belgium, etc.) or it could be related to
a nation-state, which has already all the essential elements of the
doctrine of nationalism (e.g. national movements in Austria, France,
Italy etc.). These forms of ideological nationalism - Smith here
explains - should be distinguished from sociological features of
nationalism which are:
i. Cultural differentiae
ii. Territorial contiguity withfree mobility throughout






iv. Externalpolitical relations [...]
v. Considerable group sentiment and loyalty
vi. Direct membership with equal citizenship rights
vii. Vertical economic integration around a common system
of labour.164
The first two of these features - cultural differentiae and territorial
continuity - are the criteria which are used by members of a tribe to
distinguish themselves from other tribes. These two aspects represent
the basic elements of modern nationalism and they should be
considered its anthropological foundations. The sociological evolution
of human communities adds to these two elements another three
features. Firstly, the tribe included other tribes and transformed itself
into a new sociological entity. Secondly, the newly formed
community was based on a net of internal relations which created the
conditions for external political relations with other similar groups.
Thirdly, the historical relation between different tribes reinforced the
sentiment of loyalty between members of the same sociological group.
Smith explains that the combination of these three aspects -
enlargement of the tribes, reinforcement of the sentiment of loyalty
between different tribes, and a policy of external relation between
different groups - distinguished the sociological structure of the tribe
from the kingdom which include a multitude of tribes in one country.
However, polycentric nationalism - which he considers the theoretical




which has "direct membership with equal citizenship rights" and
"vertical economic integration around a common system of labour. "
These last sociological aspects distinguish the ethnocentric model of
nationalism, such as the one adopted by the Serbian regime during the
War in the Former Yugoslavia, from the polycentric nationalism
which recognises the right of demanding the protection of their
community's rights. Legal theorists, such as MacCormick,16 Miller,166
Tamir,'67 etc., refer to Smith sociological conclusion for demanding a
legal protection of national cultural heritage and for supporting the
right of self-determination of the nation. This last claim - they argue -
is a functional requirement of the legal protection of national cultural
characteristics. They explain that in a democratic society which relies
on the majority will for making legitimate statutes, the only absolute
guarantee for the protection of national cultural identity is the
independence of the national communities. In the last chapter I will
defend a similar conclusion, but I will explain that the reasons which
support the legitimacy demand of unilateral secession are independent
from the values of predetermined social features."'81 will deal with this
issue later (chapter 6), let us continue our analysis on the relativistic
nature of Habermas' assessment of the rationality of nationalism.
MacCormick, N. "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?" National rights and
international obligations. Eds. S. Caney, D. George and P. Jones. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Westviwe Press.
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b) ErnestGellner. A common language can shapf. a nation
In addition to sociological analyses, such as the one proposed by
Smith, anthropologists like Gellner"'' suggest the existence of a
substantive link between language and nationalism. He argues that
nationalism is a consequence of the fact that modern society needs
constant communication between classes.'" This transformation,
which happened during the Eighteenth century, has mutated
nationalism from a romantic concept into an instrument of
homogenisation which imposes standards of communication within
determinate communities. With this idea, Gellner proposes his critical
analysis of the relation between language and nation making.17'
Before going onto the details of Gellner's anthropological account of
the relation between nationalism and communication, it might be
useful to point out that he does not support a substantive relation
between democracy and nationalism, nor does he argue the rational
validity of ethnic claims. Instead, the focus of his analysis is on the
factual relation between modernisation and development of
nationalism as a social phenomenon. However, his examination of the
relationship between language and the development of national
identity is indirectly used to support theoretical claims like the
protection of the national language. Gellner argues that during
169




The existence of this connection between idiom and national identity is used by theorists like Grimm
for claiming a linkage between democracy and language
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industrialisation, modern states developed a programme which
promote massive language homogenisation. "For the first time in
human history, explicit and reasonably precise communication
becomes generallypervasively used and important. "m The main effect
of nationalism on modernity is the creation of anonymous masses
which understand each other even outside the small circle of relatives
and friends. He explains that this had a double impact on the internal
relation between individuals who were not sharing anything apart
from being arbitrarily included on the same state's borders. Firstly,
citizens became accustomed to the use of a common standard alphabet
and the same language. Secondly, they started to behave as if they
were sharing a common identity. Gellner argues that nationalism acts
on modern society as an imagined communication facility which holds
symbols, customs, and operative preferences, which provides a
standard language, and a system of auxiliary codes such as an
alphabet, a writing style, a calculation system and the institutions
entitled to keep, interpret and transmit the cultural asset of the national
community.
This model of nationalism helps to understand the relation between
national groups which share the same geographical area (e.g. Flemish
and Walloon communities in Belgium; Serbs and Croats in the former
Yugoslavia, the two communities in Northern Ireland). Gellner argues




geopolitical borders and therefore the development of a national
identity is often unrelated to the state's administrative system. In
contrast with Ignatieff, Gellner explains that two national
communities are clearly distinguished if they are considered in their
ideal cultural centre, and then the differences slowly become less
evident as our point of observation moves from the ideal centre of
one, to the core of another.
To make this point clearer, we can metaphorically consider the
cultural effect of two national identities interwoven into the same
geographical area as the circle of rings made by two stones dropping
on the same pool;'" the distinction between the effects of the two
stones is obvious only if the point of view is above the pool not within
the waves. When two or more national communities are mixed,
members prefer - Gellner argues - to interact with subjects sharing the
same national identity, since the external interaction between
nationalities is less efficient than the internal communication between
members of the same nationality. On the one hand, members who
share a particular background of information (symbols, customs, and
operative preferences which provide a standard language, and a
system of auxiliary codes such as an alphabet, a writing style, a
calculation system) interact more efficiently since there is no need to
transmit this information to the members of the same group. On the
173
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other hand, the interaction with a subject who belongs to a different
nationality is more difficult since they must transmit - in addition to
the message - all the material for understanding the meaning of the
communication. This makes the interaction difficult and stretches the
risk of misunderstanding. Gellner suggests that due to these
disadvantages, there is less interaction between strangers and
members and this finally stimulates the uniformity and xenophobia of
national groups.
This idea of a strong link between nationalism and wide social
communication - which is a peculiar element of modern society -
provided the theoretical ground for claiming a constitutional
differentiation between different ethnic groups.174 However this claim
is easy to prove in the case in which different national groups are
speaking two different languages (e.g. Dutch and French speakers in
Belgium). Less obvious is the case in which the language is not the
reason for supporting a single national identity (e.g. Switzerland).
Gellner argues that in this case other features, which are all related to
communication, are relevant to understand the divisions between
people who are speaking the same idiom. He argues that a national
identity is a 'communication utility', which can link communities
which speak different languages, such as Switzerland, and divide
groups which speak the same idiom, such as Germany and Austria -.
D. Arel, "Political Stability in Multinational Democracies." in ed/s J. T. Alain-G. Ganon, Multinational
Democracies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65 - 89.p. 65 - 79.
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To clarify this point we can make an analogy between the cultural
effect of nationalism and religion.17' Gellner argues that the concept of
nationalism is an ensemble system of medias. Similar to nationalism,
the three major monotheist religions use a holy book (Koran, Bible,
and the New Testament) as the medium for transmitting and
preserving their customs and traditions. The holy book is a
communication facility, functionally similar to the national cultural
heritage, which gives to the believers an alphabet with a complete
range of communication utilities, a list of simple metaphorical
symbols, and a description of simple moral behaviours. The fact that
not all believers can read or understand the language used by their
holy books does not limit the communication between members of the
same faith, since the range of rituals and metaphorical symbols
described in the book, manages to across linguistic and sociological
barriers. This idea of getting over the language barrier makes mutual
understanding possible for members of the same faith, even if they are
not sharing the same idiom.
c) Liberal nationalism and its legal claims
Gellner's critical account of the relation between nationalism and
modernity and Smith's explanation of the effect of nationalism on
society, directly contradict the historical reconstructions proposed by
It is not on the aim of this chapter to support a parallelism between religion and nationalism, the
example I propose here is only to clarify how a common cultural elements might works as a code of
communication in a context in which people do no share the same language. I will say more about the
connection - or the lack of it- between religion and nationalism on the next chapter.
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Habermas and they provide argumentative material for supporting the
protection of national identity. For example, Smith's study of the
relation between social texture and national identity is quoted by
Weiler17" when he speaks about the constitutional protection of
national identity. Also, Grimm'77 argues that there is a substantive
linkage between language and national sovereignty. "Here, then, is the
biggest obstacle to Europeanization of the [national] political
substructure, on which the functioning ofa democratic system and the
performance ofaparliament depend: language. "178
This linkage between sociological studies and political theory is even
more evident in the proposals of liberal nationalists such as
MacCormick'77, Patten'8" or Tamir.'81 They assert that the individual and
group sense of freedom, which democracy provides, needs a sense of
loyalty to collective decisions. This acceptance of communal choices
is possible only if democracy takes into account the individual self-
realisation which depends on a substantial degree of support from
economical and social backing. From this assumption, MacCormick
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argues that the collective sense of belonging which supports
democracy should be considered an individual right of its members.'"2
"The assertion of national aspirations does
not have to be, and rationally ought not to be, a
ground for denial of other aspirations of a
similar kind. This is a principle which can and
should be recognised among the principles of
right (or justice) that set the terms of shared
democracy in a large-scale confederal
commonwealth like the European Community.
The idea of nation-state, which MacCormick'"4 suggests here, is
compatible with the reduction of state sovereignty, but it is not clear if
it is compatible with the basic rules of the democratic regime. To pre¬
empt this critique, he argues that democracy requires a sense of
loyalty to collective decisions and nationalism is among the
sociological aspects - but not the only one - which contribute to make
these choices a shared element within a particular community.'"" These
choices - in the context of democratic decision-making - are a factor
which helps the implementation of the European principle of
subsidiarity
182
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"Old conceptions of state-sovereignty and of
the absolutism of the nation-state are in the
process of being transcended, and will perhaps
be completely transcended, ifpeople realise that
this is possible and in certain important ways
desirable. The process does not abolish nations
as political-cultural communities. It may create
space for the flourishing of nations and, in a
significantly qualified sense, ofnationalism.
MacCormick argues that nationalism links together institutions
(regional, national and European) and cultural aspects, such as
religion, languages, cultural heritage. This combines the demand for
protection of national cultural characteristics, which are generally
associated with European ethnic nationalism, with civic nationalism,
which supports constitutional democracies such as USA. He suggests
that nationalistic claims are on the middle ground between the
protection of cultural heritage and the protection of the values of a
civic society. In a contest in which all democracies are nationalistic,
the protection of national identity moves the balance between the
respect of multiculturalism and the promotion of nationalism. He
points out that pragmatically, some countries might move their
internal policies close to the limit of the two axioms: republican




the common culture that prevails"He asserts that whereas civic
nationalism reads nationalism as a shared agreement between
institutions and national community, ethnic nationalism considers
nationalism as a matter of belonging. However, the two ideas of
nationalism are not exclusive. Ethnic communities can make their own
institutions, and civic commitment might create a sense of belonging
to the community, in which this loyalty is shared.
Nationalism is not a homogenising force, which only wants the
preservation of its own cultural features without recognition, but it is a
political movement which claims the right of national self-
determination for preserving cultural diversity. This distinction
between protection of cultural diversity and freedom for the national
community might be pragmatically possible,'88 but the problem of the
compatibility of the right of national self-determination with
democracy remains. If the national community has the right of self-
determination, how could we justify the exclusion of one who is not a
member of the national community, from the right to determine
his/her life within the community s/he lives?
MacCormick argues that the right of self-determination is a universal
requirement of liberal democracy, but it should be understood in a
logical sense. This means that when a political community grants to an
Ibid.p. 169
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This is a 'hot' issue in MacCormick. The problem, here, has to do with the assumption that a national
community wants to preserve its cultural characteristics in a multicultural society. How this might be
achieved without effectively reducing multiculturalism is open to discussion. In this thesis I argue that the
only democratic way to protect multinationalism - and in it I include national cultural diversity - is by
recognising multinational nature ofmodern society and leaving the democratic debate to decide.
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individual the right of participating in the democratic process, it
automatically makes the outcomes of this procedure part of his/her
political decision. However, it is possible to restrain this right to a
certain category of individuals if these restrictions are logically
justifiable. For example, we can assume that rules such as "all males
with black skin have the right to vote" would be more difficult to
substantiate than "all citizens over eighteen have the right to vote".
The ground for exclusion of under eighteens is the territorial linkage
between government, citizens and political adulthood. However, it
would be impossible to find a logical linkage between "black skin
requirement" and political maturity. The possibility of limiting the
extension of the right to vote to certain categories of people - liberal
nationalists argue - means that the principle of individual self-
determination is logically connected to the social context. "It is
clearly notpossible to understand humans as extrinsically extra-social
atoms who come together voluntarily or otherwise to form human
societies or communities, in the manner envisaged by contractarian
189
thought. " The right of individual self-determination, MacCormick
argues, is in a dynamic relation with the social context. The national
community critically affects the social context, therefore the right of
national identity should be considered as a fundamental aspect on the
construction of liberal society.
N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Law. State and Nation in the European Commonwealth.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). p. 176
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The merit of this idea of nationalism is to promote the individual sense
of national identity into the European project"" which has to balance
cultural aspects and national institutions. MacCormick argues that the
European Union represents an opportunity for making a new political
order - a Commonwealth - which transcends the traditional idea of a
sovereign state that is already weakened by the guarantee of free
movement of people, goods and services. This proposal seems to have
taken root in the European political debate which has moved from an
idealistic, economically driven super-nation-state to a net of infra-
nation-states.
3. Theoretical relativism and the role of nationalism in
modern democracy
Comparing MacCormick's work with Habermas' hypothesis, we saw
that they are both perfect examples of the relativism of using a
sociological analysis for supporting an alternative model of the nation-
state. The methodology of the two analyses is similar. Both authors
start from a non political account of nationalism, Habermas uses
Kedourie and MacCormick adopts Smith's idea of nationalism as a
social context. They then use these accounts for explaining the role of
nationalism in modern constitutional democracies; finally they suggest
some adjustments of the template of modern state which wants to
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preserve the democratic stability of a community. However, one of the
two studies supports the normative roles of nationalism on modern
democracy and the other denies it.
Cosmopolitans, such as Habermas assert that the nation-state is the
result of the transformation of the tyrannical ancien regime into a
capitalistic society during the modern era. He claims that although the
concept of the nation pre-dated the one of state, they have
subsequently fused into the nation-state and provide an irrational
psychological cover for the conceptual gap of the constitutional state.
However, sociologists, such as Smith, and anthropologists, such as
Gellner, contest Habermas' historical account of the relation between
nationalism and modern society. Historians dispute even the last point
of Habermas' historical analysis in which he claims that nationalism
became allied with anti-Semitism. Historians, such as E. J.
Hobsbawm, - hardly a revisionist of the history of the Third Reich,
points out the common mistake of confusing nationalism with
r • 191
tascism.
The plethora of studies on the role of nationalism in modern society
supports different political models which directly rebut the
cosmopolitan idea of a constitutional democracy. The comparison
between these theoretical models - and here I repeat myself - is not to
support, or to deny, a normative relation between nationalism and
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democracy, but to point out the subjectivity of a cosmopolitan critique
of nationalism. The reason for this relativism has to do with the nature
of the relationship between political model, democracy, sociology,
and history. The decision of what is rationally acceptable is a
prerogative of the democratic debate. Thus, cosmopolitanism cannot
construct a theory of democracy which seeks a procedure to support
legal decisions with a universal rationality, and then use a subjective
historical analysis to demand the exclusion of political entities of the
political arena. I suggest that the task of finding out if nationalistic
claims are rational is democratic practices which should be left to the
political arena and that the aprioristic constitutional ruling out of
nationalism from modern states - as demanded by cosmopolitans -
eschews democracy. Instead, I will suggest that a theoretical model of
the relation between nation and democracy cannot aprioristically set a
criterion of evaluation of political claims without breaking the linkage
between people (demosj and norms {leges). The details of this point
will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEBATE OVER THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DEMOCRACYAND NATIONALISM
1. Constitutional patriotism: internal incoherence and
democratic risks
In the first chapter, I made clear that there are not relationships
between the debate over the historical origins of nationalism and the
debate over its compatibility with the evolution of modern states. In
chapter 2, I continued this process of reducing the number of studies
relevant to the debate over the role of nationalism in modern
democracy. I explained that the discussion over the rational - or
irrational - basis of nationalism might provide supporting reasons for a
political claim, but it cannot support a political theory which wants the
aprioristic exclusion of nationalism - like Habermas suggests - or
underpins substantive relationship between nation and state. In this
chapter we will discuss if there are normative reasons which support
the role of nationalism in the democratic process. I might anticipate
that in the following chapters, I ultimately suggest that nationalism
and its claims contribute to the process which links demos to the legal
system, but before arriving to discuss this assertion I have to explain
why present day legal theorists fail to understand the normative
implications of this point.
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As I said before, Habermas and Ignatieff argue - such as many
cosmopolitans - that a substantive and direct relationship between the
idea of a homogeneous national-population and state is normatively
unsupported and demands the ruling out of nationalism from the
template of modern constitutional democracy. Cosmopolitans - such
as Habermas - do not make any distinction between civic and ethnic
nationalism. They argue that nationalism is irrational since it claims
the existence of a linkage between unrelated historical events, and it is
democratically dangerous since this imagined connection creates a
psychological belief which can be politically manipulated for
implementing a policy of ethnic and racial persecution against
minorities. "The positive self-understanding of one 's own nation now
becomes an efficient mechanism for repudiating everything regarded
as foreign, for devaluing other nations, and for excluding national,
ethnic, and religious minorities, especially Jews,""2 However,
Habermas is aware that this argument might support a dismissal of
nationalistic political demands - which might be discussed within the
political arena - not a ruling out of nationalism from modern
democracy. Many religious minorities and ethnic groups - which
Habermas wants to protect from nationalism - demand the
implementation of policies which are no less irrational and
antidemocratic. To distinguish these political stances from nationalists
J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).p. 111.
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he argues that the incompatibility of nationalism with democracy is a
procedural element ofmodern constitutional democracy.
On this chapter, I will discuss how Habermas tries to support this
point. In his hypothesis of a patriotic state he demands the ruling out
of nationalism from modern democracy. However, this attempt to
solve the problematic relation between democracy and social
integration pre-empts the aims of a deliberative democracy and inserts
an a priori dismissal of all substantive claims related to national
particularities from his theorisation of the patriotic state. I will point
out that not only Habermas' exclusion of nationalism is incompatible
with the theoretical bases upon which he built his theory, but more
importantly it is at the expense of the democratic coherence ofmodern
society. The review of Habermas' patriotism should make clear the
limits of a theoretical analysis of the relationship between democracy
and nationalism - which is the core of cosmopolitanism -, and will
provide a spring board for the next chapters, where I will attempt -
with the help of Tully's idea of multinationalism to propose my
solution to the problematic relationship between constitutional
democracy and national identities.
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a) The exclusion of antidemocratic claims from a liberal
democracy
Obviously, a community might rule out political movements - such as
religious extremism, fascism, etc. - since they challenge the very
existence of democracy. In liberal states, the theoretical procedure
which leads to the ruling out of these movements is relatively
straightforward. Firstly, there is a substantive evaluation of the
compatibility of these political entities with a hypothetical set of
democratic values, which are embedded in liberal societies. Secondly,
if political claims supported by these movements are considered
"democratically intolerable" the exclusion might be inserted into the
legal system either by a decision adopted by a legislative body or by
the judicial entity - such as a constitutional court -. Let me pursue this
through with an example. If a neo-fascist party proposes a draft bill
which prevents all people with black skin from accessing educational
institutions, the legislative assembly evaluates the effect of such a bill
on a democratic society and has the option of either refusing its
approval or accepting it as part of the legislative system. If the
proposals were accepted, the blatant violation of basic liberal
principles should be picked-up by judicial bodies and made
ineffective. The jurisdictional institutions work in a liberal system like
a second line of defence against the abuse of state's power. However,
Habermas explains that linking democracy with a substantive set of
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values - such as the one supported by liberalism - is irrational."4 I
agree with him, when he argues that democracy should rely only on a
minimum set of procedural rules - such as the freedom to intervene in
a political discussion and the equality of the speakers - which allow
the communicative interaction between members of the political
community. This interaction guarantees the linkage between
rationality, democracy, and popular will.
Habermas asserts that this linkage is missing in a liberal society which
is driven by private interests. Citizens - in liberal societies -
participate in the political debate in order to protect their own
resources. The expected outcome of this interaction is not rationality,
but contractual bargaining. The state's ability to find political
solutions is measured on the basis of its ability to reach into the
private sphere and settle conflicts. However, the constant emergence
of new irrational private claims drives the state into a legitimation
crisis."5 Habermas argues that the only possible alternative to the
corruption of liberal democracy is the normative separation between
private and public sphere, and the partial return to the ancient
democracy in which any political decision is taken with the
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communicative involvement of the entire political community. The
separation between private and public spheres will stop the
manipulation of the political debate by interest groups - such as
economic lobbies, political parties etc.-, and it will give a criterion to
distinguish the process of democratic social integration and systematic
state activity - such as the implementation of economic policies.
b) The difficulties of excluding claims from a deliberative
democracy
Habermas argues that the state's policies and social integration are
two normatively distinct elements in a political theory. To make this
last distinction clearer let us go back to our example of the exclusion
of fascism from modern society. For Habermas, the political debate
over the ruling out of fascism and the implementation of its exclusion
are two normatively distinct procedures. The democratic process
which leads to the political decision of excluding fascism creates a
sense of cohesion around the outcomes of the debate. In contrast with
this procedure, the implementation of the political decision is a
systematic activity in which resources are used for achieving a
determinate end - such as the exclusion of antidemocratic claims -. In
substantive theories of democracy - such as the ones proposed by
liberals -, there is no distinction between social and systematic
integration.
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This confusion - Habermas points out - gives the constitutional
document, which sustains the liberal state, a paradoxical relationship
to democracy.
"According to the classical conception, the
laws ofthe republic express the unrestricted will
of the united citizens. Regardless of how the
laws reflect the existing ethos of the shared
political life, this ethos presents no limitation
insofar as it achieves its validity only through
the citizens' own process ofwill-formation.
The principle of the constitutional exercise of
power, on the other hand, appears to set limits
on the people's sovereign self-determination.
The rule of law requires that democratic will-
formation not violate human rights that have
been positively enacted as basic rights. " 196
The paradox is due to the unjustifiable moral values attached to
constitutional norms. Habermas agrees that a legislative system is not
simply a mere executor of normatively superior political decisions but
it also works as a conveyor of moral demands which emerge from the
social debate into the systemic organisation of society. Law has a
J. Habermas, "Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?" Political
Theory 29/6 (2001), 766-81p.766
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privileged status - he explains - which pragmatically bridges the gap
between the democratic process which is the real source of political
legitimisation - and systemic integration which looks after the
economics needs of modern society. On the one hand, the legislative
system partly directs resources - capital, labour and administrative
power - towards a maximum economic efficiency, and on the other
hand it partly provides the rules which modern democracy has to
obey.
However, an aprioristic system of laws does not create social
integration. Habermas proposes his solution to the problem of the
paradoxical relation between rules of law and democracy. He argues
that citizens are only obliged by legal norms if they are allowed to
participate to the procedure which leads to legislative deliberation. He
suggests that a society ruled in such a fashion will combine popular
democracy and a Kantian theory of human rights. This linkage - he
argues - between law and the process of social integration around an
autonomous system of moral statutes is not guaranteed if the public
sphere is not completely open to social demands.
He explains that individuals have different criteria of morality, and in
a modern pluralistic society, there is little agreement about the
connection between morality and statutes. He points out that in liberal
societies the connection is a fiction based on the representative
government of the majority but the substantial connection between
morality and law might be - and in many cases is - contested by a
117
minority which is close to represent half of the population. This
tension between majority and minority affects the legitimacy and
stability of the liberal state.
Habermas points out that morality can be connected to legal statutes
only if laws are the result of a discussion and this debate satisfies
certain procedural presuppositions - such as the equality of the
speakers and the openness of the debate -. The collective interaction
during a moral discussion prevents subjective reflections on moral
issues from becoming legal statutes without being accepted as
legitimate statutes. In this representation of democracy, Habermas
outlines a consensual theory of legitimacy, according to which
constitutional norms can be legitimated only when social interests are
discussed through the discursive channel of public debate.'"
The prospect of achieving this rational legal system, Habermas points
out, depends on the procedural protection of the freedom to intervene
in the political arena, and on the equality of the speakers. These two
limits guarantee that individuals will be involved in the democratic
process with the sole interest of disclosing personal reflections and the
openness of the public debate guarantees rational political decisions as
the final product of an activity of communicative persuasion. If those
affected by a legal statute have participated in the communicative
process which leads to its approval, the agreements which are reached
197
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within the discussion are morally "correct" and can become legitimate
statutes.
c) How CAN HABERMAS EXCLUDE NATIONALISM FROM AN OPEN
DEBATE?
As I explained in the first chapter, the modus operandi which
republicans - such as Habermas - use for making their theory is based
on an interpretation of the historical protection of some basic
democratic values. The methodological procedure they follow is
called "epistemic constructivism". Authors - such as Estlund,'™ Nino,""
and Tully -2"" explain that these kinds of political proposals adopt a two
stages process. Nino2'" makes clear that epistemologists, such as
Habermas, firstly adopt a procedural theory for finding political
explanations, which they consider truthful. Next, epistemologists
combine the solutions which have been reached by using the model
into a hypothesis - such as constitutional patriotism -. However, this
procedure is democratically incoherent. In a political theory, the
practice of discussing and contesting previous political decisions is a
normative priority which protects the democratic coherence of the
D. Estlund, "Beyond Fairness and Deliberation", in ed/s J. Bohman and W. Rehg, Deliberative
Democracy : Essays on Reason and Politics. (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT, 1997), 173- 204.
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community.2"3 Thus, assuming that a debate can produce universal
political solutions supported by a general consensus and then
subjectively combining these decisions - as Habermas does - into a
political model is antidemocratic.
The problem - Nino2'" explains - of this modus operandi has to do with
the difference between epistemology and political theory.2"4 I agree
with Nino, when he argues that in contrast with a political theory -
which should always maintain the democratic coherence of polity -
epistemology is concerned with the study of the sources and the limits
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of knowledge." Epistemologists assert that it is the correctness of the
reasoning which underpins our beliefs in what is true knowledge. For
example: the result of a basic equation such as two plus two can be
considered part of our knowledge only if the procedure, which leads to
that result, is correct. Therefore, four, which is the result of the
equation, is considered true and it deserves to be inserted as part of
our knowledge only on the bases of the correctness of the reasoning
which supports it as an outcome of a basic equation. The situation
would be different if we had told to a child who learned by heart to
count from one to ten that the result of two plus two is four.21"' In this
J. Tully, "Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity." Political Theory 30/4 (2002), 533-55
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Before continuing in our analysis, I have make to clear that it is not one of the aims of this thesis to
contest the general methodological approach of Habermas' epistemology, instead this detour in our
debate over the role of nationalism in modern democracy is only for pointing out the differences between
epistemology and political theory.
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case the child would have had no reasons for believing the veracity of
our assertion since it has no reasons for considering our procedure
correct and he or she might ask why the result is not five.
Starting from similar methodological assumptions, Habermas argues
in his political account of nationalism that any rational human being is
willing to accept other political claims as part of his or her rational
thinking only if he or she has the occasion to question the reasoning
which supports the demand. He explains that questioning and debating
political claims has two effects on a political community. It creates
consensus around what is truthful and morally admissible as he
already made clear in his epistemological research (he elaborates this
point in 'Theory of Communicative Action).2"7 Next, the interaction
between individuals creates a sense of social integration which
Habermas considers essential to the coherence of the modern state.
With his constitutional patriotism, Habermas pursues this idea a step
further and argues that a coherent reading of how republican
constitutions have been made will justify the ruling out of nationalism
- as political stance - from the political arena.
To make this point clearer let us go back to our example of explaining
for the first time a basic equation to a child. The first step on the
child's learning process of mastering the fundamentals of mathematics
is the observation of reality, such as the presence of two pencils on the
table. Next, we have to make him or her note how the situation
J. Habermas. The Theory ofCommunicative Action. (London: Heinemann, 1984).
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changes if another two pens are added to the two that are already
there. This process constructs on the mind of the child an association
between reality and working with numbers which he or she considers
correct. On the one hand, this is the first step from which the child will
build his/her trust on mathematics as a formal representation of
reality. On the other, it excludes any other theoretical process for
finding how many pencils are on the table if to a group of two pencils
is added another group of two.This last consideration is the base of
constructivism: only constructive proofs, and entities demonstrable
by them, are admissible on the formation of knowledge.
Habermas adopts a more complex reasoning, but the key principles he
uses in his constitutional patriotism are similar. Firstly, he proposes
the adoption of a theory of deliberative democracy which should
provide the epistemic model for finding solutions to political
problems.
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Are mathematical statements genuinely validated (procedurally), or are procedures accepted when they
yield what is mathematically true? Is a mathematic an ensemble of unsupported assumptions? This is one
of the debates over the formalistic nature of the so called pure sciences, which might be related to the
example, but is irrelevant to the issue discussed here: can Habermas' deliberative democracy leads to
universal truth? The short answer to this question is no.
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"Given the challenges that confront today, I
want to argue, the communicative account of
republicanism is more appropriate than either
an ethno-national or even communitarian
conception of the nation, the rule of law, and
,,209
democracy.
Then, he argues that from the ensemble of solutions to past political
problems, which he assumes are collected in modern
constitutionalism, we should extract an aprioristic barring of
nationalism from modern democracy. "The nation-state must
renounce the ambivalent potential [The linkage between it and
nationalism] that once propelled it. "2I0 This praxis which works in
philosophy and science is democratically incoherent because it creates
decisions which are only based on the assumption of universal validity
of previous constitutional norms - not on a democratic decision.
In contrast with this idea, I will argue that a community cannot be
forced to accept the absolute validity of previous political decisions.
We will go back to this point in the fourth chapter, for now let us
continue our discussion on the internal coherence of constitutional
patriotism and the consequences of aprioristically excluding political
stances from democracy. An ideal democratic society - such as the
My Emphasis J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge:
Polity, 1999).p. 138
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one Habermas theorised in his theory of communicative action -2"
should be free from any attempts of sectarian colonisation of the
epistemological process which leads to the formation of political
decisions since this praxis falsifies the validity of democratic choices.
To make his point clearer Habermas takes the example of the modus
operandi adopted in liberal legal systems that try to limit their area of
regulation to the reduction of social conflict. He argues that the
epistemic validity of a political decision is ensured if the debate over
the morality or the veracity of a claim considers all participants equal
and the debate is open to any political claim. He argues that openness
of the public sphere is normatively above other social demands.
Habermas points out that the epistemic validity of a claim is
impossible within a liberal society since individuals use constitutional
protection of their private interests for forcing their claims through the
political debate. Confusing the protection of private interest with the
protection of democracy is a general problem of a liberal society
which is magnified in the European Union where member-states
irrationally protect their national interests. Habermas argues that the
irrationality of the linkage between state and the protection of national
interests is made obvious by a rational reading of the history of
constitution making.212
21]
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I have to stress again that in Habermas' political theory there is no distinction between civic
nationalism which endorses democracy and underpins the political template of all European states, and
ideological or ethic nationalism which embrace racism.
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We can say that it seems absurd to demand the ruling out of the
protection of national interests from a debate which takes place almost
exclusively for protecting them, but this is a pragmatic point which
has no effects on Habermas' political theory. Given that Habermas'
hypothesis rules out any linkage between democracy and substantial
claims, we have to assume that the republican values he wants to
protect by ruling out nationalism from the modern state are procedural
requirements of his theory. However, I want to argue that this
exclusion is still democratically problematic. Can Habermas apply his
epistemological theory in politics? Can a theory of deliberative
democracy insert a dismissal of claims related to national identity
from the political spectrum? Is this not in antithesis with the criteria of
openness of the public debate which links democracy to legality?
More importantly for us: is this exclusion democratically dangerous?
2. The internal incoherence of constitutional patriotism
Let us try to answer the questions which closed the previous section. I
pointed out that irrational claims, such as those supported by fascists
for example, can be ruled out from the democratic arena. Fascist
claims, such as imprisonment without just process, racial or ethnic
segregation etc., can be easily spotted in the course of a democratic
debate and thus excluded; but if he is to maintain the coherence of his
procedural theory, Habermas cannot have recourse to a substantive
criterion for that is to count as an anti-democratic claim. However, it
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seems that Habermas seeks to make a special case of nationalism. As I
said earlier, this constitutional patriotism appears to insert itself in the
middle ground between a procedural and a substantive theory of
democracy. On the one hand, it urges that the only form of true
democracy is one which allows the communicative interaction of all
citizens. On the other, it seems to criticise nationalism for being an
irrational and democratically dangerous political 'input' into the
communicative process and thus one which should be aprioristically
ruled out in a democratic community. It appears that Habermas in fact
pre-empts the conclusion of communicative debate, excluding apriori
all substantive claims related to national particularities from his
theorisation of the patriotic state. But this surely contradicts his
normative requirement that public debate must be open. And this is
crucial. Recall that for Habermas the openness of the public sphere is
a central guarantor of the legality of the legal system. Law can be
more than formally legal only if two normative conditions are
satisfied: public discourse in the public sphere and an extension of the
latter includes moral discourse. Thus, certain demands originating
from more general claims to the legal protection for national
particularities will not pass the rationality test of a democratic debate.
The point is, however, that this can be considered as normative
presuppositions in the public sphere only after discussion.
Nationalistic claims, such as all other political demands, cannot be
ruled out on the ground of their supposed irrationality, but only on the
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ground that they transgress the procedural requirements of democracy.
By excluding claims related to national particularities because they are
irrational, Habermas moves the foundations of constitutional
patriotism from the normative presuppositions upon which his
communicative political theory was built.
To rescue Habermas' constitutional patriotism we might perhaps
speculate that Habermas' is no more than a suggestion, which would
need to pass the scrutiny of the public sphere before it could assume
the universal status needed to become part of the legal system. This
might retain the theoretical consistency of Habermas' proposal, but it
would not exclude the possibility of a constitutional system which
promotes and defends national identity: for it goes against Habermas'
insistence that "[T\he lesson to be learned from this sad history is
obvious: the nation-state must renounce the ambivalent potential that
„213
once propelled it. " This attempt to rescue Habermas' patriotism
therefore faints.
3. The democratic risk of an aprioristic exclusion of
nationalism
In contrast with Habermas, I argue that we cannot aprioristically
exclude nationalism from democracy. National identities might
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support democratic claims such as the protection of a language,
national festivities etc. and antidemocratic demands - such as the
exclusion of 'aliens' from the state's political arena but I argue that
the evaluation of the democratic compatibility of these claims should
be left to the community itself. The difficulties of using the historical
evolution of constitutionalism to exclude nationalism is even more
evident ifwe consider the logical implications of Habermas' argument
for other constitutionally protected political elements of modern
society.
Habermas argues that the political system which supports the
constitutional protection of national self-determination is made
obsolete by an historical reading of the relation between democracy
and constitutionally protected republican values. But to dismiss claims
related to national identity from the political spectrum is to
superimpose rationality, not retrieve a model of social cohesion. Let
us take the example of religion to clarify this point. The link between
the history of constitution-making and religion plays a political role in
most modern states.214 It is widely believed that the protection of the
freedom of faith is historically the first constitutionally protected right
to be inscribed as a basic principle of modern constitution-making.
The American constitution is the first historical example: '[T]he
congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
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Or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
215
speech, or press.' On Habermas' view of the relation between
nationalism and constitutionalism, the republican protection of
religious freedom is part of the historical evolution of modern
constitution-making. There are cases in which states have a
constitutionally protected religion, e.g. Sweden and Norway; and
other secular states have preferential relationships with some
recognised religions, e.g. Germany, Poland, Italy, and Austria. But the
simple fact remains that none of these countries is particularly in
danger of losing the control of their democratic arenas at the hands of
religious extremists. Religion might be considered an ensemble of
anachronistic beliefs which are born out of a psychological need to
explain mysterious natural events. Subsequently, it has become an
efficient method of creating social cohesion, similar to that provided
by the idea of national identity to European states in the sixteenth
century. Continuing the parallel with what Habermas has said about
nationalism, the positive effect of creating a sense of belonging to a
particular group is in a precarious relationship with the irrationality of
its origins. If the balance is not well adjusted, the irrational aspect may
take over political debate, and religious claims become a pretext for
increasing sectarianism, discrimination and ethnic cleansing, as the
persecution of Jews worldwide shows.
However, the protection of freedom of faith has a regulatory effect on
215
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political debates where religious beliefs conflict with the policy of a
secular state. For example, consider a political debate over the right to
interrupt unwanted pregnancies: religion's supporters can argue for
the legal protection of their ideal of justice without fearing that their
claims will be dismissed on the ground that religious beliefs are
irrational. This approach has two advantages: first, religion is treated
as part of the cultural differentiae of modern society. Given that there
is direct relation between the number and the quality of political
claims and the rationality of political agreement, the constitutional
protection of freedom of faith indirectly increases the level of
rationality of decisions taken within the political arena. Second, such
protection makes debate possible without requiring that believers'
presuppositions be questioned. For example, 'the right to interrupt
unwanted pregnancies' might be contested by religious believers who
accept as true that life is an irreplaceable gift of God but the debate is
not conducted in terms ofwhether or not God exists.
Let me pursue this with a second example, one which directly
involves the myth of national identity. Mr. Jacopo Levi, an Italian
citizen, and his family decide to settle in Israel, and they buy over the
internet a piece of land from an Israeli company helping new Jewish
settlers. The Levi family is unaware of the fact that there is almost no
private land in Israel (it is entirely owned by the state).Consequently,
the company is bogus. When the Levi family arrives in Israel their
bogus estate agent escorts them to the land, where material has been
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prepared for them to start their new lives, and collects his fee.
However, the next day Dr. Walid Saliba, a Palestinian doctor who
works in Jerusalem, knocks on the door of their prefabricated
bungalow and asks them what they are doing on his land. Mr Levi
explains to Dr. Saliba that the Bible gives to him, as a Jew, an
ancestral right to live on this piece of land, which was once part the
Empire of King David. Dr. Saliba, who is an atheist and is not
impressed with this argument, explains to Mr. Levi that there is little
archaeological evidence that King David ever existed, and that Jews
cannot claim rights to this land which belongs to him. Mr. Levi finds
Dr Saliba's argument outrageous and points out that the existence of
King David is documented by the words of God as transcribed in the
Bible and that no other evidence is needed to underpin his claim. At
this point Dr. Saliba affirms that establishing the existence of God is
even more difficult than establishing the existence of King David,
whereas he can prove that this estate has belonged to his family since
the middle ages, when his ancestors settled in this desert. Mr. Levi
then points out that this constitutes an admission that his rights, which
originate in the Bible, historically precede Dr. Saliba's claims, and
that, therefore even under Ottoman law - which considers the right of
property not to be subject to desuetude - the land he bought belongs to
the people of Israel.
Now, both parties in this dispute argue that the reasoning which
supports 'the other' argument is irrational. They challenge the validity
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of the premises which support their respective arguments and they
assume that the impossibility of finding any "middle ways" is a
sufficient reason for denying each other's claims. However, this is to
confuse the incompatibility between two sets of beliefs with a rational
resolution of the issue. And when Habermas demands the exclusion of
nationalism from modern democracies he commits the same
theoretical mistake: he extracts a set of values from the historical
evolution of constitutionalism, and then, assuming the rational validity
of these values, he demands the exclusion of nationalism from
democracy.
If we accept that such exclusion is a rational feature of an ideal
constitution, then any political demands which refer to a sociological
feature of modern society, nationalism, religion etc., would have to be
barred from being discussed in the political arena on the grounds that
they are incompatible with the rational evolution of constitution-
making. This was sensed by Canovan, when she pointed out that
constitutional patriotism enlarges the gap between community and
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legal system and makes the state illegitimate, but few realised that
Habermas' idea of a patriotic state actually requires an anti¬
democratic a priori exclusion of any forms of thinking incompatible
with the set of norms he considers any constitution should embrace.
The same reasoning that Habermas uses to extract from an historical
analysis of the relationship between nationalism and the European
216
M. Canovan, Patriotism Is Not Enough, (Exeter: University of Exeter Department ofPolitics, 1997).
132
process of constitution-making might be analogically extended
(without boundaries) to other political entities which are grounded in
non-verifiable rational demands. These kinds of dismissal are not
related to the acceptability of these claims within the political arena,
but rather to the internal compatibility of their sociological basis with
the rational set of rules Habermas supposes should be adopted by an
ideal constitution. This consideration makes constitutional patriotism a
theoretical instrument for forging unquestionable consensus around an
idea of superimposed rationality, which induces homogenisation and
discrimination. This aspect of constitutional patriotism makes
Habermas' hypothesis similar to those undemocratic proposals by
nationalists which the author so convincingly rebuts.
4. The pragmatic effects of constitutional patriotism
I agree with Habermas when he argues that freedom and equality for
all are the only procedural requirements of modern democracy. In
contrast with these principles, in constitutional patriotism Habermas
demands an aprioristic exclusion of nationalism from democracy. He
asserts that the relationship between constitution and nationalism is
irrational and it might endanger republican values. Habermas argues
that an a priori exclusion of nationalism is supported by the historical
analysis of the process of European constitutionalism which makes the
ruling out of ethnos from democracy a procedural logical requirement
of his theory.
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However, I explained that Habermas' idea of using the historical
evolution of constitutionalism is debatable and cannot support the
introduction of a new requirement into his theory of deliberative
democracy. In addition, I pointed out that the relativistic nature of
Habermas' historical analysis of constitutionalism could be extended
to include the ruling out of any political movements which do not fit
his idea of rationality. This pragmatic aspect has a theoretical
repercussion for Habermas' hypothesis of democracy. Habermas
argues that each country develops its own "constitutional culture" and
he suggests that the republican values which constitute the back bone
ofmodern liberal democracy are interpreted in relation with individual
national histories. He argues that the patriotic desire of protecting
these historical interpretations creates a political commitment which
should take the place originally occupied by nationalism. The problem
here is how to distinguish the protection of republican values which
characterized individual European states from nationalism. To clarify
this issue Habermas tries to show how his hypothesis can provide a
solution to three ongoing discussions related to the political role of the
national state in modern democracy. To support the beneficial effect
of adopting constitutional patriotism as the theoretical template of
modern state, Habermas tests his hypothesis in three ongoing
discussions related to the political role of the national state in modern
democracy. The three issues in which Habermas wants to test the
validity of his proposal are: the protection of national minorities, the
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democratic deficit of international organisations such as the European
Union, and the right of humanitarian intervention in case of crimes
against humanity such as genocide. However I will explain that these
attempts of implementing his theoretical analysis of the connection -
or the lack of it- between state and nation magnify the shortcoming of
his aprioristic rejection of the role of nationalism from modern
democracy.
a) The protection of minorities
Habermas points out that minorities mistakenly considered the right of
self-determination as the only guarantee for the protection of their
cultural diversity. As I mentioned on the first chapter, Habermas
argues that the right of national self-determination is an irrational
misinterpretation of the individual right of self-determination which
supports the template of the liberal state.
"Kant ascribes to every human being as such
the right to have rights and to regulate his life in
common with others in such a way that everyone
can enjoy equal liberties in accordance with
public, coercive laws.
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But this does not settle who may actually
make use ofthis right with whom and when; nor
does it settle who may unite into a self-
determining commonwealth on the basis of a
social contract. "217
Habermas makes clear that the problematic aspect of assuming the
existence of a right self-determination of the nation becomes obvious
when we are searching for the limits of this communal right. He
explains that nationalists firstly misjudge the relation between
individual rights and shared cultural identity; next they propose a
solution - the right of self-determination of all national minorities -
which is unrelated to the problem of having different communities
within a polity. The difficulties of having a national minority
physically embedded into wider national communities - Habermas
argues - cannot be eliminated through the formation of a new national
state which moves the problems under a different banner. He argues
that the protection of minorities can only be achieved "[T]hrough a
process of inclusion that is sufficiently sensitive to the cultural
background of individual and group-specific differences
If it is easy to agree with Habermas on the 'Chinese box effect' of
demanding the right of self-determination of the national minority,
less convincing is considering cosmopolitanism capable of protecting
J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).p.140
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a minority. Firstly, there is a problem with the distinction - which
Habermas makes - between national minorities and national
community. The issue here is not terminological nor is related to
immigration; Habermas distinguishes the national community which
is a dangerous historical fabrication from 'born minorities' which he
inserts on the trend of multiculturalism. As I explained earlier on this
thesis, conceptualizing the idea of national identity is a theoretically
precarious process which is open to relativistic interpretations. There
is little certainty on what are the characteristics of the national
community and even less confidence on how cultural or ethnical
features can be used for separating a community from another.
Secondly, there are the questions of how and who decides what
minorities can demand and what they cannot.2"
Does he assume that majorities are capable of constitutional patriotism
and national minorities are not? Or does he ignore that national
majorities are national communities? Habermas argues that an
inclusive model of democracy sensitive to differences should protect
the individual rights of the members of the minority group, but one of
the pillars of constitutional patriotism is the aprioristic exclusion of
nationalistic claims from the political debate. This normative ruling
out of nationalism from modern democracy and the protection of
minorities are problematic. On the one hand, the members of the




protection of social features such as their language and traditions since
they are the historical result of arbitrariness and irrationality. On the
other hand, members of the national minority can demand the
protection of their cultural heritage since this is one of the aspects of a
multicultural society.
This separation appears artificial. Even if we might envisage that the
creation of a state for any nation is contra factual, this should not be
an argument for aprioristically excluding a political claim in a
theoretical proposal. There is more here than an internal incoherence.
A national minority group is normatively identical to the national
majority group which holds it captive under the imposition of a
majority vote. Imposing an exclusion of nationalism from the political
arena cannot spare the protection ofminority rights - which Habermas
wants to be protected - since the reasons which support both forms of
nationalism are identical. If Habermas takes his idea of constitutional
patriotism to its logic extent he has to exclude the protection of
minorities' rights from modern democracy. The obvious effect of this
ruling out is the endorsement of a system which squashes cultural and
political differentiae. Habermas does not realise that his idea of
constitutional democracy can transform democracy into a dictatorship
of a majority which imposes its will to a democratically defenceless
minority. This is exactly the starting point of his critique of liberalism,
which then motivates the making of his theory of constitutional
patriotism.
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b) Demos, legitimacy and the European Union
There are two different debates over the democratic deficit on the
European Union. Firstly, there is a discussion which involves mainly
constitutional lawyers and political theorists over the democratic
incongruence of the European legislative processes. The main actors
in this process are: the Commission, as the initiator of Community
legislation; the Parliament, as co-legislator; and the Council, as the
ultimate decision-maker.220 The problem with this repartition of roles is
that the Commission, which is an unelected body, has the power to set
the agenda for the two elected institutions: the Parliament22' and the
Council.222 The exclusion of democratic representatives from the
decisional process that chooses which issues should be discussed by
the political arena makes the European legislative praxis
democratically precarious. In his theory of constitutional patriotism,
Habermas does not directly discuss this problem since he considers it
- and I agree with him - a general problem of capitalistic societies not
a particular problem of the European Union. In capitalistic states the
These labels are over-simplified: there are a variety of law-making procedures that require the
institutions to interact in different ways (essentially, dependent on subject matter/Treaty provision). See
for instance: P. P. Craig and G. De Burca, EURO Law : Text. Cases, and Materials. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), K. P. E. Lasok and D. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union.
(London: Butterworths, 2001).
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practice of deciding political themes is hijacked by the strategic use of
mass-media which almost exclusively directs the interest of the public
opinion to issues which are economically relevant. In this contest, -
Habermas argues - the fact that Europe is institutionally unbalanced in
favour of non-elected institutions such as the Commission is a
pragmatic detail which magnifies the democratic deficiency of the
liberal state.221
Secondly, there is a discussion over the role of the European demos on
the future of the European Union which tries to answer the question:
should we have a European Demos bounded by a European
Constitution? In his theory of constitutional patriotism, Elabermas
argues that a European demos is not a requirement for a European
Union state. The European integration project should exploit the
already present common cultural heritage with the creation of a
communicative network among Europeans. 224 This shared political
culture derives from the sharing of a common history.
Here, Habermas makes direct reference to the history of the two
World Wars where Europeans have learned to despise nationalism and
its policies of ethnic and racial segregation. Again, the claim of the
existence of a common culture out of a thousand years of wars appears
far-fetched, but historical and pragmatic contradictions between
223
In other words, the fact that interest groups might manipulate the political debate is not a particular
issue of the European Union, instead, it should be considered as a general problem of any democratic
society.
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"[T]/;e initial impetus to integration, in the direction of a Postnational society, is not provided by the
substrate of a supposed 'European people' but by a communicative network ofEuropean-wide political
public sphere embedded in a share political culture." J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in
Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).p. 153
140
Habermas' theory of democracy - such as the fact that the European
Union plans to expand in North Africa (e.g. Morocco) and in the
Middle-East (e.g. Turkey, Israel) - are not reducing the theoretical
value of his proposal. Without dragging back this analysis to a
historical account of the relation between democracy and nationalism
that we saw in the first and second chapter, I want to argue that
Habermas' idea of a common European culture is incoherent with the
theoretical preconditions upon which his theory is built. In
constitutional patriotism, Habermas argues that a rational reading of a
common tradition of constitution making will exclude nationalism
from modern democracy. However, in his analysis of the possibility of
having a European state Habermas seems to insert a common culture
as a requirement for the creation of a public sphere.225 This referring to
a common culture as a requirement for the creation of a new political
entity such as the European Union is theoretically similar to the
reasoning that Habermas proposes for excluding nationalism from the
template of the modern state. Firstly he puts forward a subjective
historical account of European history which supports his thesis; next
he considers his historical speculation as a normative element of
modern democracy.
" To be sure, a politically constituted context of solidarity between citizens who, despite remaining
strangers to one another, are supposed to stand up for each other is a communicative context 'involving
demandingpreconditions '[Italic on the original text]." Ibid. p. 158
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"Accordingly, from a normative perspective
there can be no European federal state worthy
of the title of a European democracy unless a
European-wide, integrated public sphere
develops in the ambit of a common political
culture: a civil society encompassing
associations, nongovernmental organisation,
citizens' movements, etc. "226
The requirement of a common political culture which - Habermas
argues- has made obsolete nationalism should be considered the
theoretical base upon which democracy should be built. Apart from
the fact that this idea of a European common culture for underpinning
a European State is extremely close to MacCormick's hybrid idea of
nationalism - which Habermas certainly would not embrace this
connection between supposedly shared values and institutions seems
democratically dangerous. As I said about the exclusion of
nationalism, a theory of deliberative democracy normatively relies on
the existence of an open democratic arena where different claims are
discussed and where individuals can reach political agreements. These
diversified political claims cannot be but the expression of a culturally
diversified society. Demanding the exclusion of nationalism and then
the creation of a common political culture as a precondition of a
democratic European Union, Habermas reduces the level of cultural
226
Ibid.p. 160 [My emphasis]
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differentiae and shrinks the political debate into the limits of what he
subjectively considers rational. This is, even if we consider his idea of
a European common culture as a procedural requirement - which he
might grasp from a historical reading of the connections between
European nations - since this prerequisite presupposes a separation
between elements which are part of the European common culture and
features which are not. Therefore considering the existence of a
common European culture as a prerequisite for a European
Democratic state supports a cultural process of homogenisation which
is in blatant contrast with the requirement of the openness of the
public sphere.
c) The right of Humanitarian Intervention
Habermas also tests his tenet on the evolution of the right of
humanitarian intervention. He argues that the historical changes in the
understanding of the right of national self-determination by
international organisations - such as the United Nations and the
European Union - support the adoption of a new theoretical template
for the implementation of Human Rights in cases of crimes against
humanity - such as genocide etc.227 Until recently international law
considered the principle of non intervention on the internal affairs of a
sovereign state and the "pacta sunt servanda" - agreements must be
followed - as the few basic rules of international relations. Obviously,
Ibid.p. 150 and successive.
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the international community might question the legitimacy of a state's
internal policies but it cannot act for imposing international law. Let
us take the example of the Italian fascist regime to make this point.
The fascist party in Italy obtained the leadership by means of the so
called Acerbo's law. The parliamentary approval of such law took
place in a gallery which was filled with fascist thugs who were well-
known for using their violent methods against their political enemies.
Not a long time after, the leader of the opposition - Giacomo Matteotti
- was killed, the parliament was dissolved, and the opposition parties
made illegal. Finally in 1938 the Fascist government adopted the
system of racial laws which started the process of discrimination
against Jews and ended up with the deportation of thousands of
civilians to the concentration camps. This chain of events leaves little
doubt about the substantial illegality of the fascist government
however following the traditional interpretation of the principle of non
intervention on the internal affairs of sovereign states, the policy of
racial segregation of the Italian government during the nineteen-
thirties was an internal affair and therefore an international
interference was unjustifiable.
However, Habermas argues that after the genocide of the Jewish
minority during World War Two - which made obvious the potential
of the industrial modern state for enslaving and killing millions of
innocent civilians -, the principle of non intervention into the internal
affairs of a national state has been put under scrutiny.
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"The conception of sovereignty in classical
international law entails a prohibition on
interference in the internal affairs of an
internationally recognized state. This
prohibition of intervention is indeed reaffirmed
by the UN Charter; but from the beginning it
stood in tension with the development of the
internationalprotection ofhuman rights. "228
He points out a theoretical support for an external intervention on the
internal affairs of a sovereign state cannot be found on the traditional
understanding of the international relations between states. Habermas
agrees with the critique of the right of intervention proposed by
communitarians such as Walzer.22' Walzer explains that it is a
theoretical mistake to consider the United Nations General Assembly
entitled to enforce the protection of Human Rights against a formally
legitimate government. The Assembly is composed by representatives
of internationally recognised countries not by democratically elected
governments, thus its decisions are undemocratic and illegitimate.
In order to overcome the theoretical problem of legitimizing the action
of non democratic organisations Habermas suggests that a rational
interpretation of Human Rights should not be considered as part of the
international law but as part of a "cosmopolitan law'". "But the
Ibid.p. 147
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Habermas quotes; M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.
(New York: Basic Books, 1977).
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decisions and strategies of the world organisation, and specially the
intervention offorces carrying out UN mandates since 1989, indicate
the direction along which international law (Volkerrecht) is gradually
being transformed into a cosmopolitan law (Weltburgerrecht). "230
Habermas argues that it is the new interpretation of Human Rights
that obliges the United Nations Assembly to go beyond the theoretical
limits of the right of self-determination of the nation. He asserts that
the atrocities of the Holocaust have changed the meaning of the
protection of liberal rights from basic democratic principles to
universal laws. "These political and legal developments are reactions
to an objectively changed situation. The unprecedented nature and the
scale of the government criminality [...] makes a mockery of the
classical presumption of the innocence of the sovereign subjects of
international law. [...] peacekeeping must take into account the
complex social andpolitical causes ofwar. "2"
Similar to what he said about the exclusion of nationalist claims from
the theoretical structure of the democratic state, Habermas argues that
it is a rational interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations
which makes the protection of Human Rights a basic requirement of
modern democracy. "Such interpretations in support of internal
democratization are, however, irreconcilable with a conception of
democratic self-determination that grounds a right of national
230




independence foi the sake of the collective self-realisation of a
culturalform oflifep™
In accordance with what has already been said about the distinction
between substantive and epistemic theory of democracy, Habermas'
legitimation of violent implementation of Human Rights should be
considered as a procedural element of modern democracy. If
Habermas endorses the substantial values of the Human Rights'
theory, he also supports the ownership of rights which is the
ideological starting point of liberalism.2" This would be incoherent
with the theoretical requirement of openness of the public debate
which is one of the pillars which support his theory of communicative
action, and it is in contrast with the motivation which prompts
Habermas to propose his 'alternative' to the liberal state. However,
historical analyses are unavoidably relativistic and they cannot
provide the universal justification needed for inserting the protection
of Human Rights into epistemic theories such as Habermas' theory of
communicative democracy.
Habermas' idea that the implementation of the Charter of the United
Nations is the signal of a change of its interpretation cannot be but a




Habermas proposes his theory of communicative democracy as an alternative to liberal society. His
radical break with Liberalism is grounded on the relinquishment of the protection of the ownership of
rights. Habermas makes the point that a political system based on protection of rights transforms the
democratic debate in a strategic game where individuals pursue the protection of their private interests -
not morality of truthfulness -. In order to propose an alternative to this system Habermas argues that the
openness of the public debate and freedom of speech should substitute the concept of Habeas corpus -
literally the ownership of the body - as a basis of the political system. From this presupposition it
proposes a theory based on the communicative interaction which should substitute the political bargaining
of liberal society.
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debate before being considered as part of the legal system of a
community. Demanding a 'cosmopolitan right' - which he assumes is
embedded in modern democracy - to implement the Charter of United
Nations by antidemocratic organisations is not only theoretically
incoherent, but also dangerous since it implies that the legal system
based on the evolution of western philosophy bears universal values
that allow the squashing of the democratic practices of people which
cannot - or does not want to - be represented by the systems of values
that these international organisations uphold. Habermas should accept
that these values are not universally verified and more importantly
they cannot redeem the activity of unrepresentative international
institutions.
5. The democratic incoherence of constitutional
patriotism and the need for a new model
In this chapter Habermas' proposal for a patriotic state has opened our
debate over the relationship between nationalism and constitutional
democracy. He explains that the relation between a capitalist society
and the model of social inclusion of the national state is irrational and
democratically dangerous. He argues that a society which relies
exclusively on the values of liberalism is lacking social integration.
This lack of social integration cannot be compensated by sharing the
same nationality. Ethnicity is an irrational belief which might be
strategically abused for discriminating and persecuting non-members
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of the national community. This danger - Habermas argues - should
be limited by a procedural exclusion of nationalism from modern
constitutional democracy. He suggests that a rational reading of the
history of constitutionalism should support the exclusion of the
irrational myth of national identity from modern democracy and the
adoption of a new template for the state which he called constitutional
patriotism. This hypothesis of patriotic state would help to solve the
democratic issue of international organisations - such as the European
Union and the United Nations and the protection of religious and
national minorities.
I agree with Habermas' critique of the relation between liberalism and
modern state. On the one hand liberalism cannot provide the model of
social integration which can bind the members of the community. The
prospect of equal opportunities and fair redistribution of resources is
frustrated by an endemic distrust of public intervention in a liberal
economy. The result is a society in which greed leads to an unfair
accumulation of resources in the hands of a few who undemocratically
influence the state's policies at a global level.2" I also agree with
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How can a second or third world country democratically decide its future when multinational
companies and multinational organisations - such as the World Trade Organisation - dictate its internal
policies?
On the other hand, liberalism fails to protect the values which support it as a substantive theory ofjustice.
Firstly, the liberal state confuses the protection of the state apparatus with the protection of republican
values. The Antiterrorism legislations adopted after the episode of September the 11™' are an example of
how the liberal state increases its protection as an autonomous apparatus by annihilating the jurisdictional
guarantees of its subjects under the banner of the protection of liberal values. Secondly, the protection of
liberal values is directly linked with the protection of private interests. Liberal states behave in the
international arena as private entities which try to maximize their wealth in an environment with limited
resources. This modus operandi confuses the individual right of self-determination which is one of the
pillars of a liberal society with a national right of self-determination which is alien to liberalism. The
pragmatic effect of tiding the protection of republican values with private interests is that international
intervention protects wide violations of Human Rights - such as the case of genocide - only when these
infringements reach the phase of the biological elimination.
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Habermas' when, in his theory of communicative democracy, he
provides the basis for an alternative to the liberal state, but his
constitutional patriotism cannot be considered a suitable substitute to
the theoretical model of the nation-state. The connection between state
and nation is precarious and it might be democratically dangerous, but
I suggest that a template for the state should recognise that modern
society sustains itself by a process of social integration which is
guaranteed only by the openness of the public debate. Instead,
Habermas suggests that the extension of the political debate can be
normatively limited by a rational reading of the evolution of
constitutionalism. This claim is theoretically unsupported. Given the
normative interrelation between the extension of the political debate
and the legitimacy of the decisions taken within the political arena, I
argue that an aprioristic restriction of the political arena should be
considered democratically incoherent since it forces a process of
homogenisation which supports antidemocratic solutions on the basis
of a subjective reading of the history of constitutionalism. This search
into the past might provide reasons for supporting a political demand
not for excluding apriori a political stance.
In conclusion, I agree with Habermas' claims that we need to re-think
the role of nationalism in modern constitutional democracy, but we
have to acknowledge that all political entities - and this includes
national identities - contribute with their demands to maintain the
150




TULLY'S IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MULTINATIONALISM
1. MULTINATIONALISM AGAINST PATRIOTISM
In the preceding sections of this thesis, we set the theoretical frame of
debate over the role of nationalism in modern democracy by analysing
the limits of Habermas' cosmopolitanism. I argue that the debate over
the role of nationalism in modern constitutional theory hinges only on
the relationship between democracy and the admissibility of political
claims in the political arena. I argued that nationalist claims cannot be
excluded without compromising the democratic coherence of a
community. However, how can modern constitutional democracy
accommodate ethnocentric political claims? In what follows I shall
argue that a theory of multinationalism, similar to the one proposed by
Tully,235 provides an answer to this question.
However, Habermas' patriotism focuses on finding radical solutions
to the problematic relations between nationalism and democracy,
whereas Tully's multinationalism wants to protect the role of national
identities in modern democracy. This last perspective, which I
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J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Aee of Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), J. Tully, "Diversity's Gambit Declined", in ed/s C. Cook, Constitutional
Predicament : Canada after the Referendum of 1992. (Montreal ; London: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1994),, J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-35.
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endorse, maintains that there is a normative relationship between the
constitutional practice of acknowledging a national identity and
democracy. In this chapter, and on the following two, I will explain
the reasons which support this choice.236
a) Tully and Habermas: A common critique of modern
constitutional democracy
We should start our journey by introducing the theoretical basis upon
which Tully builds his analysis of the role of nationalism in modern
democracy. I will do this by comparing Tully with Habermas. This
brief comparative analysis has the advantage of reducing the
explicative difficulties of introducing another highly theoretical author
and will provide a clear distinction between the works of the two
theorists which are often discussed together by constitutional lawyers.
I will make clear that Habermas and Tully share a similar critique of
modern constitutionalism but their solutions to the impasse of modern
liberal democracy are normatively different.
Let us start by pointing out the similarities between the two authors,
and then I will explain why Tully's theory is better analysis of the
relationship between national identities and modern constitutional
I can anticipate that the idea ofmultinationalism endorsed in this thesis ultimately derails from the path
proposed by Tully (chapter 5). He combines liberal values with the constitutional recognition of national
identity. By endorsing an aprioristic protection of liberal values, Tully undermines the procedure of
recognition of national identity. This makes his proposal democratically coherent only for those national
communities which embrace liberal values. In contrast with Tully, I will I will argue (chapter 6) that we
have to adopt a more radical model of democracy where multinationalism is limited only by a minimal set
of procedural requirements. By adopting this idea of constitutional democracy, the dangers which
nationalism might bring to a political community are part of the risk that a community has to take in order
to ensure its democratic cohesion and finally the 'legitimacy' of its legal system.
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democracy. Tully2" and Habermas2" point out that contemporary
constitutional democracy relies on the existence of a shared agreement
on the substantial moral validity of liberal rights which is in blatant
contrast with the process of democratic deliberation.2" Liberal
societies - Tully and Habermas make clear - use two arguments to
justify the existence of this link between a system of substantive
values and democracy.24" Firstly, liberals assert that liberal values are
universal. Secondly, they argue that these values normatively support
the constitutional system and all the norms which are derived from
that system. Tully and Habermas are critical of the coherence of these
two elements.24' They explain that the system of constitutional rules
based on liberal theory betrays the democratic principles as originally
set up by democratic societies. "These democratic practices of
deliberation [which are adopted in liberal societies] are themselves
rule governed (to be constitutionally legitimate), but the rules must
also be open to democratic amendment (to be democratically
legitimate). "242 The two authors argue that an ideal form of democracy
- such as the one adopted in Athens in the fifth century BC - must
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J. Tully, "Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity." Political Theory 30/4 (2002), 533-55, J. Tully,
"The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy." Modern
Law Review 65/2 (2002), 204-28
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See for instance: J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976)., J. Habermas, The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.
(Cambridge: Polity, 1989).
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We will see later that Tully adopts a procedural interpretation of liberal rights for his theory of
multinationalism which is no less incoherent than Habermas'. but this is not the point in discussion here.
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See for Instance: J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
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We will in chapter five the differences between liberalism and Rawls's neo liberalism. J. Rawls,
Political Liberalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
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allow the direct political participation of all members of the polity.
This form of direct participation is impossible in modern states which
govern millions of individuals.
Tully agrees with Habermas that constitutionalism has solved the
problem of regulating the life of millions of individuals by assuming
the validity of a set of constitutionally protected rights. However, both
authors explain that modern constitutionalism, which relies on a
system of substantive values, is democratically precarious.241 Firstly, it
antidemocratically imposes a grid of values which substantially limits
the public debate by excluding political entities from the political
arena, such as extremist religious groups. Secondly, the procedural
connection between subjects and their indirect representatives is
weakened by pragmatic limitations.
Those elected are not bound by what they have claimed in their
political manifesto until they have to face a second election. Next, the
cost of the system opens the door to strategic abuse by antidemocratic
entities such as political lobbies which will exchange political favours
for economic support during the political campaign. The most obvious
of these forms of interference in the democratic process is the
relationship between political parties and media groups. In a polity
where a disproportionate part of the media is concentrated in the
hands of few individuals, as is the case in many western countries
243
See for instance: J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), J. Habermas, "Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of
Contradictory Principles?" Political Theory 29/6 (2001), 766-81, J. Habermas and W. Relig, Between
Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. (London: Polity, 1996),
A. C. Maclntyre, After Virtue : A Study in Moral Theory. (London: Duckworth, 1981).
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such as America, Australia, Italy, and the UK, antidemocratic entities
decide the political agenda. Like Habermas, Tully points out that the
solution to these problems is the enlargement of the individual's
participation in the democratic process. Ideally - he explains -
political choices, which affect all, should be decided with the direct
participation of the whole community. "In theory, 'Quod omnes
tangit' [Italic in the original text] (what touches all must be approved
by all), one of the oldest principles of western constitutionalism, has
been revived and given a variety ofmultilogical reformulations as a
principle of democratic legitimacy.""4 This high level of political
participation can be achieved only by adopting a procedural template
of democracy - and relinquishing the present day one. This is the only
solution which can shield the political arena from the abuse of
antidemocratic entities which hijack the political agenda by imposing
the protection of supposedly collective interests.
b) The difference between Tully's political theory and
Habermas' deliberative democracy
There are two normative differences between Tully's and Habermas'
account of the role of nationalism in modern democracy. First, Tully
conceives his theory of democracy as a procedural theory in which
formation of a political consensus over the solution of a political issue
does not to aim to achieve, as Habermas does, universal and
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J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), l-35.p.24
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unquestionable "truth". Second, Tully makes clear that modern society
is composed of an ensemble of national identities. In contrast with
Habermas, these identities have to be constitutionally recognised. Let
us start to explain the detail of the first point.
"If attention is focused primarily on the
activity of democratic struggle over recognition
in context, one can see why no resolution in
either theory and practice is definitive. Any
proposed resolution will harbour elements of
non-consensus and injustice, and thus must be
open to further democratic dissent and
renegotiation. "245
This idea of "reversibility" of previous political decisions which is
central to modern democracy shows the normative limits of attaching
universalistic claims to constitutional norms. This is the complete
opposite of Habermas' idea of communicative democracy where
procedural rules, such as the equality of the speakers and the
acceptance of the best argument, secure the so-called epistemological
veracity of political decisions which might be transformed into
constitutional norms.246 Instead, Tully argues that constitutional norms
J. Tully, "Struggles over Recognition and Distribution." Constellations 7/ (2000), 469-82p.474
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J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. (London:
Heinemann, 1984).
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- even if they are the result of a communicative interaction - have no
universal value and they should be open to possible revision."7
"Critical analyses should proceed beyond
agreement because the agreement and the
normative models of its assessment will always
be less than perfect, partial, subject to
reasonable disagreement, and dissent will likely
break out in practice and theory, reigniting the
>)248
process.
For Tully the democratic process is a practice which only aspires -
but unavoidably fails - to find normative truth.24' However, Habermas
regards the political arena as the epistemological engine which can
make universally accepted political decisions which can then be
transformed into legal norms. These norms can - as Habermas
explicitly states in his theory of constitutional patriotism - exclude
political entities from the political arena.
In his 'Between facts and Norms' Habermas too accepts the possibility of reversing a democratic
decision. However, he distinguishes the law-making process from the evaluation of norms, such as the
protection of Human Rights and the exclusion of nationalism. At first sight the reasons for this separation
are historical, but we saw in the previous chapter that it has to do to with the idea that a legal system is a
collection of rational decisions which can be assembled and dismantled. For instance, a decision taken
after an ideal political debate to allow biological experiments in space might be changed if there is a
change to the situation which allows the initial liberal approach. However, Habermas suggests that we
have enough historical evidences for considering nationalism a risk for democracy. I explained that this
idea is internally precarious and democratically dangerous. There is no such thing as the universal values
of a cosmopolitan law and the adoption of these rational norms would endanger cultural diversity.
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He continues: "Any normative model ofprocedures or agreements will harbour elements ofexclusion
and assimilation and so will have to be continually tested against its capacity to throw light on
deliberations in practice against the others models in theory" J. Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns
in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy." Modern Law Review 65/2 (2002), 204-
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The impossibility of finding "truth" is not a limitation in a political theory since disagreements over
previous political decisions support the political discussion and with it democracy.
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In contrast to Habermas, Tully explains that by limiting the
democratic debate, we add restrictions to the democratic process
which cannot be rationally accounted for. Tully makes clear that in a
multinational society the communicative practice of discussing
political decisions cannot be limited aprioristically by procedural
rules. He argues that if a political theory wants to be democratically
coherent it must consider the democratic practice as a normative
priority.
The second normative difference between Habermas' and Tully's
account of the role of nationalism in modern democracies has to do
the role play of national identities in modern constitutional law
making. In contrast with Habermas, Tully's constitutional
multinationalism considers a nationalist movement to be like any
other entity struggling for recognition within a certain community.
This interpretation of the role of political entities in a democratic
debate has normative effects. It separates nationalism, as a social
movement which attempts to obtain political recognition, from its
political claims. Tully points out that even a rejection of political
claims (which can be antidemocratic) cannot stop the process of self-
recognition of a political stance since the practice of discussing,
contesting and recognizing political claims has a normative priority
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over universalistic claims."" This inverts the presuppositions which
underpin Habermas' constitutional patriotism.
The most important element in Tully's view of democracy is keeping
political debate alive, not the search for which decisions bear
universal values and can therefore be inserted into a theory. In other
words Tully reads the political dialogue as a normative priority and
from this he concludes that national identities should be free to
interact with other political groups. Building on this idea, he suggests
that democracy is a critical activity in which the actors themselves are
the subjects of its effects. Obviously, the exclusion of a national
identity impoverishes this critical activity, but more importantly it
breaks the linkage between the outcomes of the political debate and
those subjected to them. By losing the linkage between discourse and
demos, legitimacy becomes the antidemocratic reproduction of
previous political decisions and a national identity cannot but feel
unrepresented by its constitutional system.
c) Multinationalism: A normative element of modern
democracy?
Tully argues that national identities should be considered as essential
elements of modern democratic society. From this point, he draws that
"The principle ofdemocracy (or popular sovereigntyj requires that, although the people or the people
who comprise a political association are subject to the constitutional system, they, or their
representatives, must also impose the general system on themselves in order to be sovereign andfree, and
thusfor the association to be 'democratically' [Italic in the original text] legitimate. The sovereign people
or peoples 'impose' the constitutional system an themselves by means ofhaving a say over the principles,
rules andprocedures through the exchange ofpublic reasons in the democratic practice ofdeliberation
". J. Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals ofConstitutional Democracy."
Modern Law Review 65/2 (2002), 204-28
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a modern constitution should acknowledge these political groups. The
acknowledgement of the participants in a debate is a logical
requirement of the discussion that can be easily overlooked for those
who consider the state population to be a homogeneous group of
people, but it is only by accepting that modern society is multinational
that we can have a representative democratic debate. This might drag
back our discussion to the relationship between multiculturalism and
multinationalism (chapter 1), but let us not derail our discussion here;
the acceptance of multinationalism is an inescapable consequence of
democracy since it opens the debate to all the political entities which
form our polity.
The idea of legally recognising a national identity is often perceived
as the first step of sending the state down the path of segregation (i.e.
Habermas25'), but this fear is unproved. Tully explains that the most
common political claim of modern national groups is not
independence and state sovereignty, as it is widely assumed, but the
reconfiguration of the existing constitutional associations. This
connection between independence, which in the modern world is a
chimera for any state,252 and national aspirations is due to the
overlapping ofmeaning between national and state sovereignty.
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by Schmitt, to academic discussions.
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"This classic understanding of the freedom of
self-determination has been called into question
and discredited by the persistence of struggles
for recognition in the very societies which were
until recently legitimated by it, for the struggles
demonstrate that the constitution is not
acceptable for all. As a result, the question of
the freedom of self-determination is raised
anew. It is raised in the context ofmultinational
societies whose members have passed through
the experience ofstruggles over recognition and
learned that these do not admit a definitive
solution. "2"
Even if this belief is historically inaccurate, individuals have the
tendency to understand democracy as a technical apparatus for finding
political solutions within a single national community.2" This
misunderstanding of the relationship between national population and
democracy transforms the constitutional systems ofmodern states into
an 'empire of uniformity'.255 "The first feature of modern
J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1 -35 .p.6
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constitutionalism comprises three concepts of popular sovereignty
[The uniform political association of free individuals, the individuals'
recognition of the legitimacy of the constitutions, and the
unquestioned moral validity of its norms] which eliminate cultural
diversity as a constitutive aspect ofpolitics.""6 This misinterpretation
of the relationship between identity and democracy creates a tension
between those who demand recognition of their national identity and
those who refuse this claim on the ground that it is theoretically
incompatible with a constitutional state. "Consequently, multinational
democracy appears to run against the prevailing norms of legitimacy
for a single-nation democracy and it is condemned as unreasonable
or abnormal by both the defenders of the status quo and the
proponents ofsecession. "2"
This aprioristic refusal of the role of nationalities in modern society
makes the state illegitimate.2™ The effect of this unreasonable denial of
nationalism is particularly evident in the classical liberal interpretation
of cosmopolitanism. Tully explains that liberal societies consider the
constitutional recognition of a national identity to be theoretically
incoherent with the egalitarian principle. "Modern constitutionalism
developed over the last four centuries around two main forms of
constitutional patriotism which I criticized on the first part of this thesis (chapter 1-3). This point is made
in: M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire. (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2000). A
more specific analysis is in a section which was not included in the original version but was later
published.
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recognition: the equality of independent, self-governing nation-states
and the equality of individual citizens.In a legal system in which all
individuals are equal there is little space for the political claims of a
group which asserts to be different. Next, cosmopolitans argue that
granting a special status quo to one of the national groups affects the
state's political stability since other groups might consider themselves
unfairly treated.
"[W]hen forms of multinational federalism
are advanced as solutions to some of the
demands of cultural recognition, they appear
'ad hoceven as a threat to democracy,
equality and liberty, rather than as forms of
recognition that can be explained and justified
in accordance with the principles of
constitutionalism. "26°
However, the ruling out of claims related to the protection of national
identities transform a constitutional theory into a homogenising
ideology which exploits and destroys cultural diversity.
d) The constitutional recognition of national identity
In a nutshell Tully argues that the unreasonable refutation of
multinationalism by modern constitutional theory denies the political






democratic practice. He makes clear that the theoretical solution to
this problem is to consider the struggle for recognition of national
identities to be part of the democratic practice of contesting and
understanding previous political decisions.
"A contemporary constitution can recognise
cultural diversity if it is received as what might
be called a 'form ofaccommodation' ofcultural
diversity.A constitution should be seen as a form
of activity, an intercultural dialogue in which
culturally diverse sovereign citizens of
contemporary societies negotiated agreement on
their forms of association over time in
accordance with the three conventions ofmutual
recognition, consent, and cultural continuity. "
If the struggle for recognition were inserted into the democratic
process, it would change its function from an act of protest to a step
toward the amendment of the constitutional norms. "The way to break
with the convention is to discover a post-imperial dialogue, [...] in
which the interlocutors participate in their diverse cultural form of
intercultural understanding which does not presuppose a compressive
dialogue [such as the one supported by a classical understanding of
the concept of nation-state]."2" If we abandon the concept of nation-
Ibid.p.31
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state, the demands of national groups become expressions of political
freedom which might be channelled into constitutional norms.
However, recall that democracy is perpetuated by the decisional
practice which leads to the formation of constitutional rule, not by
norms. It is precisely for this reason that federalism, confederation and
regionalism do not represent a solution to the problematic relationship
between the concept of nation, democracy and legal system.
"It [the question of freedom] is raised in the
context of multinational societies whose
members have passed through the experience of
struggles over recognition and learned that
these do no admit a definitive solution (and so
cannot be accommodated within the classic
understanding of self-determination). Rather,
these contexts constitute an enduring dimension
of modern politics: the public disclosure of
misrecognized identities and the demand that
the other members acknowledge these and
respond.
With this, Tully separates liberal universal values, which he considers
the meta-theoretical foundation of democracy, from the legal system
whose function is to register the decisions taken within the political
263
J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), l-35.p.6
166
arena.2"4 The linkage between these two elements constitutes what
Tully calls the 'the third dimension of the constitution'.2'5 This third
dimension gives a right for any individual to demand the recognition
of her/his identity and a duty for other members of the community to
answer.
"Each member must possess this right to
initiate rule change and the correlative duty to
acknowledge and answer, if the society is free
and democratic. [This] follows from the
'democraticprincipleAs a consequence, a free
and democratic society is involved in a
'continuous process of discussion', a process
which includes both the right to voice dissent
and the duty to 'acknowledge and address those
voices in the laws by which all in the community
. 1 • > f)266
must live .
Tully makes clear why the acknowledgment of the demand of
recognition of national identities is a general obligation for any
democratic community which wants to maintain the linkage between
legal system and people(s). The dynamic of this relentless practice of
recognition of national identities is already present in many
264
I will explain in the next section that my interpretation ofmultinationalism does not link democracy to
liberal values, but for now let us continue on our analysis of the relationship between the recognition of
national identity and democracy.
265
J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), l-35.p,13
266
Ibid.in ed/s p. 14 (My emphasis).
167
constitutional democracies, such as Canada, Belgium, Switzerland,
etc., but its normative impact in modern democracies is limited to
proposed constitutional answers, such as the adoption of a federal
system.
I explained in previous chapters that the normative importance of this
practice of discussing the rule of recognition is downplayed by
cosmopolitans, such as Habermas, who restrict their account of the
recognition process to constitutional responses. This creates the false
assumption that constitutionalism can provide definitive solutions to
the issues related to multinationalism. However, Tully explains that
this search for definitive constitutional answers to the demand of
recognition creates new dissenting voices which generate new inputs
into the process. Instead of seeking a panacea for the never-ending
growing demands of acknowledgement - Tully concludes
constitutional lawyers and political theorists must accept that the
dynamic process of constitutional recognition of national identities is
a constant element of any democratic community.
e) The different stages of the process of constitutional
recognition.
Let us see how demands of recognition are inserted into our
constitutional democracies. Tully explains that a demand of
recognition of a national identity has four features.2'7 Firstly, it
" The demand involves the claim that, (1) the present form of constitutional recognition of their
identity constitutes a non-recognition or mis-recognition, (2) this state ofaffairs constitutes an injustice,
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presupposes that an individual considers himself or herself not
recognised by the constitutional structure of the polity in which he or
she lives. Secondly, this 'non-recognition' should be unjust. Thirdly,
the amendment of this injustice must be supported by a public debate.
Fourthly, the debate over the unfair 'non-recognition' of a national
identity creates social cohesion among those involved in the
discussion.
It is important to notice that the traditional understanding of the
relationship between a sovereign state and its population unreasonably
simplifies the demand of self-recognition of a national identity to a
practice of exclusion and strategic protection of political interests. On
the one hand, those who support the universal values they claim are
embedded in a constitution protect their status quo by rejecting any
demand which might alter the actual sociological and economic
balance of the state. On the other hand, those who demand recognition
of their identity reject the legitimacy of the constitutional system
which unfairly fails to acknowledge their struggle for recognition. I
argue that if modern democracy wants to break this deadlock, the
process of evaluation of these claims cannot exclude the
acknowledgement of the identity of who puts forward these demands.
(3) the proposed new form of recognition is just and well-supported by public reasons (draw from the
fourth dimension), and finally (4) recognition (and institutional accommodation)by the others members
would render the overall constitutional identity of the society a just and stable system of social
cooperation." Ibid.in ed/s p. 15
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This perspective has been recently acknowledged by the Canadian
Supreme Court.2'8
The demand of changing the constitutional rules of recognition within
a political community assumes different forms in relation to those who
demand it. For instance, the demand of recognition of aboriginal
people in Canada - as the original inhabitants of the territory now
administrated by the Canadian federal government - is different from
the claim of independence of Quebec. However, independently from
the type and the identity of who puts forward these claims they should
be acknowledged by all parties who are affected by the proposed
changes. This will give them the occasion to enter the negotiation
process that acknowledges the role of a group within a democratic
community.
This process which Tully calls identity discussion and formation"' is
composed by three discursive stages. Firstly, if a group wants to
change the rules of recognition of a democratic community - for
whatever reason - it has to show to the rest of the community that the
majority of its members think that they are misrepresented by the legal
system. Thus, the first stage in a process of recognition of an identity
is always an internal debate. Tully proposes as an example the debate
within the French speaking community in Canada over the role of the
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Quebecois identity. Secondly, the members of the group demanding
recognition should start the debate with members of other identities
since an amendment of the rules of recognition would change the role
of national identity in the whole community. This phase is crucial for
us. It is here where nationalistic claims are discussed and where legal
issues emerge. It is in this phase that many national communities find
their claim aprioristically excluded since they challenge values and
ideas such as state unity, the use of a common language and
constitutional norms. We will go back to this point in chapter 5 but
before going any further, I would like to make a remark. This will
help the understanding of what follows. Here, Tully uses the term
'negotiations' as if it was synonymous with 'political discussion'. I
will explain the effect of the connection between liberal values and
legal institutions. For now let us simply say that the terms
'negotiation' and 'political discussion' are not synonymous and the
procedure of acknowledgement of cultural differences cannot be - at
least in my interpretation of multinational democracy - considered an
interaction which aims to level injustices only by strategic
mediation.27"
Thirdly, the publicity of the referendum allows for the further
enlargement of the debate about the recognition of a national identity.
I concur with Tully that a referendum is not the final word in the
270
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procedure of self-recognition. Referendum is one of the processes
which leads to the recognition of a national identity. The publicity of
the referendum will extend beyond the community in which this form
of direct democracy takes place. Groups which are not directly
affected by the proposed changes might adopt a similar proposal and
start the process of changing their rules of self-recognition within the
larger community in which they live.
f. Constitutional multinationals: a model for modern
democracy?
Modern society is multinational. This is an axiological element of
modern life"' which needs to be recognised in a legal system which
aspires to maintain a linkage between the apparatus of the state and
the population. Tully provides a decisive argument in support of this
point. I am less sure about the process which he suggests as a model
for recognising national identities. I agree with Tully when he argues
that there is no such thing as an 'original national identity' which the
community tries to promote, as some nationalists want to believe.
Instead nationality is a process in which members of the national
group and aliens define themselves in relation to each other. The
interaction which results from the process of struggling for - and
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against - recognition is multilogical and multiform. A political theory
cannot procedurally or substantially restrict this process by setting the
criteria which define a national community without breaching the
normative connection between demos and democratic self-
determination. The process of recognition is an internal never-ending
process. The internal dynamic complexity of a national identity is
reflected in the mutability and the unpredictability of its political
claims. The volatility of the political demands of national groups
affects the relations between national identities and constitutional
norms. In contrast with authors such as Canovan272 and Miller2 3 who
claim that the political stability of the modern state is related to the
fact that individuals share a common national identity, national
identities are in constant mutation and the state cannot draw political
strength from any of them without losing its political stability. Instead,
a theory of multinationalism argues that the political vigour of the
community is connected to its ability to link its constitutional norms to
all its socio-political identities. This function is guaranteed by
acknowledging diversity.
I also concur with Tully when he explains that in a multinational
society the struggle for - and against - constitutional recognition of a
national identity is an 'agonistic' political activity. Members of a
national identity support a procedure of constitutional recognition of
M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).
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their status in order to make a public display of the unfairness of the
existing form of recognition.2 4 Referring to the works of authors such
as Arendt and Foucault,275 this practice is part of the wider procedure
of highlighting discrepancies and injustices within a political
community.276 The presence of a component of chronic disagreement
among the members of a culturally diversified society is a normative
factor of democracy since it is discontent over previous political
choices which underpins the democratic debate. The impossibility of
creating a universal consensus over a process of recognition of a
national identity is one of the elements which sustain the democratic
process. This continuous contesting and mutual disclosure and
acknowledgement are also ends in themselves. "They are the activity
of democratic freedom itself ofparticipation in accordance with the
rules laid down by the last struggle for recognition,"277 Tully points
out that the activity of acknowledging national identity not only
pragmatically discharges the resentment of those who do not feel
represented in the constitution, but also - and more importantly for us
- it supports the democratic activities which create temporary
agreements over moral and political issues. These activities have been
274
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relatively overlooked because theorists and practitioners have tended
to presume that a community should have some moral aims, and
democracy is one of the means for achieving these intentions.
Theories of justice, usually universal in intent see the recognition of
national identity as something to overcome."8 However, the divisions
over a politic of recognition of identity feed into the democratic
debate.
Starting from this assumption, Tully suggests that we should adopt a
more neutral process - such as the one proposed by Laden - for the
political recognition of national identity."' This idea begs questions
such as: what constitution does Tully envisage? Should a modern
constitution aprioristically certain liberal values? Are these values
neutral vis a vis the process of constitutional recognition of national
identity? Answering these questions will be the theme of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE LIMITS OF TULLY'S
MULTINATIONALISM
The effects of considering democracy a normative priority
In the previous chapter, I explained that the recognition of national
identity is an essential element of modern pluralistic society.
However, this assumption seems incompatible with Tully's idea of
adopting Laden's distinction28" between political and social
recognition. Laden argues that liberal values can be used for dividing
reasonable political claims from social demands. This allows the
separation between individual political identity, which can be
accepted in a democratic debate and social identity which might be
tolerated but is politically insignificant.
In this chapter, I will argue that the linkage between the process of
self-recognition of national identity and democracy cannot be
normatively anchored to liberal values.28' I will do that by comparing
280
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the normative basis of modern democracy and political liberalism.282 T
will make clear why a theory of multinational democracy cannot
aprioristically adopt liberal values for distinguishing part of our
identities. By adopting Laden's reasonable radicalism, Tully supports
a constitutional system which reproduces liberal values instead of
democratically retrieving political solutions.283
1. The normative basis of communicative democracy
a) The discursive practice
In the introduction I suggested that Tully's idea of adopting Laden's
political liberalism is incompatible with the basic principles of modern
democracy. This claim begs the question what is the basis of
democracy. A clear account of the element of modern communicative
democracy is provided by Tully himself. In his early works, he makes
clear that a modern liberal constitutionalism cannot provide a template
for a democratic society. He uses the term 'empire of uniformity' to
describe the antidemocratic effects of the liberal constitutional
tradition on a pluralistic society.284 To make his point clearer he
Tully acknowledges the problems of political liberalism [J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity ;
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).p. 44-45; 63-
66. 55.]. However, in his theorisation of multinational democracy he accept that Laden has solve the
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proposes the example of aboriginal people in Canada, Australia etc.2'"
In his 'Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity',21" he argues that the
problematic relation between democracy, national identities and
politics cannot be solved by a single minded normative template;
instead we should adopt a more theoretical approach. However, the
possibility of finding a more general political model is seriously
limited by the way in which people interpret general terms. He argues
that if a theory wants to assume the status of a political theory a
common template has to be critically surveyed.
The first phase is a critical account of the 'language' used for
supporting a theoretical solution to a political problem. Here, Tully
uses the term 'language' as synonymous for the theoretical framework
which a theory adopts for supporting its normative solutions. For
instance, Habermas' constitutional patriotism accepts the 'language'
of republicanism for proposing an alternative to the national state
which denies any political space for nationalistic claims. Quoting
Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis2"7, Tully explains that the use of
general terms to describe political issues changes in relation to the
context in which these terms are used. In our example of Mr. Levi's
land, terms such as rationality, reasonableness, faith and truth, have a
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different meaning in the secular mind of Dr. Saliba and religious
world ofMr. Levi. The attempt to impose a theoretical solution, which
adopts general terms used by one of the parties in the dispute is
destined to fail since general terms change meaning in relation to the
subjective back-ground of the person who uses them.
Tully argues that the problem of the plurality of meanings of general
terms trickles down to the applications of these provisions. The
pragmatic consequences of a subjective understanding of a general
term provide a network of rules of action. "We do not find a set of
features that make us use the same word for all cases but rather an
open-ended family of uses that resemble one another in various
crossings"™ In the example of Mr Levi's land, Mr. Levi's rational
interpretation of the Bible provides the reason for deriving Israeli's
ownership of the land which was once ruled by King David, whereas
Dr. Saliba considers his claims supported by the Ottoman legal
system.
Tully would explain that the precarious relation between the different
meanings of the general terms used by supporters of a comprehensive
political theory makes these comprehensive proposals (the one which
is based on a legalistic approach and the one which advocates a
system of religious beliefs) unsuitable as political templates for a
modern pluralistic society.
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"The consequence [...] is that understanding
political concepts and problems cannot be the
theoretical activity ofdiscovering a general and
comprehensive rule and then applying it to
particular cases, for such a rule is not to be
found and understanding does not consist in
applying such a rule even if it could be found. "m
A political theory, I agree with Tully, should be capable of using
general terms such as nation, identity, rights over the land, in various
circumstances and be able to give reasons for and against this or that
use.
"Understanding a general term thus involves
being able to give reasons why it should or
should not be used in a particular case, either to
provoke or to respond to a dispute, being able to
see the strength ofthe reasons given against this
use by one's interlocutors, and then being able




This is done by describing examples with
similar or related aspects, drawing analogies or
disanalogies of various kinds, finding
precedents, exchanging narratives and
redescriptions, drawing attention to
intermediate cases so one can pass easily from
the familiar to the unfamiliar cases.
This discursive practice has the aim of disclosing political points of
view and debating differences, not finding universal political solutions
which undercut the political debate. This conclusion seems to have
closed the door to any substantive theory, liberalisms included.
However, Tully continues and argues that a critical analysis of the
languages used by a political theory is only the first step in the
understanding of a political theory. The second stage of a critical
analysis of a political theory is the historical context in which it has
been proposed.
b) Tully's historical account
Tully argues that political theory should be aware of how it should be
interpreted in an historical context. Again, the meaning of the word
'historical' should be understood in a broad sense. Historical analysis
for Tully means a comparative account of how a theory might be




historical survey has the capacity to free us to some extent from the
conditions ofpossibility uncovered in the first step.The historical
surveys take into account the fact that political debates and political
decisions are embedded in a chronological moment or - more probably
- a historical period. Again, if we go back to our example of the
relationship between Mr. Levi and Dr. Saliba, an analysis of the
historical context provides information on the meaning of a political
theory which seeks to solve the intricate relation between Israeli and
Palestinians. For instance a theoretical analysis such as the one
proposed by Margalit and Raz which supports the right of self-
determination of Israel,2'2 or the one made by Home2" about the role of
British colonial law on the construction of the land law system in
Palestine have different meanings outside the historical context which
defines the relation between Jews and Palestinians.
This difference has an obvious pragmatic impact on Mr. Levi's claims
over the land of Dr. Saliba, but it also assumes significance at the
theoretical level. Historical contexts are often taken for granted but
they make the basis for defining political issues and providing
temporary solutions. I concur with Tully when he argues that testing
and discussing the historical elements of a theory provides new ways
of looking at the problem and questions the criteria which historically
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"\T\he historical surveys disclose the
formation and historical contingency of this
specific form ofproblematisation and practice
and the different potential ways of organising
this general kind ofpractice ofgovernance that
were not actualised. [They] thus provide the
means to criticise and evaluate the practices and
ways of thinking to which we are subject by
comparing and contrasting them with possible
alternatives. "2"
He explains that a critical survey of the development of a political
theory should highlight and contest its limits and open the debate over
the possible alternatives. This interpretation of the role of history in
political philosophy is different from the analysis proposed by
Habermas which wants to substitute the modern theory of the national
state - such as the one proposed by Schmitt -2" with a normative
proposal which supports a form of constitutional cosmopolitanism.2"'
In contrast with Habermas who attempts to extract normative
principles from an historical analysis, Tully's historical account is a
critical activity which questions the relationship between a theoretical
J. Tully, "Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity." Political Theory 30/4 (2002), 533-55p.549
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proposal and the historical moment in which this proposal has been
made. For instance, an historical survey of the 'concept of political'2" -
Tully would argue - should focus on Schmitt's analysis of the
problematic relation between liberal democracy and popular will in a
Europe dominated by military and ideological dictatorships.2,8
The historical survey is a critical aspect of a political theory since it
links the theory with the social and institutional context in which it is
made. Tully dedicates the entire central part of his 'Strange
Multiplicity'299 to this task and he makes clear that modern
constitutionalism did not recognize the connection between cultural
diversity and democracy. He concludes that modern constitutional
theories should be more aware of the linkage between identity and the
legitimacy of constitutional norms."" From this idea, he deduces that
the aim of a constitution is not to find a universal theoretical solution
over political issues but to provide a theoretical space in which
previous decisions are questioned. It is in this space that political
entities, such as national communities, have the occasion to express
themselves and to form their identity.
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In contrast with authors, such as Rawls,"' who argue that this space of
debate can be limited by the 'reasonableness and values', Tully
explains that a aprioristic exclusion of political claims - or a political
group - is detrimental to democratic practice and theoretically
unjustifiable. These limitations of the political debate are irrational in
a society which wants to maintain the connection between democracy
and political practice.
"The democratization of struggle over
recognition is required not only by the
reciprocal or mutual character of recognition,
but also by the principle of democracy itself. As
far as possible, the rules in accordance with
which citizen recognize one another and govern
themselves should be based on the agreement of
the governed or their representatives.
Therefore, any amendment to these rules
[...] should rest as much as possible on the
discussion and agreement of those affected by it.
If it is not, then their action is coordinated
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Here, Tully does more than simply provide a decisive argument for
the exclusion of single-minded theoretical solutions such as the ones
proposed by liberalism; he argues that all political theory should give
to democracy a normative priority. This means that it cannot
aprioristically rule out claims without making itself antidemocratic.
This is the crucial point of Tully's analysis. However, in his analysis
of the relationship between multinational society and democracy Tully
reinstates one of the latest interpretations of liberalism. This is
problematic for a theory which advocates the priority of democracy
over aprioristic assumption.
2. What is deliberative liberalism? Rawls and Laden
Tully takes the connection between legitimacy, identity and
democracy to a theoretical level by asserting that political philosophy
must be a critical activity. He explains that exclusion and assimilation
not only make a political proposal antidemocratic but theoretically
incoherent. However, in his theory of multinational democracy Tully
suggests the adoption of Laden's interpretation"3 of Rawls's political
liberalism as theoretical template for reaching constitutional
agreements between different identities within a political community.
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"To investigate the features of a free,
multinational democracy let us start (not
uncritically) from the classic liberal account of
a reasonably plural, free and democratic society
presented by John Rawls, in 'Political
Liberalism' (1996), and its careful and
innovative extension by Anthony Laden, in
'Reasonably Radical: Deliberative Liberalism
and the politics of Identity' (2001), to free and




This choice appears in direct opposition to the critical requirements he
suggested in his previous works where he argues that Rawls's political
liberalism is democratically incoherent.
J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), l-35.p.8
187
"The non-European peoples of the world will
be recognised as equals only once they have
abandoned their lawless ways and submitted to
European markets and republican constitutions.
Many more examples could be given. In
'Superior people: the narrowness of liberalism
from Mill to Rawls', Bhikhu Parekh elucidates
how these conventions inform Mill's political
theory and his justifications of British rule and
cultural assimilation in India and Quebec.
However, in 'multinational democracy', Tully seems keen to rescue
the theory of political liberalism (or at least Laden's interpretation of
it ). This prompts a list of queries on the compatibility between the
democratic coherency of multinational democracy and liberalism. Has
Laden managed to bypass the limits of Rawls's liberalism that Tully
acknowledged in his 'strange multiplicity'? If so, how? We start
answering this question by analysing the details of the relationship
between Rawls's liberalism and democracy and then we analyse how
Laden tries - but fails - to solve the tension between political
liberalism and democracy.
J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).p.81 See also: p. 106-7; 190 ; B. Parekh, "Superior People: The Narrowness of
Liberalism from Mill to Rawls." Times Literary Supplement 35/02/1994 1994.
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a) The pragmatic problems of political liberalism
We closed the previous paragraph with a series of queries; we will
now answer the first: has Laden managed to bypass the limits of
Rawls's liberalism? Tully makes clear that Rawls's liberalism cannot
be considered as a democratic theory since it imposes a system of
values which aprioristically excludes political entities from an active
role in the polity. Even if Rawls3"6 does not automatically demand the
ruling out of political claims, the insertion of political liberalism as a
template for finding agreements into a multinational democracy has
the pragmatic effect of politically disarming entities which put
forward intolerable claims. This imposes a political template, which
undermines democracy and squeezes cultural diversity into the liberal
grill of values and goods.
Why "intolerable" claims should no be aprioristically excluded? What
makes a claim intolerable? Rawls distinguishes between unreasonable
and reasonable political demands. To be reasonable claims must at
least acknowledge some basic values, which he considers the pillars of
any society. Unreasonable claims are tolerated in modern democracy,
but those who propose them cannot expect that they will lead to the
formation of statutes. At first sight this division seem perfectly
acceptable since no one wants an unfair society. However, this has the
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pragmatic effect of excluding national groups which cannot manage to
fit their political demands into Rawls's aprioristic set of values. This is
a serious limitation in a political theory. On the one had we have the
political entities which flourish since they manage to link their
political claims to the values protected by a liberal society. On the
other hand, there are communities which cannot connect their claims
to the values shared by the remaining part of the polity. The issue here
is not only theoretical. Let us go back to our example ofMr. Levi and
Dr. Saliba's land. Mr. Levi and Dr. Saliba find themselves debating
the legitimacy of their rights over a piece of land. Both parties on the
discussion link their respective claims to an aspect of their national
identity. Dr. Saliba claims that the land belongs to him since his
ancestors took it when its previous owner relinquished it. Instead, Mr.
Levi claims that the legitimacy of his ownership is backed by the word
of God. Following the procedure suggested by Rawls's political
liberalism, Dr. Saliba's claim seems more reasonable than Mr. Levi's.
This is, even, if we do not consider that Mr. Levi has bought his land
from a fraudster.
This has to do with the procedure which liberalism suggest for
accommodating disputes. Individuals should have the ownership of a
minimum set of "goods", and the freedom to exchange these
resources. Rawls and Laden explain that the ownership of these basic
goods is an equivalent to a basic freedom since they are the basis upon
which individuals start the bargaining process that allows the full
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exploitation of their limited resources and the formation of political
agreements. In addition to this form of liberty, there is the individual
political freedom of accepting the conditions of association with other
individuals. This form of freedom is the possibility granted to
individuals to modify the procedures which allow the expression of
their communal identity. If individuals distance themselves from their
social positions, they will accept only improvements of their
individual freedom which enhance the common good of the
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community.
If we apply these criteria to the procedure which needs to find a
solution to the case of Mr. Levi and Dr. Saliba's land the outcome is
obvious. Given that the ownership and the possibility of transferring
rights are considered a constitutive element of a liberal society, Dr.
Saliba's claim appears immediately more reasonable than Mr. Levi's
demand. This has to do with the fact that Dr. Saliba argues for the
protection of his resources - and the right ofmaximizing them - which
is a basic element of a liberal society, while Mr. Levi's propriety
claims are related to a system of religious beliefs based on the beliefs
of a particular sociological group. Rawls clearly explains that claims
incompatible with a reasonable idea of justice should be tolerated -
but not protected - only if they do not endanger the basic freedoms
guaranteed by the original position.
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Rawls argues that individuals should considered themselves in a hypothetical "original position" in
which they do not know their place in society. In the original position the individual knowledge is
protected by a screen which Rawls calls: "veil of ignorance". Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals
have the right to protect the ownership of their basic goods and they should act as they do not know: their
faith, sex, race, and natural abilities.
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In his theory of justice1"8, Rawls explains that since it can never be to
men's advantage to forego the right of self-protection then the
question is whether the tolerant has the right to curb the intolerant to
respect the system of rights which emerges from the negotiation
process. Rawls argues that a fair society can properly force the priority
of basic liberties which an individual would acknowledge in the
original position over other claims. However, in the case in which
these basic liberties are in danger, those who support intolerant claims
should have their freedom restricted. In his Political Liberalism1""
Rawls tries to play down the possible effects of his procedural theory
by stressing the effect of reasonableness in the decision making
process which leads to political agreements. However, this does not
redress the critique of Tully who denounces the homogenisation effect
of aprioristically linking liberal values to a political theory and drives
us to the crucial issue in this chapter: has Laden's radical liberalism
managed to overcome the problems of Rawls's liberalism?
b) Is Laden's liberalism any different from Rawls's?
The limitations of Rawls's analysis - which Tully openly
acknowledged in his 'strange multiplicity'- of the relationship
between communal identity and democracy were first pointed out by
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communitarian authors such as Taylor."" Tully argues in his strange
multiplicity that Rawls political liberalism is an imperialistic
instrument of cultural homogenisation.
"To presuppose that the initial conditions of
popular sovereignty are a state ofnature, a veil
of ignorance, a set of European traditions and
institutions, or an already existing national
community is to beg the question of the politics
of recognition. It dispossesses Aboriginal
peoples of their constitutions and authoritative
traditions without so much as a hearing and
inscribes them within the Eurocentric
conventions ofmodern constitutionalism.
However, in the introduction to his 'multinational democracy', Tully
refers to Laden's deliberative liberalism"2 as the template for finding
political solutions. If we discharge the unsupported hypothesis that -
in the period of time, which separated the two works - Tully has
changed his mind about the effect of liberalism in a culturally
diversified society, then we have to presume that he accepts Laden's
reintegration of Rawls's political liberalism as an adequate procedural
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template for inserting nationalistic demands into the political arena.
However, if Laden wants to rescue Rawls's political liberalism he
must solve two distinct theoretical problems. Firstly he has to insert
the recognition of the role of political identities into the deliberative
process. Secondly, Laden's proposal should explain how a political
liberalism can endorse the protection of liberal values and at the same
time be democratically coherent.
Laden argues that social and political identities are elements of a
theory of political liberalism and their political demands can be
included in a society which upholds liberal values. "Deliberative
liberalism provides a strategy for thinking about political legitimacy
in the face of deep diversityHe argues that political claims can be
inserted into reasonable political decisions which uphold liberal values
without assimilation.
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"The theory makes three central claims: our
political deliberation will confer legitimacy if it
is reasonable; it can only be reasonable if we
can identify ourselves in this manner if two
conditions are satisfied: (a) no one has an
aspect of their non-political identity imposed on
them, and (b) full and active participation in
political deliberation as a citizen does not
unduly burden the occupation of nonpolitical
identities. Deliberative liberalism is reasonably
radical; its commitment to radical politics
develops out of its commitment to reasonable
politics. "1IJ
With this argument, Laden makes a distinction between reasons which
support a political claim and the identity which proposes it. He argues
that reasonableness comes to play a role only on discussions over the
validity of the reasons that support a claim, not on the social
background of its source of it. Here, Laden suggests that members
within different identities engage in political discussions and exchange
reasons in order to make reasonable decisions. In this process, entities
build up a relationship, which affects the way they assess reasons and
this will eventually change the way they make political choices.
Ibid.
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"Whether or not one person has a legitimate
claim on another may depend on the nature of
their relationship. It will turn out that in many
cases, whether something counts as a reason for
the purposes of assessing the reasonableness of
deliberation will depend on who is offering the
reason to whom. "3,s
However, considering the relationship between identities as an
element in the formation of political agreements creates a theoretical
problem on the evaluation of the reasonableness of political claims.
Relationships are pragmatically flimsy and might be unjust. Let us
take an example to make this point clearer. In the past hundred years,
the relationship between Jewish settlers and Palestinian people not
only has constantly changed but it has extended an unjust distribution
of resources between the two communities which cannot be used as
basis for supporting political claims.
Laden distinguishes two problems here. The first - which he calls:
'practical flimsiness'- is the difficulty of accepting the validity of
claims based on relationships instead of absolute criteria. He argues
that this is a false problem since a person cannot be considered as an
independent entity - such as some Kantian authors want to believe -
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and therefore his/her decisions are always made on the ground of
her/his relation with others.
"Highlighting the connection between
relationships and identity brings the stability of
the relationship to the fore. Just as I cannot just
change my identity the way 1 can change my
shirt, I cannot merely change the nature of my
relationship by deciding to do so or declaring
that I have. "3I6
Going back to our example of Mr. Levi's land, Laden would argue
that a process of deliberation which involves Israelis and Palestinians
cannot be based on universal categories since the members of both
identities form their criterion of reasonableness in relation to the
situation in which they find themselves.
The second problem that he calls the 'normative flimsiness' demands
that a theory of political deliberation includes the criterion for finding
relationships which have a political relevance. Laden argues that the
choice of which relation is politically relevant to the formation of a
political decision cannot be left to popular consensus since our
psychological adaptability would make us, under the right
circumstances, accept any kind ofregime". This possibility is reduced






values. However, the adoption of these values oppresses cultural
diversity and enforces assimilation. Laden proposes his own solution
to this problem. He argues that the political decision over a claim must
be structured in such a way that the rejection of acceptance of the
claim makes a difference.
"Deliberations will need to satisfy this
condition if they are to be reasonable. We will
then be able to say that relationships within
which reasonable deliberation is possible are
reasonable, and that only reasonable
relationships can group the normativity of
7 • »318claims.
He argues that members of different political identities who discuss
and exchange reasons should not feel threatened by assimilation and
this can be achieved only if all entities accept to relinquish aspects of
their identity which reject other identities. "If then, the identity of
citizen sits ill with some other aspect ofmy identity, then in order to
take part in political deliberation I may have to abandon that aspect
of who I am or what I value."™ Laden explains that the remaining
aspects of an identity might contribute to the making of a political
conception of citizenship which is constructed by the interaction
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between myself and different identities. Thus, political citizenship is a
deliberative process which allows the integration of the features which
constitute the cultural diversity into the search of a common good.
c) Laden's political citizenship: How to avoid the
homogenising effect of liberalism
The second problem in Rawls's proposal has to do with the
homogenisation effect of adopting liberal values as criteria for finding
reasonable political agreements. Laden starts by arguing that this
critique is due to a misunderstanding of Rawls's procedure of forming
a reasonable political conception.
"Rawls has been criticized for his method on
the ground that such a method fails to
appreciate adequately the plurality ofpolitical
deliberation. Such criticism fails to notice
Rawls's claim that even within this method
citizens are bound to disagree about the precise
content ofwhat they take to be the best political
conception ofjustice "3~"
To avoid being misinterpreted, as he claims Rawls is, Laden's
proposes his own account of the relationship between the formation of
reasonable political decisions and pluralism. It is important to stress
here, the importance of the proposed solution to this issue since the
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democratic coherence of Laden's liberalism - and Tully's theory of
multinational democracy.- relies on the solution of the problematic
relation between liberalism and democracy. Laden, like Rawls, argues
that democratic society must protect some basic liberal values.
However, both authors accept that the endorsement of liberalism is
problematic in a democratic society.
"According to democratic conceptions of
citizenship, whatever citizens decide about the
nature of the political system goes. For a
conception of citizenship to be liberal, however,
citizen must be bearers of certain inalienable
rights and liberties. These rights and liberties
are not up for debate in the political process.
They thus appear to be beyond the reach of the
collective power of citizens to change. In this
way, liberalism appears to contain an
antidemocratic element at its core, while
unbridled democracy can serve to undermine
liberal values"
The solution which Laden suggest to this problem is to interpret
liberal values in the practice which forms what he calls our 'political
citizenship'. He argues that liberal values are a meta-theoretical
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element of modern democracy and they should be adopted as criteria
for deciding which element of our identity can support a political
claim. This will separate private identity from public identity. By
separating public and private elements of our identity, we can exclude
politically irrelevant sociological entities. However, this idea is far
fetched.
Laden's deliberation process322 is normatively and procedurally too
"thick". Laden's liberalism transfers the homogenising effect of
liberalism to another stage of the deliberative process. This moves the
problem to another procedural phase in the formation of political
agreement but it does not solve the issue of adopting aprioristic values
as criteria in a process of recognition of national identity.
To make clear the details of this point, let us go back to our example
of the discussion between Mr. Levi and Dr. Saliba over the ownership
of an estate. As I explained, there is general perception that Rawls's
political liberalism323 cannot provide a political solution to the
controversy such as the one between Mr. Levi and Dr. Saliba, but
Laden would argue that the critiques of political liberalism are
misplaced. He explains that Rawls's tenet would provide a solution to
the conflict between two individuals who support two apparently
irreconcilable claims without aprioristically imposing a system of
Ibid, p.195-199
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values. Liberal principles, he argues, are criteria which work only on
the formation of what Laden calls the deliberative construction of
citizenship. An identity distinguishes its political elements from non-
political features by this procedure. Given that this interaction has to
respect the basic liberal values, such as freedom and equality, there is
no need to use them again as criteria for the evaluation of the political
claims proposed by the identity which already passes through this
process. In our example the procedures that form Dr. Saliba's and Mr.
Levi's political citizenship build - Laden would argue - a political
identity which excluded unreasonable political claims. However, the
effect on the political debate of Laden's political identity is the same
from the one we would obtain if we had adopted Rawls's practice of
overlapping consensus. Mr. Levi's reference to his religious beliefs
cannot be part of his argument with Dr. Saliba since they are part of a
non-political element of Israeli identity. Therefore, Mr. Levi cannot
claim that he and his family are the God elected trustees of His holy
land since this aspect is in blatant contrast with the principles of
equality and freedom which Laden endorses as criteria on the
formation of his political citizenship.524 However, this conclusion,
which might be possible and reasonable in Laden's terms, is
antidemocratic and leaves Mr. Levi's identity unrecognised and
politically excluded.
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Laden does not realise that equality and freedom to intervene in the
political debate are procedural elements of democratic deliberation,
not criteria for differentiating reasonableness from unreasonableness.
This is because what is politically reasonable is dynamically changing
and must be democratically decided by political debate, not by an
aprioristic endorsement of substantive values.
Laden is aware of the similarities between his concept of political
citizenship and Rawls's overlapping consensus and he tries to prevent
the same critiques that are directed to his proposal. However, even if
Laden argues that neither he nor Rawls consider the respect of basic
principles of reasonableness as criteria which individuals have to
endorse when they propose their political claims, he does not grasp
that in his theory this is the only way by which political demands can
be inserted into the political arena.
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"Nothing in the ideal ofpublic reason, as I
understand it, prevents his arguing [Laden takes
the example of a religious extremist civil rights
activist] in terms of dignity rather than
economic opportunity as the source of
understanding the importance of civil rights.
For the political deliberation to be reasonable,
he must not rely in arguingfor the importance of
human dignity on premises that derives from his
comprehensive doctrine alone, premises that he
could not reasonably expect his fellow citizens
to endorse as well. "3"
In his theory - such as Rawls's proposal the proposed procedure
has the direct effect of depriving these political claims from the
possibility of being openly discussed. This effect is in direct contrast
with the premises upon which Laden starts his proposal.
325
My Emphasis Ibid.p. 120
204
"Deliberative liberalism argues that truly
shared will can only be embodied in and
maintained by a reasonable political
deliberation. Through what I call reasonable
deliberation, people who do not have an identity
in common can come to share an identity and
thus a will. Grounding legitimacy in deliberative
endorsement thus provides a means for
establishing legitimate political principles
without assuming uniformity. "126
However, Laden's idea of political citizenship formed by political
interaction simply moves the homogenizing effect of liberalism to a
different procedural stage in the formation of political agreement/s.
Put simply, Laden does not realise that the democratic
acknowledgement of what enters into the relationship between
communicative process, cultural diversity and democracy demands the
reiteration of any criteria of evaluation. This procedure cannot be
adopted by a multinational society because it falsifies the process of
recognition of national identity. This point is overlooked by Tully
when he suggests the adoption of Laden's radical liberalism as a




d) The relationship between Tully's multinational
democracy and laden's deliberative liberalism
Once this discussion on the relationship between the protection of
Human Rights and radical democracy is closed, we can conclude our
debate over the effect of Laden's theory on Tully's multinationalism.
In his "Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity", Tully explains that
the relation between national identities cannot be limited by an
aprioristic theoretical model without breaking the linkage between
democracy and legitimacy. In his multinational democracy, he argues
that political theory should focus on how national identities interact
within a democratic community. Even if Tully does not go so far, "
this analysis makes clear the indirect relation between democracy and
nationalism. I concur with Tully when he argues that national
identities with their demands of recognising and protecting the
national community play a role - like all the political movements - in
the deliberative process which is essential to democracy. As I pointed
out earlier, the protection of the right of demanding the recognition of
the national identity is normatively essential to a society in which
there are different national identities only because their political
activities are part of the recognition of cultural and political diversity.
As a consequence, a denial of the right of acknowledging national
identities would make a society democratically incoherent. However,
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Tully's multinationalism does not embrace the full theoretical
consequences of this analysis. Laden's theoretical model is inserted by
Tully in his multinational democracy as a template for finding
political agreements within the process of constitutional recognition of
national identities.
"Indeed, part of what makes a society free
and democratic is reasonable disagreement
among the members and their political
traditions of liberalism, conservatism, socialism,
republicanism, feminism, nationalism,
environmentalism and so on (Rawls 1999,
pp.140-3).
These principles, values and goods comprise
the public, normative warrants members appeal
to in exchanging reasons over the justice and
stability of their conflicting demands for and
against recognition in any case (Rawls 1999,
pp. 129-80; Laden 2001 chs.5-7). """
However, I pointed out that Laden's proposal is not a solution to the
problems of Rawls's political liberalism. Laden's distinction between
non-political identities and citizenship is precarious and the grid of
values and goods remains the homogenising criterion for dividing
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unreasonable from reasonable political claims. I explained that if we
accept Laden's idea of inserting the relationship between identities
into the process of evaluation of political claims, we would move the
object of political accountability of a political demand from the claim
to its formation of a public identity, but Rawls's system of values and
goods remains the substantive - thus antidemocratic - criteria for
aprioristically excluding political claims.
I also made clear that this theoretical reinterpretation of Rawls's
liberalism does not give a better chance to a member of a national
group - such as our Mr. Levi - of obtaining the political recognition of
his identity; instead it simply moves the homogenisation effect it
ought to overcome -to a different stage of the political debate. Once
this effect is clarified, we can see easily that Laden's idea of political
citizenship"9 is not different from Rawls's concept of overlapping
consensus. Both tenets construct a theory in which the political
interaction is based on unquestioned acceptance of the universal
validity of liberal values. Next, they both use these values as a
theoretical base for proposing a procedural theory which ought to give
voice to the people who bear different identities. Finally, the
theoretical system they propose simply reproduces the principles - the
safeguard of basic liberal values - endorsed at the meta-theoretical
level.
329
A. S. Laden, Reasonably Radical: Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2001), A. S. Laden, "Outline of a Theory of Reasonable Deliberation." Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 30/4 (2000), 551-80
208
This template for a democratic society cannot be inserted into Tully's
theory without breaking the connection between the process of
recognition of national identity and democracy. I explained that
multinational democracy relies on two axiological assumptions. First,
all societies are multinational and pluralistic. The fact that we might
find a community ethnically or culturally homogeneous - which is
denied by anthropologists such as Gellner is a theoretical
possibility, but this is irrelevant to the problem of democratically
linking norms to people {demos). Identities are dynamic social
elements which needs to interact with 'their' legal system. This
interaction presupposes recognition.
Second, the process of public recognition is a cardinal aspect of a
legitimate democracy. The debate within a national community can be
an internal discussion which does not have political implications apart
from reinforcing the sense of sharing a common identity. In this case
there is no need for legally recognising the group. The situation
changes in the case of the national community having a political
claim. In this case the community interacts with the rest of the
population and needs to be acknowledged. The problem in this case is
the extension of this acknowledgment. Is this acknowledgment only
formal? Or can we accept that a national community has a juridical
status which allows some derogations to the constitutional system?
For instance can we conceive the possibility that a national
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community may force its members to go to certain schools? Should
we accept that a community demand unilateral secession?
Tully's answer to these questions is to adopt Laden's deliberative
liberalism as the procedure for finding political solutions of the
problems related to the recognition of the national community.
However, the endorsement of Laden's radical liberalism undermines
Tully's thesis.
Tully asserts that: "[T\he constitution includes 'the principles, values
and goods' [Italic on the original text] that are bought to bear on the
identification of members, the relations among them, and the
discussion and alteration of their identities and relations over time.""'
These systems of values and goods shared by the members of national
groups are called into question during the process by changing the
rules of recognition."2 Adopting Laden's idea of reasonableness, Tully
incoherently decreases the level of what is admissible in a democratic
society, which is incoherent with his theoretical idea of political
theory, and reduces the process of self-recognition to a possibility of
having national claims tested against the liberal view. It is precisely
this reluctance to let go of the liberal anchoring of democracy, that
compromises Tully's multinationalism and that is the reason why his
reliance is so problematic.
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J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-35.
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Ibid.in ed/s p.13 E. Christodoulidis, "Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing of Civil
Society." European Law Journal 9/4 (2003), 4001-432
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The endorsement of liberal values cannot be supported even at a
pragmatic level by linking liberalism to the protection of the Human
Rights. We might speculate that Tully is concerned with the protection
of the rights of the Canadian minorities (the French speaking and the
aboriginal people) and he wants to protect them by making a special
case of his theory of political philosophy as a critical activity.33'
However, I would argue that Laden's political liberalism should
respect the priority of the democratic practice, and - more importantly
- should protect the political role of cultural diversity in a modern
society. Adopting this procedural template of democracy, Tully
diminishes the protection ofminority rights and defends the status quo
of the endowed majority. I want to argue that in order to conceive a
theoretical model of the relation between democracy and nationalism,
we must relinquish the assumption that the process of recognition of
national identity can be channelled into a system of procedural rules
which decide what is politically admissible and what is not. This more
radical approach is the theme for next chapter.
333
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CHAPTER 6
OPEN DEMOCRACYAND THE RECOGNITION
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
What is the relation between nationalism and constitutional
democracy? Is it possible - and if it is how - to channel the
nationalistic claims in a legal system? In the first three chapters of the
thesis (Charters: 1 - 3), I argued that nationalism and its claims
contribute to the process which links demos to the legal system. In
chapter four, I suggested that if a democracy wants to include
nationalistic claims, it has to recognise the role played by national
identities in modern society. In chapter five, I explained that the
models of multinational society proposed by theorists such as Tully
and Laden are still unsatisfactory. I argued that the process of
constitutional recognition of national identity cannot be grounded on
the aprioristic protection of liberal values, even in the less invasive
form suggested by Laden. The aprioristic endorsement of liberal
values allows the constitutional recognition of all national identities,
but refuses to accept the political implications of it. However, should
we aprioristically exclude some nationalistic claims, such as the right
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of unilateral secession, since they are incompatible with basic
democratic principles?
The answer I suggest is no. The democratic arena can be opened to
any demand of recognition. I argue that the critiques which consider
this idea 'democratically dangerous' or 'normatively flimsy' are in
fact democratically inconsistent. Constitutional norms can be more
than formally legal only if two normative conditions are satisfied: all
political groups - and this includes national groups - can intervene in
the political debate and any political demand can be discussed.
Obviously, this does not mean that all claims will collect enough
support to become a norm. However, it is only by discussing and
reviewing individuals and group's political inputs that we can attempt
to knit a connection between demos, political decisions and statutes
(leges). I will discuss this process in this chapter. In particular, I will
discuss the pragmatic difficulties and the democratic risks associated
with an open process of recognition.
1. A PRELIMINARY ISSUE: SETTING THE LIMITS OF THE POLITY
There is a preliminary issue that has to be clarified before discussing
the details of the process of recognition of national identity. Who is
entitled to decide over the process of recognition? This question
echoes the debate over the right of national self-determination of the
nation."4 However, discussing the problem of 'who is entitled to
334
In the first chapter, I argued that national self-determination is no a solution to the problem of setting
the limits of the political debate. On the one hand, nationalists do no want to put their trust on the
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decide' over a political claim is a preliminary issue in any democratic
debate which here does has not a specific reason to be discussed. In
modern democracies, we assume that the democratic arena is
composed by all politically active members of the community."5 This
presumption, which solves the preliminary problem of 'deciding who
decides', is unquestioned in the great majority of the debates. For
instance: the debate over the adoption of a norm which makes a
medical vaccine compulsory for children does not normally bring into
question the legitimacy of who is entitled to decide. It would be
different, if the political debate were over the adoption of an official
language in nurseries. In this case, a minority language group might
challenge the legitimacy of a democratic decision on grounds that it is
the only legitimate political group to decide such an issue.
The importance of 'who decides' is obvious when it radically changes
the community's constitutional framework. For instance, the secession
of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom is decided by a
referendum in Northern Ireland: "1) It is hereby declared that
Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom
and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the
principle of majority will that so often have endangered their identity. On the other hand, they cannot
guarantee that they will not pursue the same policy against their internal minorities. This reproduces the
same problem under a different banner, but this is pragmatic point which should not prevent us from
searching a normative solution to the problem of setting the limits of the political arena.
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They are the ones who have a say over the political issues discussed in the political arena. Referendum
is the only case in which citizens who are not Members of the Parliament directly intervene on the
political debate. In all the reaming instances their political power is expressed indirectly. This activity
ranges from the right to vote to the possibility of participating in political campaigns. In this last activity
citizens might be supported by people who are not allowed to vote such as foreigners.
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people ofNorthern Ireland"™' However, 'who is entitled to decide' is
a general problem of any political debate, which is made more
dramatic on the discussion over nationalistic issues. Going back to the
example case of a compulsory vaccine for children, young parents
might refuse the legitimacy of norms approved by a majority who do
not have young children.
The more general implications of this point are discussed by authors
such as Christodoulidis337 and Ost338 who point out the difficulties of
combining norms which decide the limits of the polity and
democracy.1" However, the normative difficulties of deciding who is a
legitimate actor in the political arena cannot be the supporting reason
for aprioristically14" denying claims which want to re-discuss the
state's political borders. This would mean undemocratically using a
theoretical argument for stopping the practice of discussing political
issues (Chapter 4). This idea is endorsed by the Canadian Supreme
Court when it decides over the demand of unilateral secession of
336
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Journal 9/4 (2003), 4001-432 See also: E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1998).
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It the Nature of Law to Last?. (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998).
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Christodoulidis and Ost explain that the relationship between norms and democracy cannot be but
paradoxical. They explain that independently from the process which drives to the formation of a statute,
the validity of its norms can be contested by those subject by it. There are two reasons for this. First,
statutes cannot be supported by a unanimous consensus. Someone will feel left out from the process and
unrepresented by the values inserted in a norm. This exclusion will make norms democratically
unrepresentative of part of the population. A similar point is made by Mouffe - C. Mouffe, "Deliberative
Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" Social Research 66/3 (1999), 745-58, C. Mouffe, The Democratic
Paradox. (London ; New York: Verso, 2000). -. Second, norms are providing some references for our
society which try (but unavoidably fail) to keep up with the ever changing social contest which they want
to regulate. This is the 'time and law paradox' F. Ost and M. Van Hoecke, Temps Et Droit: Le Droit a-T-
II Pour Vocation De Durer? = Time and Law : Is It the Nature of Law to Last?. (Bruxelles: Bruylant,
1998). Ost and Van Hoecke argue that society is a dynamic entity which cannot be chained in a legal
norms without making these unrepresentative.
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Quebec: "[I]/ will be for the population ofQuebec, acting through the
political process, to decide whether or not to pursue secession,"341
Even if the acknowledgement of the political nature of the issues did
not stop the court from analysing the legal implications, it makes clear
that a demand of radically redefining the limits of the polity is a
political issue which must be acknowledged and discussed by those
politically implicated.342 This is so even if one of the entities denies the
role of the others.
2. The openness of the process of recognition of national
identity
Once this preliminary issue of setting the limits of the debate is
clarified, we can return to the main theme of this chapter: how can we
recognise the role of national identities in modern constitutional
democracies? In the introduction, I suggested that a process of
constitutional recognition of multinationalism should be opened to all
national identities and any political demand. I am drawing this idea
from Habermas' earlier idea of communicative democracy."1 In his
theory of communicative action, Habermas argues that the openness
of the communicative debate is one of the essential guarantees of
Reference Re the Secession of Quebec. 1998. Supreme Court of Canada. Available:
htto://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/nub/1998/vol2/html/1998scr2 0217.html. nara.27
342
The extraordinary valence of this decision in relation to the process of constitutional recognition of
national identity is analysed by Tierney.S. Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004 (forthcoming)).
343
J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. (London: Heinemann, 1984). This idea of a
normative relationship can be found in previous works such as J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society :
Student Protest. Science and Politics. (London: Heinemann Educational, 1971), J. Habermas,
Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976). but it is in a theory of communicative action that
Habermas structures his critique of capitalistic society in an alternative model of social cohesion.
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legitimacy and rationality of agreements formed within the political
arena. Even if I explained that some of the conclusions which he
derives from this hypothesis are incongruent with the principle upon
which he builds his theory (Chapter 3), I agree that the openness of the
public debate is an essential element in any democratic discussion. It
is by opening the political debate to any claim, that we can aspire344 to
create a linkage between statutes (legesj and the members of the polity
{demos). However, the idea of not limiting the debate over the
recognition of national identity is problematic. If there are no criteria
for discriminating political claims, how can we evaluate them? Can a
political debate reach rational decisions? Should we exclude extreme
political demands which want to subvert democracy?
These issues can be separated in two groups. On the one hand, we
have the problem of how to make a political debate work as a
decisional process. As I explained in chapter 5, a political arena has to
adopt some criteria for evaluating and rebutting political claims. The
idea of opening the debate to all political demands cannot provide
these criteria. We discussed this problem on our analysis of Laden's
idea of radical liberalism.145 A theory, which does not set absolute and
universal criteria for assessing political claims, is providing relativistic
344
The connection between these two elements is sustained by a practice which can only aspire to achieve
legitimacy. For direct analysis of this point see: E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics.
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), F. Ost and M. Van. Hoecke, Temps Et Droit : Le Droit a-T-11 Pour Vocation
De Purer? = Time and Law : Is It the Nature of Law to Last?. (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998).
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By opening the political arena to any claims we make democracy pragmatically flimsy (Chapter 5). The
use of the adjective pragmatic might confuse the reader; the problem of pragmatic flimsiness of theory is
a 'normative' issue. At first sight, Laden's choice of words seems unfortunate, but it is based on the idea
that any participant into a debate pragmatically needs to set the criteria for measuring the different issues
it intends to discuss. A. S. Laden, "Outline of a Theory of Reasonable Deliberation." Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 30/4 (2000), 551-80 p.571.
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and irrational solutions to political issues. However, by adopting
aprioristic standards of judgement, we falsify the process of
recognition of a national identity. This dilemma cannot be normatively
solved. To make the point clearer let us discuss a pragmatic case in
which the criteria of the debate were aprioristically imposed. During
the process of recognition of the Scottish national identity, the
possibility of discussing the secession of Scotland was excluded by
the members of the convention. This limitation4'' should have reduced
what Laden calls the 'pragmatic flimsiness' (chapter 5) of the debate
since a demand of secession is grounded on the ever-changing
relationship between Scotland and UK central Government (not on
universal criteria).347 However, the aprioristic ruling out of the
demands of secession had the indirect effect of pushing out of the
debate the representatives of the Scottish National Party. This drove
the debate over devolution to an unrepresentative constitutional
agreement.
Let us see the details of this point. Authors like Oliver explains that
before 1999 there was no institutional representation for national
identities within the UK legislative system:
The reasons which supported this limitation are not to be discussed here. See how different authors
elaborate for and against this point: N. MacCormick, "Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish
Independence?" Parliamentary Affairs 53/4 (2000), 721-36, J. E. Murkens, et at, Scottish Independence :
A Practical Guide. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002). For a more general discussion on this
matter: A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. (Indianapolis:
Liberty/Classics, 1982).
347
This is even if nationalists suggest that the connection between state and nation is a universal
requirement of any modern state. I explained that this point cannot be considered a self evident truth.
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"The. unitary, centralized system also
discouraged a sense of 'multiple citizenships'
(Heater 1990 ch.9), in the population. There
was until 1999 almost no political institutions
apart from those at the centre and local
authorities providing the opportunities for
political experimentation or to foster a sense of
belonging to a range of communities \...]There
was confusion, especially among the English,
between Britishness and Englishness.
Many English people thought of England as
being a synonym for Britain. The Scot, the
Welsh, and the members of the two communities
in North Ireland, on the other hand, have a
strong sense of national identity, sometimes
along side and sometimes to the exclusion of, a
sense of Britishness. But these identities could
find almost no expression in formal political
, J48arrangement.
This lack of institutional recognition of the multinational nature of the
British society is not - and was not - a problem of parliamentary
under-representation of Scotland within the UK parliament. Even
348
D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in UK. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).p.242, See also: D.
Heater, Citizenship. The Civic Ideal in the World History, Politics and Education. (London: Longman,
1990).
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before the process of devolution went into its executive phase, the
entities that Sloat calls Scottish elites (e.g. representatives of the
Scottish industries, the Convention of the Scottish Local Authorities,
Scottish Local Government Office, etc.) were confident about the
adequacy of the Scottish political representation within the UK
parliamentary system - and within the European Union However,
adequate democratic representation in the parliament does not
guarantee the constitutional recognition of a national identity. In the
case of the United Kingdom, Scottish nationalists argued that the
British constitutional system bluntly undermined their identity.
The New Labour's executive acknowledged this lacuna in the UK
constitutional system and favoured a process of institutional
recognition of the UK's national identities. In Scotland this process
started with a Constitutional Convention and ended with the approval
of the Scotland Act 1998.'" However, the democratic openness of the
process, which guided the reform of the institutional recognition of the
Scottish identity, was limited since the start by an aprioristic exclusion
349
A. Sloat Scotland in the European Union (Brussels: Scotland Europe, 2001).See also: A. Brown, et at,
Politics and Society in Scotland. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996)., D. McCrone, Understanding Scotland
: The Sociology of a Nation. (London: Routledge, 2001), S. Bulmer and M. Burch, "Organizing for
Europe: Whitehall, the British State and European Union." Public Administration 76/4 (1998), 601-28, D.
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Parliament with Tax-Varying Powers Was Less Emphatic." Public Finance (1997), 16-19, G. Scott, "Two
Nations?: After Devolution, the Scottish Parliament Will Have Some Influence over NHS Policy and
Funding." Bma News Review (1998), 19, M. Raco, "Governmentality, Subject-Building, and the
Discourses and Practices of Devolution in the UK" Transactions- Institute of British Geographers 28/1
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The Scotland Act 1998. In contrast with what Tully suggests in his theory of multinational ism the
institutional phase of the process of recognition of Scottish identity within the United Kingdom included
the referendum only after the legislative approval but this is a pragmatic detail which does not change the
normative aspect of a general theory of multinationalism.
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of the right of secession of Scotland imposed by the convention.'5' The
aprioristic limitation of the political debate made a direct impact on
the first phase of the process of recognition that took place without the
participation of the political stance - the Scottish National Party - that
prompted the re-discussion of the role of Scotland within the Union.
In spite of its unofficial status the convention saw the participation of
80% of the Scottish MPs and it prepared de facto a political blue print
for the Scottish devolution.'52
However, the Conservatives and the Scottish National Party - which
are the two parties that consider themselves respectively the protectors
of British and Scottish identity - refused to participate in the works of
the convention. The reason suggested by the Tories for snubbing the
convention was related to the weakening of the Union, whereas the
reason given by the SNP was that independence was not on the agenda
of the Constitutional Convention. The lack of participation on the first
phases of the debate over changing the rules of recognition does not
damage the coherence of the process, since the principle of openness
of the political arena demands that no one should be forced to
participate in the political debate. The Conservatives wanted to protect
the interests of the Union and therefore in the case of the Scottish
Constitutional Convention they were refusing to get involved in the
The reasons, which supported the insertion of this limitation, are irrelevant to the point I try to make
here.
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D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in UK. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).p.258 For a brief
history of the Scottish Conventions see; M. Keating, "So Many Nations, So Few States: Territory and
Nationalism in the Global Era", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39-65.
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discussion - in a political arena that would see them as a powerless
minority - over the reduction of the role of British identity they were
bound to uphold. This response by the Conservatives is within the
theoretical limits of open democracy. As Tully explains in his theory
of constitutional multinationalism, the process of struggling for and
against recognition is 'multilogical'" and thus the Conservative's self-
exclusion from the process of constitutional recognition of the
Scottish identity could be considered a political response.
However, the same reasoning cannot be applied to the SNP's boycott
of Scottish Constitutional Convention, since their self-exclusion was
supported by the aprioristic exclusion of a political claim from the
political debate."4 Apart from the irony ofmaking two political parties
which in theory defend cosmopolitan ideas - New Labour and the
Liberal Democratic Party"5 - the only active political entities on the
J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1 -35.p.20
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In this case, Tully would argue that this refusal to participate in the Constitutional Convention does not
change the political significance of the Convention for the people of Scotland since the demand of
external national self-determination is unreasonable within a constitutional system. Again, he supports
this point with his personal reading of the Canadian Constitutional Court decision over the secession of
Quebec. "International Law holds that the right ofself-determination of the people ofpeoples should be
exercised normally within existing constitutional states. This is called the right of 'internal self-
determination. It consists in a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state' (SC 1998, para. 126). Apart from oppressed and colonial
people, it is only if internal self-determination that they are said to have a right to 'external self-
determination': that is, to activate the right of secede (SC 1998, para.134). Ibid.in ed/s p.31 He argues
that there are two different claims of self-determination of the nation. The "external\ which demands
independence and the creation of a new state (with a new constitution and new institutions) and the
"internal', which demands the reform of the existing constitutional rules of recognition. Tully asserts that
only a claim of internal right of self-determination is admissible in a constitutional system. At first sight,
this seems a misinterpretation of the court's position over Quebec demand in the international law, but
Tully is making a theoretical point, which has little to do with the relationship between nationalism and
international law. He argues that the Scottish National Party's decision not to participate - on the ground
that external self-determination was not on the agenda - did not affect the legitimacy of the outcomes of
the process of recognition because Scottish Nationalistic demands were incompatible with basic
democratic principles. For a full version of the Canadian Supreme Court Decision see: D. Scheneiderman,
The Quebec Decision. (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999). and Reference Re the Secession of Quebec. 1998,
Supreme Court of Canada, Available: http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-
scc/en/pub/1998/vol2/html/l 998scr2_0217.html.
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We have already seen in the first chapter that New Labour embraces the so-called third way. On the
one hand, it supports cosmopolitanism as an unavoidable trend of modernity. On the other hand, it
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dialogue over the constitutional recognition of Scottish identity, the
limits of nationalistic claims reveals the anti-democratic effect of
excluding political claims from a debate over the constitutional
recognition of national identity. This lead to a political agreement
unsupported by a part of the Scottish population. This antidemocratic
effect is not reduced by the referendum. During the political campaign
which preceded it, the SNP took a political position on the "yes or no"
debate. However, the act which creates the Scottish Parliament was
the result of a process which aprioristically excluded a political stance.
This example gives a clear indication of the effects of setting
aprioristic criteria in a process of recognition: standards of evaluation
do not reinforce the coherence of the decisions taken by the political
debate; they only make them democratically precarious.
a) Democratic risks and normative flimsiness
The second problem related to the idea of opening of the debate over
recognition has to do with the possible consequences of accepting any
political claims. The lack of restraint on what is acceptable in a
democratic arena might alter the basic democratic principles which
underpin democracy. Laden points out that if we allow all claims into
considers nationalistic demands as a sociological feature which a political party has to accommodate. In
comparison with the New Labours, the policy of the Liberal democrats is clearer. They are
unquestionably committed to traditional liberal values (freedom, equality and reduction of government
intervention on economy) and consider cultural diversity as an element of any democratic society which
might be supported if it reduces the level of centralisation of state's power. See for instance:
The Scottish Liberal Democrats' Manifesto, (2001), available:
URL:httn://www. scotlibdems.org.uk/manifestos/ge2001/index.htm.
However, it would be a mistake to consider liberal democrats committed to a form of sedated British
nationalism. Their attitude toward nationalistic claims is truly cosmopolitan, and it is proved by their pro-
European position. See for instance: The Scottish Liberal Democrats' European Election Manifesto,
(2003) http://www.scotlibdems.org.uk/manifestos/nre2004/index.htm.
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the political arena, we might have cases in which an antidemocratic
proposal collects enough political support for making the electorate
degenerate into demagogy or dictatorship.3"' He calls this problem the
'normative flimsiness' from a theory cut adrift of substantive values
since it is normatively illogical to accept political inputs which want
to destroy the democratic arena. We saw earlier (chapter 5) how
Laden tries - but fails - to solve these problems by proposing a
procedural system which aprioristically decides which political
entities are allowed into the political debate.
This - again - seems another dilemma of the process of recognition of
a national identity. On the one hand, we are all concerned when
political entities put forward claims that endanger the foundations of
our democracies. Should we accept a claim that politically excluded
black people supported by the idea that this is the only way we can
protect a white national minority? Should we accept that female
members of a nation have no political rights since this conforms to the
tradition of that national identity? " Should we reject democracy and
adopt a military regime on the grounds that this better represents our
national aspiration?3" On the other hand, aprioristic limitations of the
political arena de facto exploit the process that sustains democracy. If
the process of recognition of national identity is limited by some
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A. S. Laden, "Outline of a Theory of Reasonable Deliberation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30/4
(2000), 551-80p.572
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This question is often seen on the debate over the protection of original inhabitants of former colonies.
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The referendum which annexed Austria to Hitler's Germany is an historical example of how a
democratic community can democratically decide to degenerate into a dictatorship.
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broad procedural limitations,1" national identities will appear
unrepresented by the decisions taken by the political arena.
There are two possible answers to this dilemma. The first is to
consider it a risk that a democracy has to take if it wants to maintain
the connection between people, democracy and legal systems. We saw
the details of this point in chapter 3 when I rejected Habermas' idea of
aprioristically excluding nationalistic claims. Theoretically, this seems
like the only solution, but it does not reduce the risks associated with
an open process of recognition; instead, it accepts it as an unavoidable
element of modern democracy.
The second answer to the dilemma of protecting democracy without
limiting its political decisions is to reconsider the democratic principle
of majority will. I draw this idea from Kymlicka's analysis of the
relationship between democracy and multinational states: "[T\here is
more than one political community, and [...] the authority ofa larger
state cannot be assumed to take precedence over the authority of the
constituent national communities.Kymlicka suggests that a
democratic majority cannot be used for imposing decisions on a
national minority that has democratically decided against that
particular choice. This prospective seems endorsed by institutions
such as the Canadian Supreme Court:
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Such as the ones proposed by Habermas and Tully
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"The negotiation process precipitated by a
decision of a clear majority of the population of
Quebec on a clear question to pursue secession
would require the reconciliation of various
rights and obligations by the representatives of
two legitimate majorities, namely, the clear
majority of the population of Quebec, and the
clear majority of Canada as a whole, whatever
that may be. There can be no suggestion that
either of these majorities "trumps" the other. A
political majority that does not act in
accordance with the underlying constitutional
principles we have identified puts at risk the
legitimacy ofthe exercise of its rights.
At first sight, this solution does not solve the problem of the
'normative flimsiness' of the process of recognition. We still have the
possibility that a claim gathers enough political consensus to change a
democratic political system into an antidemocratic regime. In other
words, there are no guarantees that an internal decision supported by a
unanimous majority would not make a democracy degenerate into a
dictatorship. However, the possibility of having a unanimous
consensus over a political issue is explicitly excluded in the
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Reference Re the Secession of Quebec. 1998. Supreme Court of Canada. Available:
http://vvww.lexutn.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/Dub/1998/vol2/html/1998scr2 0217.html. para. 93
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presuppositions of this thesis that considered the process of
recognition of national identity as an antagonistic process supported
by a culturally differentiated society (chapter 3-4).
If this issue is put aside, there are another two problems with
Kymlicka's idea. First, it seems to support a 'dictatorship of the
minorities' where any decisional process can be stopped by a minority
group. This is again a practical possibility; a national minority might
intervene (or refuse to do so) in the political debate with only the
intention of disrupting the democratic process. We saw in the example
of the Scottish Devolution how the Tories refused to intervene into the
debate over the recognition of the Scottish identity with the obvious
intention of eroding the political support to the constitutional
convention. However, a strategic boycott of the constitutional
convention is a political rejection of its political agenda. The reasons
which motivate this rejection should be discussed in the democratic
arena. Second, this hypothesis in which minority and majority groups
have to agree over a particular issue seems highly theoretical.
However, the process of recognition of Northern Irish national
identities follows a similar scheme with positive result. The Northern
Ireland political arena is extremely diversified but it can be defined
along the lines of the ethnic separation between two national groups.
On the one hand, there is the Irish minority which wants the
unification of Ulster with the Republic of Ireland. On the other hand,
however, there are the British nationalists who want to maintain a
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close linkage with Great Britain. The ethnic tension between the two
communities escalated in a civil war which ended (at least for the
majority of the population) with the Belfast Agreement."'2 The
Northern Irish process of recognition of the two identities started with
a constitutional convention"3 that included the full spectrum of the
Northern Irish political arena and ended with three referenda (one
each of the Northern Irish communities and one in the Republic)
which endorsed the Belfast Agreement. Notwithstanding that the
relationships between different national identities were extremely
tense, and all parties had the possibility to halt the recognition process,
they reached a common agreement.3"4 As I explained in the first three
The division between the two groups became acute during the sixties when it supported an armed
conflict between the two factions. The strategic support of the two groups by Ireland and the United
Kingdom did little to reduce the scale of the conflict. For the great majority of the Northern Irish
population, this conflict ended in May 1998 with the positive endorsement of the Belfast or "Good
Friday" Agreement. In contrast with the Scottish devolution, Northern Ireland had its own parliament
since 1922, but its activity was suspended in 1972 due to sectarian violence After the suspension, the
United Kingdom parliament approved the Northern Ireland Constitutional Act 1973 which prohibited
parts of the province to leave the United Kingdom without: previous authorisation of the Northern Irish
parliament, and a referendum which involves the entire population of the province. After 1974, Northern
Irish parliament was able to operate only for a brief period, the devolution process was suspended and the
province was administered directly by the UK central government. The Belfast Agreement is available on
line: URL: http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/agreement.htm .
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S. O'Neill, "Mutual Recognition and Accommodation of National Diversity: Constitutional Justice in
Northern Ireland", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 223- 56. See also: D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in UK. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
364
This idea of proportional political representation of national identities has carried on the administrative
setting of the region since the agreement obliges the Northern Irish Executive to coordinate its policies
with representatives of all the representative of Northern Irish political entities. The first strand of the
agreement provides that: "There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can
participate and work together successfully in the operation ofthese institutions and that all sections ofthe
community are protected, including :a)allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee
membership in proportion to party strengths. " (1998). The Northern Ireland Act 1998. para. 5. Available
on I ine:URL:http://www.nio. gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/agreement.htm. The second discusses the
relationship between North and South of Ireland, and the third controls the rapport between the Republic
of Ireland and the United Kingdom. In both strands, there are provisions for making the Ministerial and
the British-Irish councils. Even if the role of the two institutions are quite different, their aim is to
coordinate policies which have effect across the community and state borders of the different communi¬
ties The North/South Ministerial Council and the "Council of the Isles" - as the British Irish Council is
colloquially known - have the task to harmonise policies in devolved matters like social inclusion,
economy, the environment, trade and business development, etc. -. This makes the two organisations
representative of the interests of the Irish national identities - not the interests of the UK or the Irish state
-. The valence of the agreement is not reduced by the pragmatic difficulties on issues such as IRA's
weapons decommission. The deadlock on this debate - like on many others - has brought to a halt the
devolution process. For many reasons this is unfortunate, nonetheless it is part of the instability of the
agreements related to the dynamic process of recognition of identity. However, the review of previous
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chapters, we cannot derive a normative point from the analysis of a
single process of recognition; however we can consider some of the
pragmatic effects that the equality of majorities had on a process of
recognition of national identities. First, a comparative analysis of two
UK processes of recognition of national identities reveals how the
Northern Irish one has enhanced the protection of basic democratic
values.365 We do no need to debate the details of this point, since we
cannot know how the accord would have been if the parts involved
had adopted the principle of the rule of one majority. Second, and
most importantly, the Belfast agreement is democratically supported
by all groups involved. Again we cannot draw from an analysis a
single case a general principle, but it gives some indication of the
practical possibilities of this idea.
decisions taken is part of the dynamic of the process of recognition of national identities, and it should
come as no surprise that it has happened and it will happen again (chapter 4). We have to remember that
national identities are dynamic political entities that cannot be tied up in an unmovable political
agreement. This should not detract from the fact that an open democratic debate - part of an open process
of recognition of national identity - has managed to create a legitimate linkage between identities that
apparently did not have any desire to share any political decisions.
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In the Belfast Agreement, the endorsement of Human Rights starts from the 1 .para of the declaration
of support and continues trough out the text. For instance in Strand one, Democratic institutions insert the
European Convention on Human Rights for safeguarding the democratic process on the province. (1998),
The Northern Ireland Act 1998. para. 1; 5. Available on line: URL:
http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/agreement.htm This is, even if we read this increase of the
democratic protection of the Northern Irish communities as a constitutional entrenchment of Human
Rights. D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in UK. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). As I made in
chapters 3, 5, National identities - or other political entities - can demand the enforcement of Human
Rights for protecting their identities. The requirement of openness of the debate over recognition does not
prevent national communities from proposing and adopting policies grounded on Human Rights theories,
or indeed other substantial political analyses. It is a mistake to confuse the exclusion of any aprioristic
criteria for evaluating political demands endorsed in this thesis with their admissibility in the political
arena as underpinning reason for a political claim. The openness of the process of recognition, which I so
strongly advocated against Habermas and fully, is a theoretical requirement of the political debate which
has nothing to do with the national group's strategic protection of their identity. However, we should not
assume that the protection of Human Rights is an aprioristic requirement of the process of recognition of
national identities. As I argued before, this idea eschews democracy.
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b) The role of constitutional courts in the process of
recognition of national identity
In the previous sections, we discussed the two normative problems of
opening the process of recognition of national identity. I answered that
the pragmatic flimsiness of an open debate cannot be theoretically
solved. Instead, we have to rely on the democratic arena for deciding
the criteria to use for recognising the political role of a national
identity. I also suggested that the risks of opening the process of
recognition might be accepted as a 'price to pay' for maintaining the
democratic coherence of our theory, or might be controlled by
endorsing the equivalence of majorities'"' which is the idea suggested
by Kymlicka'"7 and endorsed by the Canadian Supreme Court."'* The
court in its 'Reference re Secession of Quebec' explains that the will
expressed by the majority of the Canadian population cannot eclipse
the majority will of the Quebecois, but it limits their demands to the
respect of basic principles of a modern constitutional democracy:
'federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and
respect for minoritiesThe extraordinary valence of this decision
might suggest that jurisdictional entities should be inserted as
independent referees into an open process of recognition of national
This last hypothesis cannot be explored here since its account would need a comparative sociological
analysis of the effects of different processes on the recognition of national identity.
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W. Kymlicka, "Is Federalism an Alternative to Secession?" in ed/s P. B. Lehning, Theories of
Secession. (London: Routledge, 1998), x, 262.
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identity. This should provide a protection against antidemocratic
abuses and help to solve the problem of normative flimsiness (we
discussed in the previous section). However, the duty of a
Constitutional Court is to uphold the constitution, not to police the
political arena.
There are two reasons for denying a role to the constitutional court in
a process of recognition of a national identity. First, courtrooms are
not a substitute of the democratic forum. While courts can guarantee
political rights they cannot serve as vehicles of a democratic dialogue
(as sometimes suggested, e.g. Michelman""), they use the legal system
as reference for responding to questions they are bound to answer and
therefore their analysis of a political claim is aprioristically restricted
by previous political decisions. By adopting this procedure a society
becomes divided between those who manage to make legitimate
claims by linking them up to pre-existing legal norms and those who
cannot. As Christodoulidis points out, and he quotes Luhmann's
Social Systems"' to support his idea, legal institutions settle legal
indeterminacy 'by' using the legal system 'for' the legal system"2.
See for instance: F. I. Michelman, "Terry Firma: Background Democracy and Constitutional
Foundations." Michigan Law Review 99/8 (2001), 1827-52, F. I. Michelman, "The Problem of
Constitutional Interpretative Disagreement", in ed/s M. Aboulafia, et al., Habermas & Pragmatism.
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2002),
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N. Luhmann, Social Systems. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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E. Christodoulidis, "Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing ofCivil Society." European Law
Journal 9/4 (2003), 4001-432 See also: E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics. (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1998). and N. Luhmann, Social Systems. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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"The ambit of all that can be contested is
delimited by institutional categories that
determine the who, the how and then when of
constitutional politics. [...] To the extent that
constitutional theorists, from Habermas to Tully,
elevate law into the centrepiece of social
deliberation, they do establish the possibility of
a meaningful argumentation in context, but at
the cost of remaining reflexive over the
contextual conditions [Italic on the original
text]. Legal argumentation as practical
discourse is always-already disciplined by'
[Italic on the original text] the contextual
conditions, therefore no longer reflexive about'
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[Italic on the original text] them. "
In contrast to this point, authors such as Tully argue that a
constitutional account of a political claim and the democratic praxis
are equivalent. From this hypothesis, he derives that the limitations
adopted for discussing legality and admissibility of nationalistic
claims can be extended to the democratic debate. "[I]/ there are
peoples or nations in the constitutional association, then the
constitution ofmultinational democracies must find a way to reconcile
E. Christodoulidis, "Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing ofCivil Society." European Law
Journal 9/4 (2003). 4001-432p. 413: 415. IMv Emphasisl
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their exercise of the right ofself-determination with the requirements
of [constitutional] unity and with the other forms of diversity in the
association" m However, considering the unity of the legal system as a
limitation of the democratic debate is democratically incoherent. In
this respect, the Canadian Supreme Court seems more aware than
Tully of the political nature of the Quebecois demand of secession.
"[T]/zc Court's primary concern is to retain
its proper role within the constitutional
framework of our democratic form of
government. [...] In considering its appropriate
role the Court must determine whether the
question is purely political in nature and
should, therefore, be determined in another
forum or whether it has a sufficient legal
component to warrant the intervention of the
judicial branch.5
Not only has the court itself-limited its competence to the legal
implications of a demand of unilateral secession, but also argued that
it cannot interfere with the negotiation process:
My emphasis: J. Tully, "Introduction", in ed/s J. Tully and A. Gagnon, Multinational Democracies.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), l-35.p.31
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My Emphasis. Reference Re the Secession of Quebec. 1998. Supreme Court ofCanada.
Available:httn://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/nub/1998/vol2/html/1998scr2 0217.html. . para.26
The court continues in para. 28. "As to the "legal" nature of the questions posed, if the Court is of the
opinion that it is being asked a question with a significant extralegal component, it may interpret the
question so as to answer only its legal aspects; if this is not possible, the Court may decline to answer
the question. In the present Reference the questions may clearly be interpreted as directed to legal issues,
and, so interpreted, the Court is in a position to answer them."
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"The Court has no supervisory role over the political
aspects of constitutional negotiations. Equally, the initial
impetus for negotiation, namely a clear majority on a
clear question in favour of secession, is subject only to
political evaluation, and properly so. \...]Only the
political actors would have the information and expertise
to make the appropriate judgment as to the point at
which, and the circumstances in which, those ambiguities
are resolved one way or the other. "
At first sight, it seems ironic that an argument against the idea of using
a constitutional court in a process of recognition is provided by a
court's decision. However, it is part of the court to assess its own
competences and limiting his analysis to the mandate given to it by the
constitution.
Second, a nationalistic claim which wants to radically change the
institutional framework of a community - such as the one of unilateral
secession - cannot be analysed by a constitutional court. As
Christodoulidis explains in his analysis of the relation between
constitutional pluralism and temporality we cannot expect a
constitutional institution to re-discuss its foundations.
Ibid, para 100
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"In temporal terms the much elaborated
problem of reconciling constitutionalism to the
democratic imperative might be put like this: the
democratic imperative requires that the
current' [Italic on the original text] voice ofthe
people register as binding law for the
future '[Italic on the original text]. And yet to
register as such a democratic voice
simultaneously requires a prior 'scheme of
interpretation' (Kelsen's words) to give it its
meaning as law.
The issue, here, is not whether the Canadian Supreme Court or other
jurisdictional institutions might allow the Quebecois unilateral
secession or not, but whether national communities can be limited in
their quest for recognition by an institution like the Canadian Supreme
Court. If a theory of multinational democracy is taken to its logical
extreme, the answer should be negative. A court draws its decisional
power from the constitutional norms and cannot limit a political
redrawing of these norms. This is more evident in the case a polity
decides to change - in a radical sense - these norms and create a new
democratic constitutional entity since the new state cannot be bound to
E. Christodoulidis, "Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing of Civil Society." European Law
Journal 9/4 (2003), 4001-432p.418 Again I have to stress that this point is made here to criticise Tully's
angle on multinationalism not the whole theory. The democratic phases - internal, external and
institutional - which form the back bone of the process of recognition of national identity in multinational
society are unaffected by denying the involvement of a constitutional court and its evolution of the non
violation of liberal rights.
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the decision of the one it used to be part. This point, again, is clearly
acknowledged by the Canadian Supreme Court."8
378
Reference Re the Secession ofQuebec. 1998. Supreme Court ofCanada. Para. 100
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CONCLUSION
I structured our debate over the role of nationalism in modern
democracy in two parts. The first part (chapter 1 - 3) focuses on the
various theories that support nationalism and cosmopolitanism. As we
saw in chapter 2, both points are based on unverifiable assumptions.
On the one hand, cosmopolitans such as Habermas"' and Ignatief8"
argue that nationalism is dangerous political phenomenon. They argue
the concept of national identity is grounded on sets ofmental images™
that create an irrational sense of belonging to the national community.
Historically, these images have been endorsed by political parties for
implementing policies of racial and ethnic segregation. Thus, a polity
that cares for the protection of its democratic values should rule out
nationalistic claims from democracy. On the other hand, nationalists
such as, Canovan,™ MacCormick,™ Miller,™ and Smith™ argue that
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J. Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
ed/s P. De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999),
: 105 - 27, J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation : Political Essays. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
2001), J. Habermas, "On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of Law and Democracy", in ed/s P.
De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 128 -
53.
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M. Ignatieff, Blood & Belonging : Journeys into the New Nationalism. (London: Vintage, 1994), M.
Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. (London: Vintage, 1999).
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This idea is drawn from B. Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread
ofNationalism. (London: Verso, 1983).
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M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).
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N. MacCormick, Can Nationalism Be Intellectually Respectable?. 1991), N. MacCormick,
Questioning Sovereignty Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
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D. Miller, On Nationality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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the political stability of modern democracy is based on nationalism.
This gives to nationalistic claims a special status which makes them
incomparable with other political entities. It is - nationalists argue -
the loyalty to the national groups which morally and politically
underpin the validity of the decisions taken by the political arena.
These analyses seem completely different, yet they have something in
common. First, these proposals consider the finds historical accounts
as axiologicaf"' (i.e. historically nationalism is a dangerous political
movement) and they use them to support their claims (i.e. nationalism
should be excluded from democracy). However, I explained that both
cosmopolitan and nationalistic demands are based on a relativistic
analysis of the role of nationalism in modern society. These analyses
cannot be used to support normative claims such as an aprioristic
exclusion of national identities from democracy or an unquestioned
endorsement of nationalistic claim (chapter 2-3). Why is this? There is
a direct relationship between the practice of discussing political claims
and democracy. A political theory cannot aprioristically exclude
political entities - or its political claims - except at the cost of
1 387
democracy.
I tried to show that the first phase in any democratic debate, which
involves national groups, is the recognition of their identity. National
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A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971), A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), A, D. Smith, Nationalism : Theory, Ideology. History.
(Cambridge: Polity Press ; Blackwell, 2001).
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In the case of Ignatief and Anderson, a psychological analysis is used for underpinning their thesis.
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I explained that from a democratic point of view, we cannot differentiate between nationalist claims
and a chess club's demands. Both claims are equal and their validity should be discussed in a political
arena.
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identities should be constitutionally recognised as one of the elements
of a modern pluralistic society that contribute with their political
claims to the democratic practice of making political decisions. By
constitutionally acknowledging the role of national identities in
modern society, we prevent their exclusion from the political arena on
the ground that they are irrational social phenomena. I use the
example of the protection of religious (chapter 3) freedom endorsed in
all modern constitutions that allows debates over political claims
proposed by religious groups without questioning the rational basis of
their beliefs. This increases the number of political discussions which
enter the democratic arena. Given that there is a direct link between
the level of participation in political debates and democracy, the
protection of freedom of faith indirectly increases the democratic
coherency of political decisions. I suggested on similar ground one
should support the recognition of national identities. However, the
process of recognition of national identities is problematic; how can
modern constitutional democracy accommodate ethnocentric political
claims? Can we allow nationalistic demands that discriminated against
women or immigrants? Should a white national minority discriminate
against a black majority for protecting its identity? Should we allow a
national group to use the political arena for amplifying racist
demands?
I answered these questions in the second part of the thesis. I suggested
that we cannot limit these demands without making the process of
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recognition of national identity pointless (chapter 4-6). This idea,
which is summarised in the principle of the openness of the
democratic debate, is drawn from Habermas' theory of communicative
democracy. Again, it seems a little ironic that I have drawn from
Habermas' analysis an argument in favour of allowing nationalistic
claims into the political arena, but, the reasons which support my idea
of opening the political arena are quite different. The idea of openness
suggested in this thesis guarantees the democratic coherence of the
process of recognition of national identities; whereas Habermas'
openness is a procedural requirement of his theory of constitutional
patriotism which wants the aprioristic exclusion of irrational
nationalistic claims from the political arena. I made it clear (with the
example of a debate between a Jewish settler and a Palestinian
landowner) that a political debate cannot be open, if we use previous
political decisions for deciding which entity is allowed into a
democratic debate. This process eschews democracy.
Can a national identity use the political arena for amplifying
antidemocratic political demands? This is a delicate issue since a
debate over a racist claim proposed by a national group produces its
dividing effects in a community without the need of political approval.
For instance, an Italian political party, the Lega Nord which demand s
the independence of North Italy, has used the protection of political
freedom in a relentless campaign against the inhabitants of southern
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Italy whom are portrayed as lazy and dishonest. *8 Should we allow
these political claims in a modern constitutional dem°cracy? To this
problem there are no easy theoretical answers: I explained that
constitutional courts can protect rights but cannot decide over the
admissibility of political claims nor set a procedure which precludes
the democratic evaluation of political demands (chapter 5). However,
the solution suggested by Kymlicka and endorsed by the Canadian
Supreme Court might help limit the antidemocratic effects of these
claims."[T]m> legitimate majorities, namely, the clear majority of the
population of Quebec, and the clear majority of Canada as a whole,
whatever that may be. There can be no suggestion that either of these
majorities "trumps" the other. "m This idea seems highly theoretical,
but it has been endorsed during the process of recognition of the
Northern Irish national identities and might provide an attractive
model for a polity which recognises the democratic role of national
identities but wants to protect the political arena from the abuses of
antidemocratic groups.
In 1990s the campaign of the Lega Nord used the finding of a group of investigators (which drove to
the resignation of 70% of the MPs) for denouncing the chronic level of corruption of the Italian central
government based in Rome. Firstly they won the administrative election in Milan (1992), then (1997)
they joined a coalition which won the national political election. If we exclude the brief parenthesis of
Prof. Prodi's executive, the Lega Nord has been the second most influential political party (with
Berlusconi's Liberal Party) on the Italian executive for the past 7 years.
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